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Helen Goodman, Bernadette V. Russo and Joana Zózimo 
 
Listen closely. Can you hear the echoes of their cries resounding in the night, or 
is it the accusing shrieks of the condemning? Perhaps it is the outrage of the 
masses at such weakness… Or is it their fear? Madness: a diagnosis, a label, a 
construction of power, and, for some, a life sentence of isolation. This volume is an 
interdisciplinary compilation of the scholarly dialogue and inquiry presented 
during the 5th Global Conference on Madness. 
The Making Sense Of: Madness is but one aspect of the Inter-Disciplinary.Net 
organisation. Founded by Dr. Robert Fisher in 1999 with the vision of creating a 
space for research and knowledge to grow unencumbered by the commodification 
of education, Inter-Disciplinary.Net is a non-profit organisation based on two 
primary principles: all member contributions are given equal status in dialogue, 
thereby promoting an atmosphere conducive to the free exchange of ideas; and, the 
purpose of engagement is to establish self-sustaining communities of dialogue. For 
this reason, empirical research into the nature, perceptions, and constructions of 
madness are presented in the same arena as personal narratives that express the 
depths of existence within the realm of madness. 
Through the efforts of Dr. Fisher and a dedicated staff of volunteer scholars, the 
Making Sense Of: Madness is made possible. The product of an interdisciplinary 
exchange spanning four days, this volume is a collection of those voices joined in a 
dialogue that dares to probe the questions of madness. The order in which the 
editors’ names appear throughout the volume is alphabetical as all three editors 
were involved in its creation and shared the editing duties equally. We all invite 
you to come, join us as we explore, consider, and probe the boundaries of 
madness. 
The conference papers, and the resulting e-book chapters published here, 
engage critically with a number of historical and contemporary themes. This 
volume also looks towards the future of this subject, considering current 
developments, and the lessons of madness which may be learned. Given the 
wonderful and vast array of different perspectives on madness presented at the 
conference, this volume is divided into three sections, each concerned with distinct 
but connected fields of research. Within each part, the chapters are arranged in 
chronological order of the material they discuss, to give a sense of the development 
of each field over time. These sections reflect the Inter-Disciplinary Network 
project theme, Making Sense Of, and aim to illuminate the fascinating and rich 
subject of madness using different approaches.  
Part I, on making sense of madness through Society and Social Policy, begins 
with a discussion of nineteenth-century colonial policy on lunatic asylums, before 
moving through 1950s New Rhetoric theory and discussions of studies of mental 
health and social policy across the world in recent years, and concluding with 
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discussions of the lay and medical approaches and the implications of the 
forthcoming fifth edition of the DSM (The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders). The section begins by addressing the following question: How 
can a madman still produce an organised discourse? In the first chapter, Angélica 
María Franco Laverde gives us some theoretical insights on how to understand 
this. Drawing from 1958 Perelman-Olbrechts’ New Rhetoric (or Argumentative 
Theory), she addresses President Schreber’s case from two of his works in which 
he tries to demonstrate how his illness has not affected his rational and logical 
abilities. Can madness be a form of reality, when by reality we mean a logical and 
organised one? Laverde’s chapter gives powerful and innovative clues on how mad 
reasoning can fulfil the gap left by social-constructed sanity, and still preserve the 
mad person’s intellectual capacities. Indeed, as she applies the analytic tools of 
New Rethoric to psychopathology, she is therefore able to show that Schreber’s 
discourse(s), a man kept in an Asylum for several years, did not lack a logical or 
rational structure as typical clichés about madness would state. 
Emma Tseris’ chapter is an incredible contribution towards exposing the effects 
of extreme victimisation - put forward by social workers and psychiatrists in 
particular, but by western societies as a whole - of young abused women. As Tseris 
intelligently puts it, the social construction of traumatised adolescent girls derives 
from a deterministic paradigm that medicalises and confines these young women to 
the powerless role of victims, hence underlining and pushing even further the 
violence previously exercised on them. Drawing from her experience as a social 
worker and interviews conducted with women who have experienced trauma and 
with other social work colleagues, Tseris addresses the gender inequality that 
justifies violence inflicted on women, the strive to determine a diagnostic 
classification in therapeutical contexts, and the psychiatrisation it may lead to.  
This section’s third chapter, written by Frances Davies, examines the link 
between self-harming behaviour and creativity, casting some light on a frequent 
and historical association between madness and creative process. Davies designed 
a quasi-experimental project, using an online survey to collect precious data from 
non-clinical settings, with two different groups of self-harmers and a control group 
of non self-harmers. Presenting quality data on self-harmers’ attitudes, this chapter 
delivers analysis on the actual differences among those three different types of 
people towards creative activities, and gives some important clues that will allow 
for future investigation to escape common assumptions, which portray self-
harmers as a fairly homogeneous group and therefore may overlook the diversity 
of people composing this category. 
In their chapter, Mira Marcinów and Fátima Alves compare lay rationalities 
regarding madness in Poland and Portugal, giving us the rare opportunities that 
only comparative studies can give. Exploring qualitative data from a recent project, 
born from last year’s Madness 4 Conference, Marcinów and Alves discuss both 
modern and traditional representations of mental suffering, revealing very 
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interesting information on how the medicalisation process shapes Polish and 
Portuguese explanations about people who suffer with mental illness. Specially 
concerned with the plurality of social processes that create discourses and attitudes 
towards mental health and illness, these authors strive to stress the legitimacy of 
lay people rationales as forms of practical knowledge that interfere in social reality 
autonomous from science. Actually, this chapter clearly shows how lay people 
incorporate and reproduce medical classifications of mental illness to later use 
them according to their own logic and priorities. Hence, as the authors describe, 
not denying psychiatric knowledge on mental suffering, lay people tend to use it 
independently, directing their explanations of madness in a way that so often 
contradicts the technical background from which was acquired.  
The fifth chapter of Part I approaches the matter of chronic mental illness, from 
the point of view of people living with major depression diagnoses. Cecília Neto 
and Fátima Alves bring us the results of a qualitative study that, using in-depth 
interviews, aims to understand the individual experiences, ways of life, and identity 
adjustments that these people have to tell. Neto and Alves show their particular 
interest in how people diagnosed with chronic depression conceive and represent 
their own illness, and pull together an expressive description and analysis on how 
care is delivered to the people interviewed, both officially and informally. Hence, 
they give valuable clues of how families and other significant people may relate 
with chronic mental illness, when it is inside their walls. Finally, Neto and Alves 
arrive to an interesting contribution to sociology of health and illness, as they stress 
the heuristic power of Erving Goffman’s mortification of the self and Michael 
Bury’s biographical disruption concepts in the discussion of the data they have 
collected. 
Joana Zózimo presents a case study of interviews of doctors, specifically 
general practitioners and psychiatrists, regarding the prescription of antidepressants 
and tranquillizers in the chapter. In fact, following the growth of depression rates 
has been the widespread prescription of psychopharmacs, on a global scale, while 
in Portugal they represented, in 2009, the second drug type with greater 
expenditure for the National Health Service (NHS). She posits that in their 
discourses, a social narrative of how contemporary societies manage mental 
suffering, as well as the role of doctors in that process can be ascertained. As such, 
she suggests that the psycho-medicalisation of the common citizen is connected to 
therapeutical ideologies of biologisation and normalisation of the individual 
behaviour, which has led to the assumption of pharmacotherapy as the prevailing 
strategy of managing and treating these diseases.  
The author of this section’s last chapter, Bruce M. Z. Cohen, reviews and 
discusses some concepts that are critical to understand the chapters grouped in this 
Society and Social Policy section. Although not replacing the theoretical discussion 
made by each author in his/her chapter, Cohen’s approach provides unique 
reflection and debate about mental illness categorisation, as it also challenges the 
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scientific status of psychiatry. Aiming to expand the social constructionist 
perspective, Cohen proposes a way to solve its limitations - i.e. in explaining 
cleavages within psychiatry and back and forth movements in the medicalisation of 
mental suffering - by applying the Marxist concept of an ideological state 
apparatus to psychiatry and exploring the importance of capital as a base of 
professional legitimacy. In this sense, Cohen analyses earlier versions of APA’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and, specifically 
aiming a future analysis of the forthcoming publication of the DSM V, lays ground 
for potentially useful critical insights on the idea of psychiatric hegemony to 
explain the influence of contemporary psychiatric classification in producing real 
mental diseases, as they undoubtedly shape (ab)normality and therefore how sane 
and insane people relate to mental illness. 
The second part of this volume, Making Sense of Madness through Literature, 
examines ways in which different authors over the last 150 years have sought to 
make sense of madness. Helen Goodman explores ideas of love and desire at the 
borderline of madness in late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century English 
literature. Although there has been recent research regarding female madness in 
this area, the relationship between masculinity and jealous desire culminating in 
madness has yet to be examined. She considers depictions of men’s borderline or 
absolutely monomaniacal desire to control the female body, focusing primarily on 
Trollope’s He Knew He Was Right (1868-9) and Galsworthy’s A Man of Property 
(1906), part of The Forsyte Saga. Tracing the development of Shakespeare’s 
depiction of jealousy as ‘the green-eyed monster’ in Othello, in the period from 
1860 to 1910, to Robert Burton’s work identifying ‘love-melancholy’ and jealousy 
as significant forms of madness, she contends that these two novels are grounded 
in nineteenth-century theories of monomania and erotomania, and Esquirol’s work 
in particular. Further, she suggests that they frame the failed marriage plot 
primarily as a male plot rather than a female one and draw attention to the 
psychological limits on male agency in the period. 
Bernadette V. Russo’s chapter draws parallels between portrayals of female 
insanity in two seemingly unrelated texts - Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s short story, 
‘The Yellow Wallpaper’, and TsiTsi Dangarembga’s novel, Nervous Conditions. 
Discussing theories of the hegemonic power dynamics involved in the social 
construction of insanity, this chapter observes the same underlying dynamics of the 
colonisation of female gendered space in both stories. By making such 
comparisons, despite the contrasting settings of 1890s England and 1960s 
Zimbabwe, new light is shed on the interaction between the fields of madness and 
gender politics. The casting of female subjects, as insane or as complicit in others’ 
insanity, is reformulated here as a practice extending far beyond the nineteenth-
century context in which it is usually seen.  
Ekaterina Yasko’s chapter makes a fascinating analysis of sensual passion 
leading to madness in fiction by these two eminent Russian writers, Tolstoy and 
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Nabokov. In the characters discussed, insanity engenders an entirely new 
emotional and spiritual state. ‘The Kreutzer Sonata’ and ‘Music’ depict an adultery 
motif which, entwined with the enraged frenzy of the protagonists, produces states 
of madness. Tolstoy himself found sensual passions a mystery, while to Nabokov, 
music was an incomprehensible and dangerous passion. Love and music embody 
an illusory, inorganic reality, an unfamiliar language, inapproachable and 
maddening, yet producing the disparate results of murder and forgiveness.  
Tzu-Ching Yeh’s chapter explores the dynamics of power and surveillance at 
work in the medium of the radio. Drawing on Bentham’s conceptualisation of 
panopticism and Foucault’s subsequent critique, this chapter focuses on two key 
aspects of the disciplinary power of radio: the surveying system and the institution 
of the internalised visibility. Beckett’s radio play, Rough for Radio II, is filled with 
images of violence, torture and confinement, invoking the subject of madness. The 
fictional, confined protagonists develop their own form of internalised self-
surveillance. A fascinating extension is made to this argument by suggesting that 
the radio itself may be understood as an instrument of such surveillance.  
The chapter by Elaine Pigeon focuses on the similarly troubled world of 
science fiction, written over the twenty years following Beckett’s play. In A 
Scanner Darkly, a novel set in the 1990s but written in 1977, the distinction 
between the one doing the surveillance and the one being watched is blurred while 
the pitfalls of drug abuse are addressed. Pigeon draws our attention to the contrast 
between the author’s relative obscurity at the time of his death, and his elevation to 
cult status in the following years. Dick’s writing explores psychological and 
metaphysical themes, and the author himself is labelled by some as mad. 
Nonetheless, his brilliant and lucid vision of a future that resonates with our 
present suggests that fundamental truths are revealed by this alleged insanity.  
Daniela Chana’s chapter examines the intersection of themes including 
insanity, sexual deviance, drug abuse and criminal behaviour in a particular genre 
of Italian literature in the final decades of the twentieth century. This unconnected 
group of authors, dubbed Giovani Cannibali (Young Cannibals), shocked their 
contemporary audience by using a dry tone which refused to judge the actions of 
their characters. The protagonists of these stories are unable to find a compromise 
between their abnormal desires and the expectations of society. Such moral 
conflicts often signal a descent into self-destruction or crime. Chana’s critical 
analysis makes an important contribution to our understanding of this little-
researched genre, successfully navigating the intricate and often progressive, but 
occasionally voyeuristic, voices of the anti-élite. 
Finally, Part III of this volume, Making Sense of Madness through Art and 
Personal Narratives, aims to improve our understanding of madness through art, 
literature, and personal reflection. The long tradition of artistic representations of 
madness is discussed from its beginnings in early cave drawings, through poetic 
expression in the early twentieth century to art as therapy and representations of 
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madness in film. The section concludes with two brave, personal narratives, which 
use theory and reflection to make sense of past experiences and explore themes 
such as love, loss, anger and forgiveness.  
In her chapter Terryl Atkins considers the relationship between the compulsion 
to draw and human intentionality to the creative process. Implementing an 
interdisciplinary approach, she explores the creative process in autistic savants and 
un-medicated schizophrenics. She examines the imaging process in art-making 
both historically and existentially. 
In her chapter Katia Mitova interrogates the existence and use of heteronyms 
through consideration of Fernando Pessoa. She considers the case of Pessoa as 
unique material for a study of artists’ ability to live with incongruent subjective 
perspectives and to make creative use of this plurality. In addition, the complex 
relationship between reality and fiction is discussed from an artist’s perspective. 
Other writers’ legacies (from Homer and Plato to Shakespeare and Kierkegaard) 
are identified as exhibiting the Pessoa Syndrome, which entails a conspicuous 
sense of nobodiness as a characteristic of the writer and betweenness as a property 
of the writing. 
Written as a dialogue between each other, Eleanor Bowen and Laura González 
take a unique approach in an exploration of the depiction and treatment of the 
hysteric. They purport that hysteria is a process, a state of mind, rather than a 
condition, and that its relationship to femininity and the body is the reason it has 
disappeared from the medical vocabulary. Yet, this state captures something 
inherently human, ambivalent and conflicted. It names, defines and understands 
something elusive. This chapter questions hysteria as madness in relation to an 
epistemology that, according to Christopher Bollas, is depraved. Even though it 
seems to be a state impairing the mind’s judgment as the body takes over, the 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan placed the production of knowledge within the 
hysteric in his theory of the Four Discourses. The hysteric knows what the master, 
the university and the analyst do not. Through their exchange in conversation, they 
argue that hysteria as madness relates to the visionary aspect of the state, to the fact 
that hysterics articulate and know in the body, that which does not want to be 
known. 
Using the form of a Japanese demon mask as a metaphor, Claire McCurdy 
provides a poignant personal narrative of her experience of life growing up with a 
schizophrenic father. She uses the metaphor to portray the duality of her father’s 
behaviour during her youth: seemingly calm and rational in public arenas yet 
violently brutal and volatile at home. Her narrative also explores the effect that 
growing up in such an environment had on her own mental health. She culminates 
this narrative with notes taken from the conference during the question and answer 
period subsequent to her presentation. 
In her chapter Katrina Jaworski interrogates the necessity to forgive and forget 
as a perquisite to healing. Through her discussion of her experience as the child of 
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an alcoholic, she depicts her struggle between resentment and forgiveness, anger 
and love. Drawing on the abyss as a metaphor for vulnerability, she offers a 
personal account of the relationship with her alcoholic father. Part narrative, part 
analysis, this account canvasses what it feels like to stand on the edge of the abyss 
- a space where her sense of self is about to unravel. Analytically deploying the 
work of Wendy Brown, Emmanuel Levinas, and Judith Butler, she considers the 
degree to which she is wounded, and whether hope can come from 
interdependence between herself and her abuser. 
We believe the chapters compiled in this book draw an impressive picture of 
the intense work and discussion made during the four days spent in Mansfield 
College. As Probing the Boundaries of Madness was the motto of this 5th 
conference, the papers presented throughout it persistently lead the conversation 
towards various ways to look at madness whether we meant mental illness, délire, 
insanity, alienation, dementia, mania, hysteria, crime, passion, creativity, survival, 
or defiance/rebellion.  
Having people from so many different backgrounds, our conversation 
frequently circled around some transversal, everlasting questions, central to most 
of us who think about, live with, or investigate this subject: What is madness? 
What is not? Can madness lead to a special kind of creativity? Can madness be a 
way of escaping? Is madness always an illness? 
Not reaching a consensus, but arriving at so many insightful arguments, the 
attempted answers have hovered between music, history, visual art, literature, 
psychiatry, sociology, social work, and personal experiences with madness, sewing 
a richer blanket, a richer pattern, because it was filled with as many academic 
reflections as actual intimacy with the mad. Hence, the extremely courageous and 
valuable testimonies gathered in that room from people with any kind of personal 
experience with mental illness - either theirs or experienced through others - 
matched and elucidated much of the dilemmas put forward by the academic, 
sometimes making them much simpler than they seemed, others making them even 
more complicated or nuanced than some could have thought in the beginning.  
In fact, as we have stated, one strength of these conferences is 
interdisciplinarity because it widens the realm of the thinkable, of the conceivable, 
making us go further than the common questioning about madness, even getting to 
the point of trying to impersonate it so to apprehend it. Thus, at some point, what 
stroke us was yet another question: is madness always an impersonation, i.e., a 
foreign perspective of external or internal reality that grasps one’s mind 
deregulating it? Or, is it a certain shade of one’s own spirit, unbalanced but 
argumentative, emotional but logical, absurd but reasonable at the same time? 
Finally, we hope we have achieved our goal of showing you how the papers 
presented in the conference, and mirrored in this book, brought us images of 
madness from different times and rationales, confronted national boundaries so as 
to push madness’ own confinements, making it unquestionably plural and 
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comprehensive, but to an extent that, when we take a closer look, could be 
frightening. Even if sometimes in small amounts, is it madness really ubiquitous?  
Not having a closed answer for any of these questions, as plurality oblige, we 
believe to have reached a fairly common ground, as we acknowledge that thinking 
and talking about the mad gives a fertile starting point to think about those who 
consider themselves to be normal. Hence, whether our normality is carved in our 
chemical and neurological brain or in our social, economical, environmental 
surroundings, its boundaries are also probed every day, making lower and higher 
cleavages/relieves according to the strength of the tide. 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 1 
 
 
Making Sense of Madness through 
Society and Social Policy 
Délire and Reality Contributions from the New Rhetoric 
 
Angélica María Franco Laverde 
 
Abstract 
I carry out a detailed argumentative analysis both of the Memoirs and of the 
Grounds of Appeal of President Schreber. This analysis is undertaken from the 
perspective of the New Rhetoric or Argumentative Theory proposed by Perelman-
Olbrechts (1958). It is an attempt to apply argumentative theory to 
psychopathology, a field that the aforementioned authors did not touch on. The 
purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the mutual benefits that arise from the union 
between psychopathology and rhetoric. Additionally, I want to establish points of 
encounter between psychoanalysis and the new rhetoric with the intention of 
opening the latter to others kinds of rationality that it has not contemplated; also, to 
show the relevance for psychoanalysis of an analytical tool as the one forged by 
Perelman-Olbrechts. With this analysis, I seek to break with several 
commonplaces. First of all, madness is not necessarily synonymous with absurd or 
disorganised thought. In fact, the limits between reason and unreasonableness are 
lost to us constantly. Secondly, I want to show that the delusional person has not 
lost the notion of reality because this notion constitutes a value of action both for 
the therapist and the patient. President Schreber shows us how important that 
notion is, he shows us the way he constructs his reality and the beings that fill his 
world. 
 
Key Words: Délire, delusion, rhetoric, argument, psychopathology, reality notion, 
Schreber, Perelman.  
 
***** 
 
I belong to the number of the educated men, not to that of the 
madmen […]. Though it is true that I am a nervous patient by no 
means I suffer a mental illness… 
Daniel Paul Schreber1 
 
I begin my observations on the topic of délire 2  and reality with the subtle 
distinction President Schreber makes between a nervous illness and a mental 
illness to show that in the title of his work there is a rigorous argument in the 
making that will be developed in both his Memoirs and the Grounds of Appeal, to 
show that his intellectual capacities are intact and that he can use rationally his 
inherited assets, and that in consequence, his incapacitation in Sonnestein’s public 
Hospital does not make any sense.3 
Indeed, in the title of his work, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, one can find 
condensed central aspects of his délire and commonplaces in the madness that he 
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intends to fight. Schreber is conscious that he faces a great challenge. It is well 
known that this challenge was successfully accomplished. He won his lawsuit, was 
discharged in 1902, and published his Memoirs in 1903. 
It is important to stress that there is something surprising in the texts of 
President Schreber that I intend to analyse. ‘Two threads of speech’4 are woven in 
these texts that seem, at first sight, to be incompatible: a highly coloured délire 
and, at the same time, a most rigorous argument. However, as I will try to show, 
this incompatibility is a mere appearance. In psychosis, délire and argument are 
two sides of the same coin, as the expression reasonable madness proposed in 
1909 by Sérieux and Capgras,5 shows. It could be objected that in what I have just 
indicated there is nothing new, since the psychiatric literature has stated for a long 
time that in systematically evolving délires, such as President Schreber’s, what is 
at stake is precisely an intensification of the argumentative component. However, 
what I want to show here, with the help of Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s 1958 New Rhetoric, 6  is that an argument is a privileged route for 
psychotics to construct a new reality, to find again a lost subjectivity. It is not only 
that in systematically evolving délires argument is the form that délire acquires, 
but also that argument becomes the foundation of the psychotic’s being. In 
psychosis, then, there is no supposed loss of reality and rationality, since the 
psychotic is forced to create a new reality, through délire that gives sustenance to 
his being; furthermore, he can relate to social reality, which others share in and 
from which he isolates himself and is isolated by others. These elements allow us 
to see that psychotic rationality is of a considerable complexity, given that it 
exceeds the narrow frames of positivist rationality so valued by Western culture. In 
order to see in all its complexity the kind of rationality President Schreber displays, 
we cannot keep to the analysis of his Memoirs only; this thread of his speech 
should be read and understood in parallel with the Grounds of Appeal which, even 
though it appears marginally in the annexes, is of an inexhaustible wealth. 
Why does the New Rhetoric become so important when thinking about notions 
of délire and reality? Where does the novelty of this proposal lie that it allows one 
to think differently about paranoid psychoses? It should be noted that Perelman-
Olbrechts did not enter the field of psychopathology, although Perelman was 
enthusiastic when stating in 1961 that in Paris: ‘The persuasive, rational, 
reasonable, slightly reasonable uses of language, from the point of view of 
psychology and specially of psychoanalysis were studied.’7 The novelty of their 
proposal lies in the radical turn they made when faced with reflections that had 
been made on the discredited rhetoric until the middle of the 20th century. They 
proposed, then, a vindication of the ancient rhetoric, especially in the field of 
philosophy, with the intention of showing that even the more rationalist 
philosophers have to argue; therefore, their theoretical systems are not completely 
safe from criticism. Perelman-Olbrechts’s musings lead them to propose an 
extended rationality that does not remain limited to the concept of reason as 
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necessity that dominated philosophical debates, and whose task was, following the 
model of mathematics and natural sciences, to replace confused ideas with clear 
and distinct ideas, the only ones that could be used in science and rationalist 
philosophy. The expansion of the notion of reason proposed by the authors, allows 
the granting of rationality to the decisions of practical life to which not only 
common man is doomed, but also the philosopher and the scientist, when they need 
to take responsibility for and justify their point of view. It should be added that 
rationality is also a matter of délire such as President Schreber’s. Besides this 
expanded concept of reason for decisions of practical life, the New Rhetoric breaks 
with a static and essentialist vision of rhetoric. Their proposal is of a dynamic 
rhetoric in which there is no place for an ideal rhetoric that would be used to judge 
an argument as simple artifice. To invoke that kind of ideals would imply assuming 
a formalist, static and scholastic vision of rhetoric, which they criticise. These 
authors proposed basically to describe the ways individuals have of arguing in 
different contexts, but they did not count on being able to do such an analysis for 
psychosis. My challenge, therefore, is to show that the New Rhetoric proposal can 
be extended to the field of the arguments of the well-called ‘reasonable madmen’ 
in order to understand the délire outside the framework within which it has been 
misunderstood.  
Having done an argumentative comparative analysis of the Memoirs and 
Grounds of Appeal with the help of New Rhetoric tools, I could corroborate central 
differences in the fundamental notions of an argumentative process: construction of 
the audience to which the argument is addressed, the argument starting points, 
types of arguments used, and argument goals in every case. These differences 
constitute an important contribution to psychopathology. 
Both in the Memoirs and Grounds of Appeal, President Schreber directs his 
argument to an audience. Perelman-Olbrechts define the audience as a construction 
of the speaker, depending on what he knows of those he attempts to persuade. The 
type of audience that Schreber constructs in the Memoirs is different from that of 
Grounds although they share the same characteristics. Schreber addresses in a 
concrete way (Grounds) or ideally (Memoirs) those who are reasonable and 
competent to judge. In the Grounds it is an elite audience, specialists, it is a 
concrete audience and his argument seeks to persuade the judges of the Supreme 
Court that, in spite of the psychiatric diagnosis, he can act sensibly in all the 
activities of his daily life and has total discernment to assume the managing of his 
inherited assets. Schreber knows clearly what he wants to obtain from this type of 
audience:  
 
I have to make the attempt, in front of other men, and especially 
in front of my judges, not certainly of converting them to my 
belief in miraculous facts […] but at least of offering them the 
impression that the experiences and considerations registered by 
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writing in my Memoirs must not be treated as a quantité 
négligeable, as addled fantasies of a disturbed mind, which a 
priori do not justify the work of taking them as an object of 
major reflection and of effecting any observation about my 
person.8 
 
In the case of the Memoirs his audience is not concrete, inclusive, he does not 
address his contemporaries, and that’s the reason he has decided to write. He wants 
future generations to judge on the truth of his religious concepts. Dr. Weber - his 
psychiatrist at Sonnestein clinic - says about this: Schreber ‘has abstained from 
doing oral propaganda in his own favour, he prefers publishing his Memoirs to 
share with mankind, by means of the printed word, God’s knowledge reached by 
him.’ Schreber expresses:  
 
... my Memoirs have not been written for schoolgirls or young 
ladies: no reasonable person could reproach me if I have not 
managed in every case to find the tone that the modest head of a 
boarding school would consider appropriate for her pupils.9 
  
It is important to highlight this different construction of the audience in each 
text, since that construction is articulated with the objective of his argument. In the 
case of the Grounds the objective is very clear: to persuade the judges that in spite 
of his nervous disorder he is in a condition to act in a reasonable manner; on the 
other hand, in the Memoirs it is not clear what is the purpose of the argument. 
There is no explicit and direct attempt to persuade, since Schreber proposes as the 
starting point for his argument the reality of the miracles he has been experiencing 
during the course of the evolution of his nervous disorder. That is to say, he 
proposes as the starting point what should be the final point of his argument. 
Schreber seems to say: I am going to argue but I am not interested in persuading 
you, since I have the absolute certainty of the reality of the miracles experienced 
by me. In spite of this, we could not affirm that he has not argued because he has 
not tried to persuade or to achieve the adhesion of the audience. In fact, he argues 
at every moment and in a noticeable way. We can, then, venture the hypothesis that 
the function of this ideal audience, to which he addresses himself in his Memoirs, 
is simply to be witnesses. He makes the Other a witness of his psychic collapse, 
the collapse of his world and reality, but also witness to the creation of a new 
reality. Remember that in psychosis, délire appears as a patch in the psychic 
fissure and because of that the need to construct a new world arises, of creating a 
new reality that implies even - as Freud affirms - the task of procuring perceptions 
that correspond to the new reality. This is achieved by means of hallucinations. 
This is the reason why in délire there are only certainties. 
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Schreber, without renouncing his délire, manages to construct an argument 
adapted to his Grounds intentions. This explicit exercise of constructing an 
audience to be persuaded, allows us to break with a mistake of positivist 
psychiatry, that is, to believe that the psychotic is outside reality. Although, in his 
Memoirs, Schreber makes us witnesses of a new reality that he has constructed and 
that is intelligible only for him, this does not mean that he cannot relate to social 
reality, or that he is foreign to its dynamics, and this is what can be seen clearly in 
the Grounds of Appeal, as I will try to show now. 
The comparative analysis of these two threads of Schreber’s speech also allows 
us to throw some light on psychosis when we contrast the types of argument in 
both texts. I will begin by showing the arguments with which Schreber exhibits the 
truth of his délire, his delusional reality. In his Memoirs the most invoked 
arguments correspond to the group that Perelman-Olbrechts classifies as arguments 
based on the structure of reality, specifically causal links. Remember that President 
Schreber in his Memoirs is, at the time of writing, constructing and consolidating 
his délire. He is creating his own world built on an unmovable base. The psychotic 
reality is unquestionable and because of that he uses this type of link. Schreber 
says:  
 
The constraint that takes place simultaneously to make me aware 
of the relation of causality of every event, of every feeling and 
every cognitive representation, has taken me to a penetration in 
the essence of things regarding almost all natural phenomena, 
regarding almost all the expressions of human activity in art, 
science, etc. […]. The nerves lose their peace when these 
questions about the cause appear and they cannot reject, simply, 
the questions that are formulated, they do not reach “the real 
quiet” with trivial answers [...].10 
 
We can observe that in Schreber’s delirious narrative - and of psychotics in 
general - there is nothing left to chance, everything has an origin and a cause, and 
everything happens because there is a reason, there is a purpose at play, an 
intention that is not of the delirious person but of Voices that inform him about the 
intentions of the Cosmic Order, of the mission for which he has been designated. 
This is the kind of reality Schreber exhibits in his délire and that he clearly 
considers to be the real one; it is the reality of psychotic certainty.  
Opposite to this type of reality, which appears in his Memoirs, we should place 
the one he evidences in the Grounds of Appeal. There, on the contrary, it is not a 
question of exhibiting the reality of his délire, from which evidently he cannot take 
distance, but of showing his skill in relating with social reality. He uses especially 
the kind of argument classified by Perelman-Olbrechts as quasi-logic. This is 
something that should be highlighted since these authors indicate that this type of 
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argument is appreciated for all discussions given their similarity with formal 
principles of logic and mathematics; that is the secret to its persuasive force, since 
he assumes that in those fields things cannot be otherwise, all situations have only 
one solution. I now take up again and develop the ideas mentioned in the epigraph 
of this document to illustrate a quasi-logical argument that Schreber raises in order 
to dismantle the argument of the expert, Dr. Weber. 
The first thing that Schreber wants to discuss in his Grounds is doctor Weber’s 
statement considering him mentally ill, which would lead to Schreber’s prolonged 
stay in the hospital. Schreber says it is false that he is mentally ill and establishes 
the following distinction: one thing is to be mentally ill and another to have a 
nervous disorder. In the first case, we face an intellectual disorder and Schreber 
thinks that this is by no means his case. Yet, the other case (nervous disorder) only 
means that his nervous system has been in a morbid condition for years, and that 
would be his case. In neither situation would there be any justification to prolong 
his hospitalisation. In case of being deemed a mental patient, it would not make 
any sense to prolong his hospitalisation in order to restore his mental clarity, since 
his mental clarity is without any damage: ‘My mind, I mean, the functioning of my 
intellectual faculties, is as clear and healthy as any other man’s.’11 In case of being 
deemed to have a ‘nervous disorder,’ it also does not make any sense to prolong his 
hospitalisation because his nervous overexcitement cannot be eliminated by human 
means. We see, then, that Schreber’s argument wants to place Dr. Weber at a 
crossroads (a rhetorical dilemma) because both alternatives are unfavourable to the 
expert. Besides using the dilemma argument in order to weaken the argument of 
his opponent, Schreber appeals to the incompatibilities in which Dr. Weber falls. 
Schreber criticises his apparent worry for the negative consequences of publishing 
his Memoirs. On this point, Schreber states that the major danger that might 
happen with this publication would be that he would be labelled as ‘mentally 
disturbed’ and that has already been done even without publishing them. He admits 
that the only person who might be harmed by this publication would be Dr. 
Flechsig, and he would probably lodge a ‘complaint for damages;’ nevertheless, 
Schreber ‘is prepared, in reason of his positive intention, to also confront this new 
martyrdom, and that, to his judgment, nobody has the right to prevent him.’12 We 
can see how Schreber reaffirms his right to be wrong, to assume the consequences 
of his acts, of having free determination and, in this sense, not to be treated as ‘a 
child under seven-years-old.’13 Schreber thinks the most untenable thing in the 
expert’s position is the incompatibility in which he falls because: 
 
to defend myself from a sentence of imprisonment for some 
months at least, I will be shut up for life in a hospital and I will 
be deprived of my free disposition over myself and my person.14 
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Schreber again puts Dr. Weber at a crossroads since he raises two options with 
which he would lose again. Schreber highlights that in any of the two options he 
loses, because if he publishes his Memoirs the complaint would send him to jail for 
a few months, but if they protect him in the hospital, and he does not publish his 
Memoirs, this protection would mean that he would remain imprisoned for life, so 
he prefers assuming the risk of publishing them. 
Given the previous reflections it is necessary to ask: is there really loss of 
reality in psychosis? What can an expression like that mean in the case of President 
Schreber? Is there a criterion of infallibility and incorrigibility that allows us to 
decide, without mistake, which is the real reality as opposed to what is mere 
mistake and simple appearance? Is there only a step from use to abuse when 
depriving the psychotic of any concept of reality, because the reality he invokes in 
his délire is not a shared reality? We can affirm without fear of being wrong that 
not only is there no loss of reality, but there is the creation of a new world, a new 
reality and that is the reason why he constantly offers tests of reality. Finally, I 
hope that it is clear that I am not making a defence of psychosis. I only want to 
highlight the brilliance of the paradox in front of which Schreber places us with 
those two threads that he has interwoven in his speech - the delusional one and the 
argumentative one -, because in spite of his délire he can indeed relate with the 
social reality that the others share. In exchange, he only claims one thing that 
others who are not psychotic seem to be unable to do: that the experiences and 
considerations registered by writing in his Memoirs are not rejected a priori as 
empty fantasies of a disturbed mind. 
 
Notes 
1  Daniel Paul Schreber, Memorias de un Enfermo Nervioso (Buenos Aires: 
Ediciones Carlos Lohlé, 1979), 217. 
2 I have decided to use this French word because of the reasons that Jean-Jacques 
Lecercle gives on this matter. He says: ‘I cannot find an English equivalent for it. 
The obvious candidate is “delirium”, which shares the etymology and use in 
psychiatric contexts. But it is too narrow: there is no delirium outside psychiatry, 
and wider uses are both rare and explicitly metaphorical […]. The other possible 
translation are equally unsatisfactory. Neither “delusion” nor “frenzy”, “mania”, 
“raving” (or even “ranting’”) have the meaning I am looking for. Thus, “delusion” 
[…] points out an important element in my definition of délire: its systematic 
aspect, the long and painful construction of a system, an “idée fixe”. But since it is 
defined in terms of falsehood or deception, “delusion” fails to capture the element 
of truth that is present in délire […]’. Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy through 
the Looking-Glass: Language, Nonsense, Desire (La Salle, IL: Open Court 
Paperbacks, 1985), 8. 
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3 Schreber remained in Sonnestein between 1893-1902. 
4 This expression is taken from Lecercle, Philosophy through the Looking-Glass. 
5  Paul Sérieux et Joseph Capgras, Les Folies Raisonnantes: Le Délire 
D’interpretation, Marseille, Laffitte reprints, 1982, p. 8. [Primera edición, 1909]. 
6  Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation. La 
Nouvelle Rhétorique (Belgique: editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Collection 
de Sociologie Générale et de Philosophie Sociale, 1970). 
7 Chaïm Perelman, Le Champ de L’argumentation (Bruxelles: Presses 
Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1970), 320. 
8 Schreber, Memorias de un Enfermo Nervioso, 333. 
9 Ibid., 355. 
10 Ibid., 188-189. 
11 Ibid., 328. 
12 Ibid., 388. 
13 Ibid., 394. 
14 Ibid., 359. 
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The Social Construction of Traumatised Young Women 
 
Emma Tseris 
 
Abstract 
This chapter explores the social construction of traumatised adolescent girls within 
mental health services. Mental health research indicates that abuse in adolescence 
is related to a range of psychiatric problems, including self-harming behaviours 
and emotional dysregulation. Yet, rather than resulting in a sensitising lens for 
practitioners to use in a flexible way, this knowledge often leads to a deterministic 
paradigm, in which young women are viewed as powerless victims, who will 
experience enduring symptoms. The focus on psychiatric symptoms ignores the 
socio-political issue of gender inequality that actually produces the problem of 
abuse against young women. Questioning the ethics of diagnostic classification, I 
put forward the notion of a politics of indeterminability. I draw on qualitative data 
from research interviews conducted with women who have experienced trauma and 
social workers situated in adolescent mental health contexts, adopting a 
poststructural feminist lens to guide my analysis.  
 
Key Words: Trauma, young women, sociology of mental illness, poststructural 
feminism, resilience.  
 
***** 
 
1.  The Medicalisation of Women’s Experiences of Trauma 
       
I would say that a large portion of the young women we see here 
have been [traumatised] in some way ... which often means that 
they are living rough or they are in a refuge. They may have been 
removed [from their parents’ care]. I mean, it just has such a 
huge flow-on effect ... It can affect a whole range of issues ... 
[but] service provision these days has become more and more so 
focused on purely diagnosis - specific diagnosis. This person has 
got depression. This person has anxiety - generalised anxiety. 
Social anxiety, or whatever. And all these other issues are seen as 
peripheral (Mental Health Practitioner)1 
 
There were issues that I would have hoped could have been 
addressed, which never were ... They forget that you’re not just a 
client, you’re a person. That you have to go away, go back to 
your life, go back to everything that’s going on ... Not everyone 
is the same and I don’t think that a one-size-fits-all mentality is 
good and I don’t think you should ever go into a situation of 
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supporting someone with the mentality that one size fits all, 
because it doesn’t (Young woman reflecting on her experience of 
counselling).2 
 
The above quotations come from research interviews that I have conducted 
over the past year, in which I have interviewed both women who have experienced 
abuse and trauma, and social work practitioners employed within adolescent 
counselling and mental health services. The reason that I have interviewed these 
two groups of people is because I am interested in what I have named the politics 
of trauma. I am also interested in what is sometimes referred to as the 
medicalisation of young women’s experiences of abuse.  
In referring to the medicalisation of trauma, I agree with other writers who have 
posited that we need to develop more holistic assessments of women.3 I agree with 
practitioners who have advocated for more contextualised understandings of 
female distress, and I agree with theorists who have argued against offensive 
diagnostic labels assigned within psychiatry to women, such as borderline 
personality disorder.4 However, I would like to extend this critique of the 
psychiatric paradigm further, to examine the core assumptions underpinning the 
disciplinary practice of classification itself, so that diagnoses that are sometimes 
conceptualised as benign, or even progressive, might also come under critical 
examination. I am thinking here of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, as a category 
which quite conclusively sets right any remaining scepticism regarding the impact 
of trauma on individuals, but nonetheless, in conforming to the traditional 
psychiatric paradigm, risks contributing to the de-politicisation and re-privatisation 
of women’s distress. Judith Herman’s groundbreaking book, Trauma and 
Recovery, argued that trauma counselling must occur within the context of a broad 
social movement towards gender equality.5 Yet, some therapists appear to have 
memorised her chapter on symptoms in isolation.  
In naming trauma as a socially constructed concept, I am taking the position 
that there are multiple and contradictory discourses that surround the issue of 
women and abuse, but that the medical-diagnostic paradigm frames a significant 
portion of the interventions that are provided to young women. This paradigm 
privileges the assessment of symptoms above and beyond any consideration given 
to issues of context, meaning and experience. The failure to acknowledge the 
context of young women’s lives represents a social justice issue of tremendous 
proportions. A participant recently shared with me her experiences of seeing a 
psychologist, after being referred by her school as a result of 100 absences in one 
year. The reason for her multiple absences from school was a situation of chronic 
child abuse. She told me that she loved going to school, and would go whenever 
she could, but that there were many days in which this was just not possible. This 
is what she told me of her experience of speaking with the psychologist: 
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I really didn’t think that they had my best interests at heart, I 
really didn’t think that they wanted to help me - I kind of just felt 
that it was just like a tick-a-box, “we met with her, everything’s 
fine”. I really didn’t think that they cared that I had to go home to 
violence, that I had been through horrific things, I really didn’t 
think that they cared about that ... I think that relationship and 
rapport and trust is obviously essential, rather than just a clinical 
approach, you know, the doctor comes in and looks at the wound 
and says this is what it is, without looking at the person.6 
 
From the participant’s narrative, it is evident that the purpose of this therapeutic 
intervention was to ascertain whether there was any clinical diagnosis that would 
explain her absenteeism. The sociologist Nikolas Rose points out that the search 
for certainty around psychiatric diagnoses misunderstands not only the social role 
played by diagnostic classification, but also fundamentally misunderstands the very 
nature of what human mental distress is.7 Some critics of the ever-growing number 
of mental health diagnoses have called for rationality regarding the increasing 
intolerance towards difference that is engendered by a society preoccupied with the 
categorisation of human experiences, beliefs and behaviours. Within this critique, 
it is often stated that the functionality of a particular behaviour or characteristic 
should determine whether it should be classed as abnormal, and should come under 
the umbrella of mental illness. Yet, it occurs to me that functionality is also a 
highly contextual and value-laden concept. I would like to interrogate the validity 
of categorisation itself, particularly related to the experiences of young women 
who have survived abuse and trauma.  
 
2.  The Ethics of Classification? Towards a Politics of Indeterminability 
My research is informed by poststructural and feminist lenses, and I am 
interested in the work of Michel Foucault, who discussed the surveillance and 
monitoring of individuals within modern societies and argued in 1979 that ‘We are 
entering the age of infinite examination and compulsory objectification.’8 Much 
more recently, Jan Slaby in 2010 wrote about the concept of self-objectification -
the phenomenon whereby clients come into therapy hoping or demanding to 
receive a diagnosis.9 The desire to receive a diagnosis is a highly complex and 
interesting concept, which is in need of further critical analysis.  
A very experienced social worker who participated in my study spoke about the 
paradigm shifts over the course of her career, and noted that currently  
 
the room for ... relational work with young people is seen as 
slightly less important [than diagnostic assessment work] and 
discussions [within team meetings, etc.] bordering on negative 
about that kind of work.10  
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One very honest professional I interviewed noted that ‘It’s easier just to go 
“Ok, this person’s arrived and seems to be depressed. Book an appointment with 
the psychiatrist.”’ As a practitioner, I do understand time and resource constraints, 
but I would like to examine the implications of an approach such as this, 
particularly relating to outcomes for young people across the lifespan. One social 
worker summarised the broader implications very eloquently. Speaking of his 
colleagues, he said: 
 
They’re so secure, they need to be so secure within a psychiatric 
diagnosis system ... ideas which ... keep the status quo, [and] 
ultimately obscure the whole issue of ... why are young women 
abused and traumatised?11 
 
- thus illuminating an oft-hidden socio-political issue relevant to young women’s 
mental health presentations. Alongside the power of the diagnostic and assessment 
paradigm, my research interviews have also revealed an undercurrent of creative, 
subversive and alternative ways of conceptualising young women, as evidenced in 
the following: 
 
My hypotheses are always tentative and they’re not meant to be 
bible truth, but more to develop a working explanation and a way 
through something ... often there [are] so many truths in mental 
health.12 
 
The participant here embodies a stance of indeterminability, which is a political 
act that subverts the traditional power dynamics present within the therapeutic 
relationship. As such, the illusion of impartiality offered by the diagnostic 
classification approach can be elucidated, and transformed into merely one 
discourse among many.  
 
3. Surviving Trauma 
A separate, but related, issue regarding the assessment of trauma is the question 
of what it might mean to survive trauma. Within a symptom-oriented paradigm, 
surviving trauma is sometimes simplistically conceptualised as the absence of 
symptoms. This understanding of trauma recovery may be useful for people who 
have survived traumas of a single-episode, non-relational nature; however, people 
who have survived abuse of a chronic, interpersonal nature, such as childhood 
sexual abuse, the complexity of this trauma may have additional effects. While 
people who have experienced chronic trauma are often able to experience symptom 
relief - so that they no longer (or indeed, never did) engage in self-harm or fit the 
criteria for a diagnosis of depression - they may continue to experience feelings of 
shame, self-blame and stigma relating to their experiences.13 As such, it may be 
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more useful to understand trauma work as helping a person to find ways of living 
with what has happened, in contrast to an artificial attempt to compartmentalise the 
past from the present. For example, while some of the participants in my study 
found the concept of resilience empowering, others experienced the concept as a 
form of social control - an expectation that they somehow separate aspects of their 
lives and move on. Jeanette Winterson, in her recent memoir, reflected on the 
effects of growing up with abuse and neglect, and highlighted the ongoing effects 
of the trauma, as well as expressing her survivorship: 
   
I had been damaged and a very important part of me had been 
destroyed - that was my reality, the facts of my life; but on the 
other side of the facts was who I could be, how I could feel ... I 
have to hold these things together and feel them both/all.14 
 
As counselling practitioners, then, we must learn to become comfortable with 
working with paradox. On the one hand, we need to be saying to clients that what 
happened to them was a severe indictment to their human rights to safety and 
dignity, and this should never have happened to them; on the other hand, in order 
to be effective in our work, we need to also be sending a message to our clients that 
we hold exceptionally high hopes for their future and for their capacity to recover. 
There are other paradoxes worth noting here too. Currently, I occupy the dual 
spaces of practitioner and researcher, and I am aware of a tension within myself. 
Within the academic sphere, I am interested in social constructionism, in particular, 
what social constructionism can say about how certain behaviours come to be 
understood as normal and ideal and how other human characteristics come to be 
understood as dysfunctional. Within the sphere of counselling, however, I 
constantly come into contact with clients who do not fit into society’s perception of 
functional, and, experiencing high levels of distress about this, desperately want 
help within therapy to more successfully fulfil the expectations of society, and thus 
decrease their levels of distress. I am yet to establish a satisfactory solution to this 
problem (but I seem to do my best work when I wrestle with, rather than attempt to 
resolve, this tension). The paradoxical nature of trauma work was conceptualised 
well by a practitioner I interviewed, who described trauma work as: 
 
exploring how the person lives with the trauma, the problem, the 
effects of it, and how when the effects are overwhelming but also 
how the person lives with that problem, to survive and maybe, 
maybe takes, already takes action, to minimise the effects of the 
trauma of the abuse.15 
 
Here, this practitioner holds onto competing ideas in order to develop a rich and 
nuanced understanding of her client. 
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4. Concluding Reflections 
I want to conclude by reflecting on the dream, within mental health services, of 
reaching a place of certainty, as seen in the expanding DSM,16 the privileging of 
the diagnostic paradigm within workplaces, the preoccupation with neuroscientific 
imaging, and evidence-based discourses. A stance of certainty not only provides 
the illusion of narrative coherence, and thus ignores the complexity of clients’ 
lives; additionally, in assessing for a single, acceptable truth, it involves the 
enactment of power and control over clients’ lives by placing limits on how clients 
are able to understand and make sense of their own lived experiences. Social 
problems become individual pathologies, which should be treated and managed. It 
is for this reason that I believe that the notion of certainty within mental health 
settings is in need of an urgent and decisive transformation. The social workers in 
my study were not paralysed by the complex theory-practice frameworks guiding 
their interventions with young people. Rather, by being comfortable with 
complexity, they were able to work with young people in a much more responsive 
and nuanced manner. Contemporary efforts to diagnose young women who have 
experienced trauma, and to extinguish their (so-called) dysfunctional symptoms, 
represent a moral conservatism that ignores the gendered power relations that have 
so significantly affected their lives and their wellbeing.  
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The Relationship between Creativity and Perfectionism: 
Problem-Solving and Impulsivity amongst a Self-Harming 
Population and a Non Self-Harming Population 
 
Frances Davies 
 
Abstract 
This research1 examined the relationship between self-harming behaviour and 
creativity. Perfectionism, impulsivity and emotion dysregulation were examined as 
all have been shown to correlate positively to self-harm. Research surrounding 
self-harm is still extremely lacking in non-clinical settings, despite its increasing 
prevalence in recent years.2 A quasi-experimental design was adopted to examine 
differences in several traits between self-harmers, self-harmers who overdose and a 
control group who were non self-harmers. The research was conducted via survey, 
online. All scales adopted for this study were pre validated and reliable measures 
previously used within similar research. Additionally, basic demographics, 
previous self-harm experience and psychiatric diagnosis were required. Descriptive 
statistics confirmed earlier results depicting early adolescence as an increased risk 
age group for self-harm starting.3 Findings also confirmed that self-harm tends to 
be a repetitive behaviour.4 Both self-harming groups revealed cutting as the most 
common form of self-harm. Significant differences existed between self-harmers 
and overdosers in terms of mental illness and subsequent medication usage. One-
way ANOVAs indicated significant differences between all three groups in the 
extent of creative activity, attentional impulsivity, non-disclosure of imperfection 
and anxiety/depression. In terms of creativity, the two self-harming groups 
displayed significantly different extent of creative activity levels from the control 
group. Self-harmers and the control group have significant differences in their total 
creativity. The group an individual was assigned to moderated their relationships 
between creativity and the impulsivity, perfectionism and emotion regulation 
variables. No constant significant relationships existed across the three groups. The 
research examined the areas it set out to. In particular, self-harmers’ levels of 
creativity in contrast to self-harmers who overdose and non-self-harmers.   
 
Key Words: Self-harm, self-harm and overdose, creativity, perfectionism, 
impulsivity, emotion regulation, quantitative research. 
 
***** 
 
1.  Literature Review 
A.  Self-Harm 
Self-harm describes intentionally injuring oneself without suicidal ideation.5 
Self-harm includes cutting, burning, hair pulling, bruising and the insertion of 
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foreign objects under the skin,6 cutting being the most common form.7 Young 
adolescents face an increased risk of starting self-harming activities.8  
Contention exists over the inclusion/exclusion of intentional overdosing into 
self-harm.9 While various similarities exist, there are also definite differences.10 
This requires consideration when conducting self-harm research. 
Research has linked self-harm to various psychopathologies11 and personality 
traits.12 Borderline personality and bipolar disorder sufferers are more likely to 
self-harm than the general population.13 Personality traits increasing the risk of 
self-harm include impulsivity,14 perfectionism15 and emotion dysregulation.16 
Despite creativity involving everything from innovative thought to completed 
item,17 measurement is mainly in terms of physical productions. This is true when 
considering self-harm and creativity where the only association is creativity as a 
self-harm intervention.18  
 
B.  Creativity 
Creativity describes the ability to create something both different and 
appropriate,19 involving the generation of unique products from already existing or 
previously created items.20 Creative individuals have an increased risk of 
experiencing psychopathologies.21 It has yet to be determined whether the 
psychopathologies result in the creativity or vice versa.22 
Research involves four areas: person, process, product and press.23 This 
research concentrated on the product, which refers to behavioural outcomes, 
products or ideas shared.24 The quality and extent of creative experiences 
determine the creative product.25  
Rothenberg examined creative individuals’ ability to conceive and rationalise 
opposite ideas simultaneously.26 The belief and experience of self-harming as a 
solution,27 rather than the traditional view of avoiding pain and injury,28 illustrates 
self-harmers’ conception of opposites.  
Despite several correlations,29 creativity and self-harm have never been 
researched together. Creativity and self-harm are viewed from a product 
perspective rather than encompassing creativity in its totality, resulting in 
associations limited to creative interventions for self-harmers.  
 
C.  Perfectionism 
Perfectionism describes continual striving to do everything without mistake.30 
Perfectionists are overly critical31 and set unrealistic and unachievable goals.32 
Perfectionism has both adaptive and maladaptive outcomes.33 Maladaptive 
perfectionism results in distress and a lack of self-belief and confidence.34 Links 
exist between the maladaptive components of perfectionism and self-harm.35 
Perfectionism can be broken down into personal standards and evaluative 
concerns.36 Research has revealed evaluative concerns are maladaptive.37  
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D.  Impulsivity 
Impulsivity describes acting on ones’ desires without consideration for 
consequences.38 Impulsivity involves both risky decision-making and a lack of 
behavioural inhibition,39 and is generally a negative and at times risk inducing 
behaviour.40 Impulsivity can be broken down into motor, cognitive and non-
planning impulsiveness.41 All three result in negative outcomes.42  
 
E.  Emotion Dysregulation 
Emotion dysregulation defines the failure to integrate and manipulate emotions 
to ensure they stay in line with goals.43 A key component is lability, which refers 
to the frequency, range and speed of changes in an individual’s affective state.44 
Emotion dysregulation leads to a lack of stability in lability.45 Emotion 
dysregulation also often leads to modulation and understanding of emotions being 
impacted and at times distorted,46 leading to further changes in lability.47 
 
2.  Hypotheses 
A.  Hypothesis 1 
Significant differences will exist between self-harmers and non-self-harmers on 
levels of creativity, perfectionism, impulsiveness and emotional dysregulation. 
 
B.  Hypothesis 2  
There will be significant differences in levels of creativity, perfectionism, 
impulsiveness and emotional dysregulation between self-harmers and self-harmers 
who overdose. 
 
C.  Hypothesis 3  
Significant associations between creativity and, perfectionism, impulsivity and 
emotional dysregulation will be moderated by an individual’s self-harming 
behaviour. 
 
3.  Method 
A.  Design 
Static-group comparison was utilised for the research allowing for comparison 
between two self-harming groups and a non-harming control group.48 Data 
collection utilised snowball sampling.49 Website forum usage maximised 
participation. Websites pertained to self-harm, depression and mental health.  
Self-harm is an extremely sensitive topic and likely to produce unsettling 
emotions. To counteract negative outcomes, names of support organisations and 
contact details appeared in participant information. Only participants over 18 were 
included due to topic sensitivity. A tick box regarding age was included prior to the 
questionnaire.  
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B.  Participants 
A total of 292 individuals participated, 267 containing enough data to be 
usable. Three participant groups were established. Group one consisted of 41.8% 
of participants (n = 112) who were all self-harmers (SHG1), group two, 35.8% of 
participants (n = 96) were all self-harmers who had intentionally overdosed 
(SHG2) and the control group of non self-harmers made up the remaining 22% of 
participants (n = 59). 
Inclusion criteria ensured maximum participation. Requirements stipulated 
participant groups needed to have self-harmed previously and be 18 or older. 
Control group respondents needed to be 18 or older and not have taken part in self-
harming activities. 
 
C.  Apparatus 
Variables were adapted from four published and recognised surveys.50 Previous 
testing illustrated their validity and reliability.51 Demographic questions relating to 
self-injury and pathologies were included. The scales used were the Lifetime 
Creativity Scale,52 the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale,53 Perfectionistic Self-
Presentation Scale (new version)54 and the Affective Lability Scale (short-form).55 
Questionnaires had word selection, language and grammar evaluated to ensure 
appropriateness. Relevance and ease to answering online were determined. 
Numerical numbering of sections avoided response bias. 
 
4.  Results 
A.  Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analysis of self-harmers in relation to self-harmers who overdose 
for their age when self-harm started, length of time the self-harm has been 
practiced, different types of self-harm practiced and mental illness and medication 
usage.  
 
Table 1 - Frequencies and non-parametric testing of age when self-harm was first 
tried for self-harmers and self-harmers who overdose. 
 
Total  
n 
Self-harm 
112 
 
% 
Self-harm and overdose 
96 
 
% 
Younger than 11 10 8.9 19 19.8 
11 – 15 69 61.6 63 65.6 
16 – 20 24 21.4 9 9.4 
21 and over  9 8.1 5 5.2 
X2 
p  
9.854 
0.020 
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Both self-harming groups face increased risk between 11 and 15 years old. 
Individuals self-harming and overdosing are more likely to start younger than 
physical self-harmers are. By the end of adolescence, self-harm decreased 
significantly for both groups, indicating less than 10% of participants starting after 
they turn 21. 
 
Table 2 - Frequencies and non-parametric testing for length of time self-harm has 
been practiced for self-harmers and self-harmers who overdose. 
 
 
Total  
n  
 
Self-harm 
112 
 
 
% 
Self-harm and overdose 
96 
 
 
% 
0 – 6 months 13 11.6 2 2.1 
6 - 12 months 18 16.1 4 4.2 
1 – 2 years 15 13.4 2 2.1 
2 – 3 years 5 4.5 6 6.3 
3 – 4 years 8 7.1 11 11.5 
4 – 5 years 8 7.1 13 13.5 
More than 5 years 45 40.2 58 60.4 
X2 
p   
29.255 
≤ 0.001 
   
 
 
Both self-harming groups exhibited the highest number of participants self-
harming for more than 5 years. Self-harmers who overdose displayed significantly 
higher results for the longer times, while physical self-harmers indicated higher 
rates of having self-harmed for up to 2 years.  
 
Table 3 - Frequencies and non-parametric testing for the types of self-harm; 
cutting, burning, bruising and hair pulling split by group. 
 
 
 
Total  
 
Self-harm 
 Self-harm and overdose  
 
 
  
N 112 % 96 % X2 P 
Cutting 101 90.17 94 97.92  0.069* 
Burning 38 33.93 56 58.33 11.478 0.001 
Bruising 48 42.86 48 50 0.750 0.401 
Hairpulling 20 17.86 24 25 1.354 0.306 
* Fisher’s exact score 
 
Cutting is the most common form of self-harm for both groups. Self-harmers 
who overdose displayed higher rates for all methods of self-harm. The Fisher’s 
exact score replaced the cutting significance due to low cell count, resulting from 
the high number of both groups cutting. 
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Burning indicated significant visual differences across the groups. Self-harmers 
were more likely to report no while self-harmers who overdose were more likely to 
report yes. Across the other forms of self-harm, the self-harm and overdose group 
indicated only a slightly higher participation rate. 
 
Table 4 - Frequencies for mental illness diagnoses and subsequent prescription 
medication usage according to each group. 
 
  
 
n 
Mental 
illness 
diagnosis 
 
 
% 
 
Take 
medication 
 
 
% 
Self-
harm 
Self-
harm 
and 
overdose 
112 
 
96 
37 
 
70 
33 
 
72.9 
28 
 
55 
25 
 
57.3 
Control 59 0 0 0 0  
 
Both self-harming groups indicated higher rates of mental illness than non-self 
harmers. Self-harmers who overdose face a much higher risk than physical injurers 
do, with more than 70% of overdosers diagnosed with a mental illness. In 
comparison, 33% of physical self-harmers had a diagnosis. None of the control 
group had a mental illness diagnosis and therefore took no medication. Of the self-
harmers who overdose with a diagnosis, 57.3% were on medication, while 25% of 
the self-harmers required medication. 
 
B.  Hypothesis 1 
The examination of self-harmers’ creativity levels in comparison with self-
harmers who overdose and non-self-harmers.  
An ANOVA analysed the subscales of creativity in relation to each participant 
group. 
 
Table 5 - Descriptive and inferential statistics for each of the groups on levels of 
Creativity. 
 
Group 1 2 3 F Sig 
Variable Self Harmers Self Harm + OD Control   
Level of Peak Creativity      
Mean 11.751 11.522 10.771 2.031 0.133 
(SD) (3.238)    (3.185)  (2.401)   
Extent of creative involvement      
Mean 12.396 12.213 10.869 4.858 0.008 
(SD) (3.211) (3.267) (2.911)   
Total Creativity       
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Mean 24.149 23.736 21.64 3.436 0.034 
(SD) (6.325) (6.32) (5.24)   
 
Significant differences between the groups in the extent of creative 
involvement and total creativity, but not level of peak creativity existed. Post hoc 
analysis for the extent of creative involvement indicated differences between 
SHG1 and the control (p = 009), and SHG2 and the control (p = 033), but not 
SHG1 and SHG2. Total creativity post hoc tests indicated a significant difference 
between SHG1 and the control (p = 033). No other significant differences existed.  
Self-harmers exhibited significantly different levels of creative involvement 
from the control group, but not from each other. Physical self-harmers and the 
control group exhibited significant differences for their overall creativity levels.   
 
C.  Hypothesis 2 
Examination of self-harmers’ impulsivity, perfectionism and emotion 
regulation levels in comparison to those of self-harmers who overdose and non-
self-harmers. 
Impulsivity ANOVA: An ANOVA compared the effect of the extent of 
impulsivity, by subscales on each group.   
 
Table 6 - Descriptive and inferential statistics for each of the groups on levels of 
Impulsivity. 
 
Group 1 2 3 F Sig 
Variable Self Harmers Self Harm + OD Control   
Attentional       
Mean 23.26 24.82 20.57 19.00 ≤0.001 
(SD) (3.50) (4.90) (4.03)   
Motor       
Mean 24.517 25.077 23.633 1.826 0.163 
(SD) (3.42) (5.908) (3.939)   
Non-planning      
Mean 32.4 33.854 30.571 6.158 0.002 
(SD) (5.39) (6.469) (4.735)   
 
Significant differences existed amongst all groups for attentional and non-
planning but not motor impulsivity. Attentional impulsivity post hoc tests indicated 
significant differences between SHG1 and control (p ≤ 0.001), SHG2 and control 
(p ≤ 0.001), and SHG1 and SHG2 (p = 0.022). Non-planning impulsivity post hoc 
tests indicated a significant difference between SHG2 and the control (p = 0.002). 
No other significant differences existed.  
The self-harming groups exhibited significantly higher levels of attentional 
impulsivity than the control group in addition to a significant difference existing 
between the two self-harm groups. Differences were also present for the self-
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harming group who overdosed and the control group in terms of non-planning 
impulsivity.  
Perfectionism ANOVA: An ANOVA compared the effect of the extent of 
perfectionism by subscales on each group. 
 
Table 7 - Descriptive and inferential statistics for each on levels of Perfectionism. 
 
Group 1 2 3 F Sig 
Variable Self Harmers Self Harm + OD Control   
Self Promotion      
Mean 46.513 47.776 41.587 6.189 0.001 
(SD) (9.712) (11.863) (9.058)   
Non-display of imperfection       
Mean 51.25 53.383 44.693 14.545 ≤0.001 
(SD) 8.479 (11.206) (10.129)   
Non-disclosure of imperfection      
Mean 31.316 34.153 27.046 17.744 ≤0.001 
(SD) (6.203) (8.112) (7.447)   
 
Significant differences existed for all subscales. Post hoc analysis indicated 
self-promotion perfectionism differences between SHG1 and the control (p = 
0.011), and SHG2 and the control (p = 0.001). Non-display of imperfection post 
hoc analysis indicated differences between SH1 and the control (p ≤ 0.001), and 
SHG2 and the control (p ≤ 0.001). Neither indicated differences between SHG1 
and SHG2. Post hoc analysis for non-disclosure of imperfection indicated 
differences between SHG1 and the control (p = 0.001), SHG2 and the control (p ≤ 
0.001), and SHG1 and SHG2 (p = 0.015).  
The two self-harming groups display significantly higher levels of all 
perfectionism subscales than the control group as well as differing significantly 
from each other in their non-disclosure of imperfection. 
Emotion Regulation ANOVA: An ANOVA compared the effect of the extent of 
emotion regulation by subscale on each group.  
  
Table 8 - Descriptive and inferential statistics for each of the groups on levels of 
Emotion Regulation. 
 
Group 1 2 3 F Sig 
Variable Self Harmers Self Harm + OD Control   
Anxiety/ Depression      
Mean 6.46 5.85 7.493 27.211 ≤0.001 
(SD) (1.247) (1.032) (1.88)   
Depression/ Elation       
Mean 11.589 11.052 11.863 3.423 0.034 
(SD) (1.669) (2.007) (2.51)   
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Anger       
Mean 7.594 7.187 8.105 7.004 0.001 
(SD) (1.331) (1.552) (1.65)   
 
Significant differences existed for all subscales. Post hoc analysis indicated 
significant differences for anxiety/depression between SHG1 and the control (p ≤ 
0.001), SHG2 and the control (p ≤ 0.001), and SHG1 and SHG2 (p = 0.004). 
Depression/elation post hoc analysis indicated differences between SHG2 and the 
control group (p = 0.045). No other significant differences existed. Post hoc 
analysis for anger indicated differences between SHG2 and the control (p = 0.001). 
No other significant differences existed. 
Self-harmers differ from non self-harmers and self-harmers who overdose in 
terms of their anxiety/depression level, while self-harmers who overdose display 
significantly higher levels of all three subscales than non self-harmers.  
 
D.  Hypothesis 3 
Correlations examining the creativity levels of the three participant groups. 
 
Table 9 -  Self-harm, self-harm and overdose and control group correlations. 
 
 Self-harm Self-harm and overdose Control group 
 Peak Extent Total Peak Extent Total Peak Extent Total 
Attentional -0.158 -0.110 -0.137 -0.021 0.060 0.020 0.134 0.239 0.195 
Motor -0.039 -0.018 -0.029 0.042 0.062 0.053 -0.106 0.023 -0.036 
Non-planning -0.086 -0.092 -0.091 -0.165 -0.106 -0.138 0.020 0.162 0.099 
Selfpromotion 0.071 0.108 0.091 -0.096 -0.099 -0.100 0.266* 0.264* 0.269* 
Nondisplay 0.105 0.157 0.134 -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 0.049 0.151 0.106 
Nondisclosure -0.136 -0.115 -0.128 -0.161 -0.124 -0.145 0.035 0.117 0.081 
Anxiety/dep -0.142 -0.187* -0.167 -0.020 -0.056 -0.039 -0.236 -0.361** -0.309 
Depression/el -0.026 -0.004 -0.015 0.119 0.049 0.085 0.043 -0.029 0.004 
Anger -0.057 -0.030 -0.045 0.204* 0.154 0.182 -0.075 -0.183 -0.136 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.005 level (1-tailed) 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed) 
 
Bivariate correlations indicated a weak negative significant relationship 
between the extent of creative involvement and anxiety/depression: r = -0.187, p = 
0.048 for SH1 and a stronger negative significant relationship for the control 
group: r = -0.361, p = 0.005. A significant relationship was not present for SH2. 
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The only significant relationship present for SH2 was between peak creativity level 
and anger: r = 0.204, p = 0.046. 
Further significant relationships existed within the control group correlation 
between the self-promotion of perfectionism and all creativity variables. The 
correlation between the level of peak creativity and self-promotion of 
perfectionism indicated a positive significant relationship: r = 0.266, p = 0.042. 
The relationship between the extent of creative involvement and self-promotion of 
perfectionism was slightly weaker: r = 0.264, p = 0.043, while a slightly stronger 
relationship existed between total creativity and the self-promotion of 
perfectionism: r = 0.269, p = 0.040. No further significant correlations existed. 
 
5.  Discussion 
The current study aimed to assess differences between self-harmers and non 
self-harmers on common measured traits as well as specifically focusing on 
creativity. 
 
A.  Demographic Differences between the Two Self-Harm Groups 
Demographic analysis confirmed previous research; in particular age when self-
harm starts,56 self-harm being a repetitive behaviour57 and cutting being the most 
common form of self-harm.58 
Self-harmers who overdose exhibited a younger starting age, longer time spent 
self-harming and higher rates of all forms of self-harm than physical self-harmers, 
confirming the hypothesis that differences exist between the two groups.59 
Findings indicate self-harmers who overdose take self-harming further, raising 
questions about whether self-harmers who overdose progress to more severe self-
harm when the initial form is no longer effective. Psychiatric diagnosis rates for the 
two self-harming groups highlighted further differences, with self-harmers who 
overdose displaying a significantly higher diagnosis rate. These findings further 
illustrate the importance of treating self-harmers and self-harmers who overdose as 
two specific and different groups.60 
 
B. Differences between Self-Harmers and Non Self-Harmers on Levels of 
Creativity, Impulsivity, Perfectionism and Emotion Regulation 
Earlier findings that self-harmers are more impulsive;61 have more perfectionist 
tendencies62 and experience higher levels of emotion dysregulation63 than non 
self-harmers were confirmed. Several subscales exhibited differences across all 
three groups, including positive significant differences for attentional impulsivity, 
nondisclosure of imperfection and anxiety/depression. 
 
C.  Attentional Impulsivity 
Attentional impulsivity involves deleting information no longer relevant to the 
working memory.64 For self-harmers, this could be the deletion of self-harming 
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acts, including physical, emotional and psychological consequences experienced 
following self-harm.  
 
D.  Non-Disclosure of Imperfection 
Links exist between non-disclosure of imperfection and self-harm.65 It involves 
secrecy surrounding any error made and is managed using maladaptive coping 
strategies.66 Self-harming is categorised as a form of maladaptive coping.67 In 
terms of self-harmers, the secrecy surrounding errors could be related to their 
fierce reluctance of anyone knowing about their self-harm, especially if they view 
their behaviour as wrong.  
 
E.  Anxiety/Depression 
Increased levels of anxiety/depression can be a result of a lack of emotion 
regulation which is a widely reported factor in self-harm.68 Often associated with 
emotion dysregulation is a lack of self-awareness.69 An increase in self-awareness 
would lead to greater emotion regulation and ultimately less need to self-harm.70  
 
F.  Creativity 
Significant positive differences existed between the physical self-harmers and 
the control group in terms of total creativity and extent of creative involvement. 
This furthers the hypothesis that self-harmers possess more overall creativity than 
non self-harmers. Not all areas indicated significant differences, with no significant 
differences for the level of peak creativity. This indicates that while self-harmers 
tend to spend more time on creative activities than non self-harmers, their level of 
creative achievement is not significantly different.  
  
G.  Relationship between Creativity and Factors of Perfectionism, Impulsivity and 
Emotional Dysregulation for Self-Harmers, Self-Harmers who Overdose and Non-
Self-Harmers 
Negative significant correlations existed for self-harmers and the control group 
for the extent of creative involvement and anxiety/depression. The control group 
exhibited a strong correlation and the self-harm group a weak correlation, while the 
self-harm and overdosing group showed no correlation. As the extent of creative 
involvement increases for self-harmers and the control group, their 
anxiety/depression decreases. The self-harm and overdose group displayed a 
positive significant correlation between the level of peak creativity and anger, 
indicating the level of peak creativity and anger are weakly related. As peak 
creativity of those who overdose increases, so too does their anger level. 
These results indicate that the group an individual falls into moderates the 
relationship between the variables. There were no significant relationships constant 
across all three groups. Rather, the extent of creative involvement for self-harmers 
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and the control group moderates their anxiety/depression levels while for self-
harmers who overdose, their peak creativity level is linked to their anger level.  
 
H.  Self-Harm Discussion  
Self-harm may be a novel and new way to cope with extreme emotions or a 
lack of emotions for individuals willing to consider alternatives not necessarily 
approved of by mainstream society.71 A lack of coping skills or the failure of 
interventions could lead to an individual searching outside the acceptable for 
solutions. 
Rothenberg discussed differences between those who are creative and 
individuals experiencing mental distress.72 Creative individuals are in control of 
their behaviour,73 while individuals with mental illnesses may display involuntary 
actions.74 In line with this, self-harming could act as functional coping mechanism 
executed by individuals lacking other coping skills. It may not be desperation that 
leads to self-harm, but rather flexibility demonstrated by individuals75 willing to 
experiment with solutions considered extraordinary.   
 
I.   Limitations  
Several limitations experienced were the result of carrying out the research 
online. These included; lack of face-to-face contact with participant, the inability to 
control the answering setting and the lack of response from webhosts. Further 
limitations were high incompletion rate of surveys and the possibility that the 
population representation was not even.76  
 
J.   Recommendations for Future Research 
The findings establish a basis for furthering self-harm and creativity research. 
In particular examining whether anxiety/depression levels result in individuals’ 
creative involvement; or conversely, whether it is their extent of creative 
involvement that determines their levels of anxiety/depression. Similar research 
should examine the relationship between level of peak creativity and anger levels 
experienced by self-harmers who overdose. Is it the level of peak creativity that 
leads to the increased anger levels or is it the increased anger levels that result in 
the level of peak creativity? 
Further research examining differences and similarities between self-harmers 
and those who overdose would be beneficial. This should include an examination 
of starting ages and types of self-harm to determine whether overdosing is an 
escalation of self-harm or whether separate classifications are required from the 
beginning. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The research achieved its aim of exploring creativity and self-harm, while 
simultaneously exploring differences and similarities between self-harmers and 
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self-harmers who intentionally overdose. Descriptive statistic analysis clearly 
illustrated several differences and similarities between the two self-harming groups 
in various areas, confirming previous research. Positive significant relationships 
existed between self-harm and variables of perfectionism,77 impulsivity78 and 
emotion dysregulation.79 Each of these traits is multidimensional, making the 
relationship between them and self-harm and creativity even more complicated to 
unravel.  
Both self-harming groups exhibited significantly higher levels of the extent of 
their creative involvement than the control group. A significant difference also 
existed between self-harmers and the control group in terms of total creativity. 
There was not a significant difference for the level of peak creativity between the 
control group and either of the self-harming groups. This indicates that while self-
harmers may not achieve more acclaim or recognition for creative activities than 
non self-harmers may, they tend to be more involved and spend more time on 
creative endeavours in conjunction to displaying higher overall level of creativity 
than non self-harmers. 
Further research into creativity and self-harm needs to be conducted to increase 
the understanding of the relationship. Following the indication of the differences 
and similarities existing between self-harmers and individuals who intentionally 
overdose, it is imperative that future research not homogenise the two groups. 
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Lay Rationalisation about Mental Suffering: A Comparative 
Study between Portugal and Poland 
 
Mira Marcinów and Fátima Alves 
 
Abstract 
Comparing Portugal and Poland, in this chapter we reveal and discuss the socio-
cultural processes that we believe to underlie the impacts of the confrontation and 
coexistence of plural models used to explain and deal with madness, between 
tradition and modernity. Based on a study carried out in Portugal,1 we compare 
how lay people explain and deal with madness and mental suffering in both 
countries. Results show that the concept of mental illness includes one of illness 
(there are ill people), and the one of non-illness (mental suffering is not an illness). 
Lay rationalities about mental suffering in Portugal and Poland also reflect the 
process of psychiatrisation (medicalisation) of societies: lay people use the 
professional taxonomies, but often with different meanings. In Portugal and 
Poland, those rationalities categorise people into three kinds: the ill people, the 
weak-people (these may turn into ill-people) and the strong-people (these succeed 
in the combat with mental suffering, a normal event during life). In what concerns 
mental illness, almost all respondents, both Portuguese and Poles, identify such 
disease as depression and schizophrenia. Moreover, there were also differences: 
only Portuguese talk about dementia, and only Poles talk about alcoholism as 
mental illness. We also compare the identified causes of mental suffering and the 
ways that people use to deal with it - the itineraries of care. The results we 
gathered, only possible with the qualitative methodology, exceed results of 
previous researches about social perception and representation of people with 
mental illness. In fact, it occurs that these narratives contain wide conceptions 
about the different level of mental suffering and craziness, with modern and 
traditional elements. 
 
Key Words: Lay rationalities, Polish psychiatry, Portuguese psychiatry, sociology 
of mental health and illness, lay rationalities, madness, mental suffering. 
 
***** 
 
1.  Introduction 
It is difficult to imagine two more different countries in Europe than Portugal 
and Poland. They are located in almost extreme points on the map of Europe and 
they had almost nothing in common in their history. Thanks to this, even more 
interesting seems a comparison of how lay people explain and deal with mental 
suffering in both countries. Based on a study carried out in Portugal,2 we compare 
results on lay concepts of mental suffering and mental illness in Portugal and 
Poland. There is a huge gap in this kind of researches in Poland and in comparative 
Lay Rationalisation about Mental Suffering 
__________________________________________________________________ 
42 
international studies in Sociology of Mental Health and Illness, especially with this 
kind of approach. The aim of our research is to start filling a gap in the area of 
understanding the way lay people - in Portugal and Poland - think and act about 
mental suffering. We try to show that although lay rationalities about mental 
suffering are different in some points in these countries, mostly they are very 
similar. Moreover, both nations, besides a lot of social differences, seem to be 
similar in the socio-cultural history of madness and problems with actual 
inadequate psychiatric policy. Therefore, studies on lay rationalities can be seen as 
a new challenge in the policies of mental health care in both countries.  
Due to the fact that this topic has been very well discussed in the case of 
Portugal, in this chapter we focus, most of all, on the situation of Poland. The main 
research question is: How lay people in Poland think about mental suffering when 
compared to lay people in Portugal?3 We give special relevance to the categories 
of mental suffering and mental illness, particularly the ones related with the 
conceptions; causes of mental suffering or mental diseases; and the way of dealing 
with those kind of problems (both in a social and individual way).  
In this chapter we report the main findings of both researches carried in 
Portugal and in Poland, using a qualitative methodology based in semi-structured 
interviews. The samples are diverse, not representative from the statistical point of 
view, but representative to the sociological analysis, aiming to identify types of 
situations and interpret their meanings and senses.  
 
2.  Main Categories of Mental Suffering as Non-Disease 
In both countries, mental suffering is perceived as not always an illness. Hence, 
mental suffering is a wider category than mental disease. In Portugal and Poland 
lay rationalities categorise people into three kinds regarding mental suffering: the 
ill people, the weak people (these may turn into ill-people) and the strong-people 
(these succeed in the combat with mental suffering, considered a normal event 
during life). 
Thus, people in those two countries were talking about two types of mental 
suffering as non-disease. In Portugal we have found mainly the cismas (confusion, 
to think obsessively about something) and nerves, as cultural categories of lay 
thought, used to describe continuous mental suffering. Nerves are one of the most 
common images of suffering, found in several cultures.4 While in Poland, weak 
people were often specified as those between, as they seem to always be in 
between a strong/normal existence and mental illness. This category is often used 
to talk about people who worry too much and who feel helpless all of the time. In 
both countries, lay rationalities included being in some kind of permanent inner 
conflict and nervousness as a part of the weak person way of being. However, in 
Poland people commonly emphasised resignation as a distinctive characteristic of a 
weak person. 
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Although slight differences can be found regarding the concept of mental 
suffering as non-disease, lay rationalities in both countries have many features in 
common. In Poland, as well as in Portugal, this category is connected with 
willpower, considered the only way to deal with both the disease and the suffering.  
 
3. Mental Illness as a Disease: Main Categories and Their Understandings 
Lay rationalisation about mental suffering in Portugal and Poland involve not 
only talking about it as a permanent state, as part of a person’s normal way of 
being, but also as a disease. Yet, interestingly, almost in all cases, narratives about 
mental illness were found in speeches about others, and not in the first person. In 
what concerns mental illness, almost all respondents, both Portuguese and Poles, 
identify it as (deep) depression, schizophrenia, and neurosis. Therefore, we can 
state that lay rationalities about mental suffering reflect in both countries the 
process of psychiatrisation (medicalisation) of societies.5 In fact, lay people use the 
professional taxonomies, but often with different meanings: in general, mental 
illness is something very serious, threatening the life in society and identity, and is 
considered incurable. 
Moreover, there were also differences: only Portuguese talk about dementia, 
and only Poles talk about alcoholism as a mental illness. We can interpret this 
difference by relating it with the cultural context as Portuguese population is more 
aged than Polish population, and in Poland, alcoholism is still treated as one of the 
main social problems. However, on the other hand, the presence of alcoholism in 
Polish speeches about mental disease is very unexpected, as previous studies have 
suggested that the big problem in polish society is treating alcoholism as a sin and 
choice, not as a disease.6 It is worth to add that in speeches about mental illness 
people very often refuse, for example, considering depression or alcoholism as a 
disease. In fact, those categories are used both to describe mental disease and 
continuous mental suffering, so in the end people use the same term to talk about 
features of personality and to talk about illness. However, they make a strict 
distinction when they use the category to refer to a way of being human and as a 
way of identifying a disease.  
At the end, we compare also the lay causes of mental suffering and the ways 
that people use to deal with it - the itineraries of care.  
 
4. Causes of Mental Suffering and Mental Diseases, and the Ways of Dealing 
with Them 
Understanding the causes is another dimension of the lay concepts of mental 
illness and mental suffering. Illness clearly is inscribed in the body and its causes 
can be organic or moral. In Portugal and Poland, we have found several causes that 
we have categorised in the following elements: social; genetic or inherited; organic 
or physical; natural; spiritual, and finally those elements related with personal 
identity. Both Portuguese and Poles link their explanations to a multifactorial 
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aetiology of mental illness. Much more related with personal experience - with 
some kind of choice - they identify more often the causes of mental suffering than 
the causes of mental disease. In this area lay causal system in Portugal and Poland 
are very similar. 
As for the speeches about the ways of dealing with mental suffering and mental 
diseases in an individual way, we recognised - in Portugal and Poland - the domain 
of the relations of solidarity within the family (support and care), the 
neighbourhood (support), and friends (support and care); the domain of the 
psychological resources within the person (the will of power), and finally the 
domain of faith and religion (support and care). In Poland, in contrast with 
Portugal, people mainly mention the church as one of the main places where one 
can find support for people who mentally suffer as well as for people who are 
mentally ill. In both countries, when it comes to question about how society can 
deal with mental suffering and mental diseases, we have distinguished three main 
categories of care systems to deal with mental illness and with mental suffering: 
the official and professional system; the alternative system; and the informal 
sphere. For example, in Poland as an official way of dealing with illness, 
interviewees pointed out the existence of large mental hospitals. Also, in both 
countries, psychiatry is faced in a biomedical approach and not in a 
psychodynamic approach. In the end, from the data we collected, some ideas of 
how to deal with mental suffering and mental disease can be perceived as very 
interesting and humanitarian, while others highlight the isolation of people with 
mental illness. 
 
5. Conclusions: The Perspective of Further Research 
To sum up, results show that the concept of mental suffering includes the one 
of illness (there are ill people) but it always refuses it (mental suffering is not 
illness). Furthermore, we can notice that lay people use psychiatric names (as 
schizophrenic, depression, nervous system, dementia, disability) to talk about the 
illnesses of the head, but they use it with meanings that differ from those given by 
the professionals. Moreover, social representations emphasise the biomedical 
instead of the psychodynamic model, however, talking is described as the most 
valued therapeutic resource and is attributed to other dominant professions 
(psychologists) or professions from the alternative systems.  
Apart from the above-mentioned similarities, we have found also some 
differences between lay rationalities about mental suffering and mental disease in 
Portugal and Poland. Firstly, the main distinction is between concepts of mental 
suffering as non-disease. In Portugal, we have found cultural taxonomies of mental 
distress, such as nerves and cismas, while in Poland we have found only 
descriptive categories connected with permanent sense of resignation. Secondly, in 
the field of mental disease we have found names of diseases, which have been 
mentioned only in one country. In Portugal, lay people talk about dementia, whilst 
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in Poland they talk about alcoholism. Other differences between those two 
countries have been not so strongly marked. Therefore, we can expect that 
although we have found a lot of singularities, nowadays lay rationalities about 
mental suffering and mental disease have some universal characteristics.  
Finally, we hope to have shown that the study of lay rationalities opens the 
possibility of taking common sense as a form of knowledge, valid, practical and a 
way of conceiving and intervening in social reality and not just as a belief 
subjugated to a higher form of knowledge, pure, true, as attested by science. 
Because of that, it seems to be very important to continue pursuing researches on 
lay rationalisation about mental suffering in other countries. 
 
Notes 
1 Fátima Alves, A Doença Mental nem Sempre é Doença: Racionalidades Leigas 
sobre Saúde e Doença Mental (Porto: Afrontamento, 2011).  
2 Ibid. 
3 Alves, Fátima. ‘Recognizing Madness in Others, Relativizing Madness in 
Oneself: From Lay Concepts to Therapeutic Itineraries’, in Madness in Plural 
Contexts, eds. F. Alves, K. Jaworski and S. Butler (Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary 
Press, 2012). 
4 Cecil G. Helman, Culture, Health and Illness (Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 
2000). 
5 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la Folie à L’âge Classique (Paris : U.G.E., 1964). 
6 Wiktor Osiatyński, Alkoholizm: Grzech czy Choroba? (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
Iskry, 2009); Wiktor Osiatyński, Alkoholizm: I Grzech, i Choroba, i... (Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Iskry, 2009). 
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Living with Chronic Depression: Reconstructing Biographies 
and Representations about Their Own Illness 
 
Cecília Neto and Fátima Alves 
 
Abstract 
The rise of chronic diseases, including chronic mental illness, as well as the 
changes in the social answers to mental illness require the assessment of their 
impact on the daily lives of individuals, groups and social organisations, but also 
require the understanding of the experiences, the changes and the adjustments at 
the level of identity and the ways of life of people with major depression diagnosis. 
In Portugal, there are few studies about the experience with mental illness, 
particularly on those that live with it in their daily lives. In this chapter, based on 
empirical evidence resulting from an exploratory study, we analyse the data from 
in-depth interviews with ten people with a psychiatric diagnosis of chronic 
depression, exploring the conceptions about their own illness and the perception of 
its impact on their daily life, seeking their personal experience and the senses they 
give to it. We sought to understand how people with major depression experience, 
understand, explain and interpret this condition, and cope with its consequences 
and impacts on the various levels and contexts where their life unfolds. Finally, we 
give special emphasis to their concepts and representations of their own illness. 
 
Key Words: Sociology of mental illness, lay rationalities, depression, identity, 
chronic illness. 
 
***** 
 
1.  Introduction 
Depression as a chronic illness and as a social deviance challenges and 
confronts both the patients and the health care systems, in the need of controlling 
the disease in order to minimise the impacts on people’s daily lives and also to 
manage their symptoms and crises. When trying not to neglect social intervention, 
in order to maintain some quality of life, it is expected that the patient takes a more 
active role, because it is required that he recognises the first signs of crisis and seek 
for help, i.e. to decide accordingly and effectively.1  
As Miles and Alves analysed, the social impacts of a chronic mental illness are 
quite different from the ones of a physical illness. 2 In order to understand the 
subjective experience of the individual in relation to its own disease, and 
correlating it with the objective experience (with reference to psychiatric 
diagnosis), we followed the contributions of Social Interactionism.3 Although the 
interpretation and meaning of the psychiatric label can vary according to the 
sociocultural context of the person, assigning a psychiatric diagnosis originates a 
complex set of individual experiences of mortification and identity reconstruction, 
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especially if its interpretation changes his social destiny, as in the case that the 
person is hospitalised. 
As Fox pointed out, the effect of temporality in identity is the key to understand 
how individual control reflects cultural impositions.4 In this context, the 
emergence of a disabling disease breaks social and cultural organisation, exposing 
the individual to threats of losing self-identity and control. Bury introduced the 
expression biographical disruption to translate these processes, referring to the 
subjective experience of illness as an event that disrupted the trajectory of life set 
in a temporal context.5 This subjective experience of illness involves changes in 
the global situation of the individual and integrates the disease in other 
temporalities, spaces and features of everyday life: work performance, sociability, 
family interaction, secondary social networks, etc. 
Our chapter is organised in three parts. At first, we will address very briefly the 
research performed and the methodology used. In the second part, we will present 
the main results and discuss them very briefly. Finally, we will point out the 
highlights of the research relating to other previous studies. 
 
2.  Method and Interviewees 
This is an exploratory study, which highlights the active role of the individual 
in the construction of their experiences with chronic depression. In order to access 
to these experiences we conducted semi-structured interviews.  
We have interviewed, in 2010, ten men and women with psychiatric diagnosis 
of chronic depression, integrated in their community, monitored in Psychiatric 
consultations and who agreed to collaborate freely. The participants signed an 
informed consent and were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity.  
It is not a representative sample from the statistical point of view, but it can be 
considered representative from the in-depth sociological point of view, which 
seeks to identify types of situations and to understand the social relations that are 
established in them. 
 
3. Results 
A.  Lay Conceptions About Depression 
In their discourses, respondents classify depression sometimes as a disease, 
sometimes as a non-disease. They have shown us depressions, instead of a uniform 
and clearly defined classification. These concepts relate closely to culturally based 
conceptions about what they felt/feel, and to the impacts on their daily lives, that 
are rooted in the experienced suffering, as well as in their therapeutic itineraries. 
The depression as a disease is often recognised because the doctor diagnoses it. 
Generally, it is understood as having no cure and is related with the body, with the 
brain and with different impacts in everyday life. It is the same individual who 
thinks and acts, but the present elements - brought about by the arising of mental 
suffering - cause identity changes, resulting from losses in a life that has changed, 
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implying a degree of mortification of the self as Goffman would say.6 However 
heavy, in the end the medical explanation (psychiatric) allows a number of answers 
that remove the individual guilt for socially unvalued behaviours, as they are 
culturally considered negative. 
The depression as non-disease refers to a suffering caused by ordinary life 
situations and events considered normal: relational conflicts, work problems, debts, 
social injustice and violence. These are considered as causes of their suffering, 
described as: exhaustion, tiredness, stress, disability, will to die and humiliation, 
sense of shame. 
Depression seen as mental distress, is not considered a real mental illness, it is 
something lighter. Moreover, the processes resulting from the biomedical label of 
mental illness have consequences and are devastating to social and individual 
identity. Consequently, and in this context, the label is rejected. 
In this research, we came across a plurality of conceptions related with 
subjective criteria of normality and referring mainly to the performance of adult 
social roles (employee, father/mother, son/daughter, brother/sister, friend; etc.). 
When referring to before the onset of the disease, they talk about When I was a 
normal person. 
 
...For me, depression... that is what I feel: it is a sadness... a 
sadness that does not go... is chronic (...) speaking for myself... I 
was a very happy person (...) My kids do not remember... they 
don’t know the other mother they have (...)  
(Female, 49 years old, retired) 
 
We highlight the social stigma attached to the true mental illness as they report 
that their greatest fear is to become crazy, by reference to the brain and the head, 
structuring their discourse around mental illness in general, which means running 
out of memory and lose track of reality. 
 
I am afraid of going crazy... not knowing what is said or done...  
(Female, 49 years old, retired) 
 
The interviewees relate depression with reactions to life events, and not with 
something biological. The suffering they feel, although chronic and incurable, 
moves away from the label of mental illness because it is perceived as different 
from it. Expressions like exhaustion, nerves and stress are common to define their 
suffering. 
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I do not know ... (...) the diseases of nerves (...) There are better 
ones and others that are worse (...) because there is medication, 
but there is no cure.  
(Man, 60 years old, employed) 
 
Depression also appears linked with the body, the brain, the nerves, and 
sometimes with the personality. The relationship with society is highlighted and 
related with a kind of psychosocial disturbance, a relational disturbance, connected 
to the events of life. 
 
...It is related with the thought. Before, I thought it had to do with 
the brain. We’re those people who are not good of the head, 
crazy… Associated to those intuitions (...) to hospitals…  
(Man, 27 years old, unemployed) 
 
B.  Causes of Depression in Lay Rationalities 
Although we found some discourses where the ignorance of the causes is 
asserted, we acknowledge their need to find an explanation for their case, looking 
for the reasons that may give meaning to their suffering. Overall, the explanation 
of the causes for the suffering they live and report refers to a certain situation or a 
painful event, caused by the inevitable miseries of existence and the constraints of 
life. 
The hereditary, social, economic, and cultural factors, as well as elements of 
individual personality arise, in general, as the causal factors explaining the 
emergence of the experienced suffering. 
 
...Exactly, my depression is hereditary. That’s why it starts so 
young ... and of course it also consists of a family environment ... 
sad, heavy, (...) a father who is always sick...  
(Woman, 44 years old, housekeeper) 
 
The social elements, that show the relationship of the individual with society 
and the constructed habitus to explain the suffering, are varied. Mostly these are 
highlighted: parent’s personality, the psychological abuse between spouses, etc. 
 
...Yeah... oh ... my mom tries to do something ... my dad is a very 
distant… and was always very cold when I was little... 
(Man, 27 years old, unemployed) 
 
It is when they speak of the causes that most of the interviewees explicitly refer 
their suffering to a status of non-disease, based on normal but problematic life 
events. 
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It... is... at home is not to be understood... in the street is because 
I see things done badly...  
(Man, 64 years old, employed) 
 
C.  The Subjective Experience and the Identity: Negotiations and Tensions 
The misunderstanding that they say they feel towards their own suffering, 
which in most cases they can not explain, often leads to considering that the signs 
they show are also misinterpreted by others. 
 
...Invite me to a date ...the first question that comes to mind is: 
Will I do well, or not, in going out? (...) When I'm down and 
nobody invites me I think: they don’t invite me because it's my 
fault (...) I am very suspicious ... (...) ... is ... is such a vicious 
cycle... so it is better to isolate myself...  
(Man, 27 years old, unemployed) 
 
All refer to the importance of receiving affection and attention, which helps to 
forget the suffering and recover. However, there are only few who feel supported 
by the nuclear family and it is here, referring to the family, that primarily arise 
narratives about situations of discrimination and stigmatisation. 
 
Everyone always puts me aside... people are afraid to be near... 
(Man, 44 years old, retired) 
 
...When I complain to my wife ... she answers me that I'm crazy 
... because they think I don’t have nothing wrong(...) 
(Man, 60 years old, employed) 
 
As a consequence of the onset of the disease, several of them also said that 
some of the leisure activities they had were abandoned because they don’t feel in 
the mood and able to maintain such performances. 
 
...I just want to be in bed ... I do not have action for anything... I 
stopped painting and writing in the computer... 
(Man, 44 years old, retired) 
 
The most visible consequences are at work. On the one hand the interviewees 
refer to the inability to perform work, this being understood as a consequence of 
the suffering itself, but also of the medication. On the other hand, they feel 
discriminated and marginalised because of the stereotype/idea that they are not 
valid for work. This is interpreted and experienced as unfair. All of these factors 
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are seen as potential promoters of a relapse. They also speak in decreased 
productivity and simultaneously in relief when they do not have to go to work. 
 
... I am afraid of failing to perform the duties... 
(Man, 49 years old, employed) 
 
Highlighting the effect of temporality and the consequent biographical change, 
discourses focus on the impacts at the level of identity and self-concept. They 
rethink the sense of existence and express lack of hope in recovering the life as it 
was before the onset of the disease. 
The feeling of I have no value or social utility produces the destruction of the 
identity and the mortification of the self, installing a sense of individual 
devaluation, played by himself and in contact with others. 
 
...Is to carry those thoughts: you don’t worth nothing ... you have 
no value ... I feel useless... 
(Man, 27 years old, unemployed) 
 
Generally, they suffer because they feel unable to have normal lives. The 
feeling that they will not stop suffering, and that the drugs treat but do not cure, 
transforms the future into uncertainty. The future is viewed with great 
apprehension. The fear of relational and affective abandonment arises. They also 
fear of true madness. This perception leads to immobility, to dropout, to inaction: 
Lie down in bed and stay there until I am dead (Man, 27 years old, unemployed). 
 
4. Conclusions 
Our results demonstrate the plural processes underlying the experience of living 
with chronic depression and the social factors that are present in the patient Career. 
We have introduced the notion of patient roles, in the plural, to draw attention to 
the diversity of conditions and experiences, as Freidson had already observed. 7 
We have seen that although the interviewees never identify themselves with the 
label of mentally ill, in the face of misunderstanding and lack of social recognition 
of their suffering, they sometimes require the classification of disease but as 
something similar to physical illness - thus claiming the social status of patient and 
justifying the social potential of this suffering. 
Our study confirms categories that report a permanent suffering, which has no 
cure and is seen as socially incomprehensible because it overlaps with behaviours 
that are socially and morally evaluated as negative - these people are in fact seen as 
lazy, complicated, weak, nervous, lacking desire and motivation. These attributes 
reinforce the idea of their social incompetence, both relational and in the labour 
market. 
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Highlighting the effect of temporality and the consequent biographical 
reconstruction, as Bury pointed out, is at the level of identity and self-concept that 
the interviewees centred the impacts of their illness.8 This destruction of identity 
and consequent mortification of the self, also proposed by Goffman9, result from 
the fact that they feel devaluated by others. 
Hence, in an attempt to deal with its consequences in everyday life, particularly 
in terms of stigma, depression emerges as a chronic mental illness, more acceptable 
for society, but still associated with a negativistic vision of the future, as linked to 
uncertainty and fear of loss of control over the individual and their lives. This idea 
draws mental illness closer to madness and craziness, as someone who is not right 
in the head. The individuals (daughters in most cases, or parents) surrounding them 
become their caregivers.  
 
Notes 
1 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951). 
2 Agnes Miles, O Doente Mental na Sociedade Contemporânea: Introdução 
Sociológica (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 1982); Fátima Alves, A Doença 
Mental nem Sempre é Doença: Racionalidades Leigas Sobre Saúde e Doença 
Mental (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 2011). 
3 Erving Goffman, Manicómios, Prisões e Conventos (São Paulo: Perspetiva, 
2003). 
4 Nick J. Fox, ‘Os Tempos dos Cuidados de Saúde, Poder, Controlo e Resistência’, 
Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas 29 (1999): 9-29. 
5 Michael Bury, Health and Illness in a Changing Society (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997). 
6 Goffman, Manicómios, Prisões e Conventos. 
7 Eliot Freidson, La Profession Médicale (Paris: Payot, 1984). 
8 Bury, Health and Illness in a Changing Society. 
9 Goffman, Manicómios, Prisões e Conventos. 
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Prescribing Antidepressants and Tranquillizers: A Case Study of 
Therapeutical Ideologies in GPs’ and Psychiatrists’ 
Medical Practice 
 
Joana Zózimo 
 
Abstract 
Depression is one of the major causes of illness in western societies, and it is 
expected that, by 2020, it will be the leading cause of disease in the developed 
world. Following the growth of depression rates has been the widespread 
prescription of psychopharmacs, on a global scale, while in Portugal they 
represented, in 2009, the second drug type with greater expenditure for the 
National Health Service (NHS). Therefore, we have designed a case study, using 
in-depth interviews with doctors, regarding the prescription of antidepressants and 
tranquillizers in the practice of general practitioners (GPs) and psychiatrists, those 
medical specialities that usually attend to this type of conditions. We thus sustain 
that we can find, in their discourses, a social narrative of how contemporary 
societies manage mental suffering, as well as the role of doctors in that process. As 
such, we believe to be looking at the medicalisation of the individual’s 
psychological dimension, made possible through the pharmaceuticalisation of 
mental suffering (like sadness or stress, which were not subject to medical 
intervention some years ago). Likewise, this psycho-medicalisation of the common 
citizen would be connected to therapeutical ideologies of biologisation and 
normalisation of the individual behaviour, which has led to the assumption of 
pharmacotherapy as the prevailing strategy of managing and treating these 
diseases. This cultural pattern also favours the prevention and control of diseases, 
allowing, therefore, medicalising and prescribing drugs to deal with uncertain 
conditions and prevent them from worsening. This calls for further investigation 
into how medical specialities divide the medical work of managing mental health 
and mental illness, as this study stresses the emerging role of GPs in maintaining 
mental health and social performance, and the social reproduction of the traditional 
role of psychiatrists in managing mental illness. 
 
Key Words: Depression, psycho-pharmaceuticalisation medical ideologies, 
therapeutical ideologies, psychopharmaceuticals, General Practitioners, 
psychiatrists, psycho-medicalisation, anxiety. 
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1.  Introducing the Subject 
This research project was born from a scientific questioning of the sociological 
reasons for the widespread prescription of psychopharmacs, mostly antidepressants 
and tranquillizers. Indeed, it is estimated that over 27% of European adults will 
experience at least one type of mental illness at some stage of their lives, and that 
the most common types of mental illness diagnosed in the European Union (EU) 
will be depression and anxiety syndromes. It is also expected that, by the year 
2020, depression will be the leading cause of disease in the developed world.1 
The official figures of drugs’ prescription show the importance of this 
phenomenon: psychopharmacs are the second pharmacotherapeutic subgroup with 
greater burden for the Portuguese National Health Service (NHS), both in terms of 
expenditure and number of packages sold.2 Internationally, this tendency is 
documented as well:3 according to the European Commission,4 medicines for the 
nervous system have been among the three pharmacotherapeutic groups with 
greater expenditure in North America and Europe in 2008 (sided by those for the 
cardiovascular system and for the alimentary tract metabolism).  
Since in Portugal there is hardly any sociological research regarding 
therapeutical rationales related to the prescription of psychopharmacs, we 
considered the relevance of investigating psychopharmacs’ consumption, namely 
of those that are most prescribed, tranquillizers and antidepressants, whilst 
acknowledging the predominant role of doctors in this process. Therefore, our 
main objectives were: (i) to identify the importance of the medicalisation and 
pharmaceuticalisation processes on the increase of antidepressants’ and 
tranquillizers’ prescription; (ii) to learn about the different therapeutical ideologies 
that may underlie the prescription of these drugs; (iii) to understand how general 
practitioners (GPs) and psychiatrists are involved in the expansion of 
medicalisation, while exploring the differences that may exist in the meanings they 
give to their prescription patterns. 
For these reasons, the empirical object of this research is the prescription of 
antidepressants and tranquillizers in the medical practice of GPs and psychiatrists, 
those medical specialities that usually attend to this type of conditions and 
prescribe these types of drugs. Theoretically, we are searching for the therapeutical 
ideologies that support the prescription, as our first aim is to understand the effect 
of medicalising the psychological dimensions of the individual in the increasing 
prescription of antidepressants and tranquillizers. As previously stated, it is our 
goal to study this phenomenon from the doctors’ point of view, acknowledging that 
this is a typical process in contemporary societies where the medical regime has 
particular influence, especially when it comes to the belief in drug therapy as the 
way to solve problems of stress and anxiety. 
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2.  From Pharmaceuticalisation to Psycho-pharmaceuticalisation: Main 
Conceptual Framework 
Along this investigation process, we have drawn an extensive theoretical 
framework, largely based on sociology of health and illness. However, we will not 
go through them thoroughly for time and space limitations, but we still think it is 
important to outline the boundaries of our theoretical reasoning on this subject. 
Otherwise, our perspective on the prescription of psychopharmaceuticals could be 
easily seen as unframed or out of context. 
Some authors like Marcelo Otero5 suggest that mental illness has gone out 
from psychiatry’s sole responsibility and into public health’s domain. Otero speaks 
about a social nervousness (nervosité sociale6 in the original) as a new, mild, type 
of mental illness that could explain the increase in the prescription of 
antidepressants and tranquillizers. We used this concept to describe types of mental 
suffering that were deemed normal some decades ago but are now seen as social 
difficulties, and combined it with the concept of medicalisation of society,7 as this 
is defined as the process by which aspects of life that were not previously under the 
jurisdiction of medicine, turn out to be established and managed as medical 
problems.  
With regard to how medicines are socially represented and used in our daily 
life, we draw from the concept of pharmaceuticalisation of society,8 defined (i) as 
the process through which various aspects of the human condition are addressed or 
improved with the use of pharmaceuticals, (ii) ‘the process by which social, 
behavioural or bodily conditions are treated or deemed to be in need of treatment 
with medical drugs by doctors or patients.’9 This distinction is important as the 
established necessity for pharmaceuticals may legitimate its use. 
For clarity and conceptual accuracy purposes, we will use the words 
psychomedicalisation and psychopharmaceuticalisation when addressing the 
expansion of medicalisation and pharmaceuticalisation to the psychological 
dimensions of the individual. Not distant from the two-aforementioned processes, 
but a modality of each, we believe them to be more explicit in this context.10  
We have also combined the concepts of psychologisation of individual 
behaviour11 and biologisation of the psyche12 to cast light on how psychology’s 
representation of the individual - a rational and reflexive being, aware of the 
implications of a normatively inadequate behaviour, and having a particular 
psychological world13 - has contributed to the biologisation of his/her/our psyche. 
In fact, in contemporary societies influenced by biosciences, an individual’s psyche 
is situated in the brain, and it is from here that the individual chooses to behave 
according to the norms or not. Having a physical and biological place - the brain - 
the psyche is therefore amenable to medical or paramedical intervention whenever 
it seems to be not working (i.e. when the individual acts abnormally). It was hence 
with these conceptual contributions that we could scientifically distinguish normal 
and abnormal behaviour and that, according to Foucault,14 the disciplinary power 
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was inscribed into the individuals’ psyche. Thus, choosing15 not to behave as 
socially expected, i.e. poorly, the individual may be seen as psychologically ill and 
subjected to technical interventions aimed at the normalisation and improvement of 
individuals’ behaviour. 
To understand how the urge of individual improvement extended to physical 
features, Featherstone16 refers to a consumer culture applied to the body, in which 
it is crucial to maintain a good performing self and healthy social habits. The 
discourse of continuous individual enhancement17 is built around a notion of 
individual plasticity, which can be extremely important in the medical decision of 
prescribing antidepressants and tranquillizers to a patient. Combining these 
perspectives, we conclude that every individual may be improved, so one medical 
duty is helping the patient to get better, not only physically but psycho-socially. As 
with other social processes, this dynamic goes beyond medicine, and is also 
culturally incorporated by the lay people, who aim to constantly and reflexively 
enhance one’s self, often looking for professional help to do it but also pursuing it 
autonomously. Therefore, the psychologised individual is twice normalised, since 
he also incorporates the social need to be physically and psychologically normal. 
According to this theoretical framework, we chose to look at the prescription of 
antidepressants and tranquillizers as a way to reinforce medical power and as a 
way to reproduce a broader process of medicalisation of contemporary societies, 
since we acknowledge doctors prominent role in this process. We have thus 
established two main hypotheses to guide our investigation: (i) the increase in the 
prescription of antidepressants and tranquillizers expresses the expansion of the 
medicalisation process, specifically onto the psychological dimensions of the 
individual; (ii) the expansion of medicalisation echoes in the professional 
reorganisation of psychiatrists and GPs, as the division of work in mental health 
may have gained different features. 
 
3. Methodological Approach 
This is a case study, designed to investigate how doctors view and explain their 
clinical practice, regarding the prescription of tranquillizers and antidepressants. 
We have conducted ten in-depth-interviews from June to September 2011, five to 
General Practitioners and five to psychiatrists. As to gender type, we have 
interviewed six women and four men. To have some coherence among the people 
interviewed, we have chosen only Portuguese doctors working in the NHS, even if 
not exclusively, and with a range of ten to twenty-five years of postgraduate 
clinical practice. This is a qualitative study; hence, the data collected was treated 
using content analysis.  
 
4. Patients’ Profiles and Symptoms: Modalities of Psycho-Medicalisation 
Doctors start by saying18 they see each patient as an individual and that they 
could not find any typical profile among the patients they assist, but then they 
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would point out several profiles or patient characteristics as the conversation 
continued: gender differences (they prescribe more to women); age differences 
(elder people are seen in most cases as depressed lost causes); social isolation 
(those who do not have anchors in their lives are more depressed); relational 
difficulties (mostly with family, husband and wife, etc.); personality features (such 
as low resistance to frustration; competitiveness); socioeconomic conditions (type 
of profession, unemployment, etc.); family precedents (which were related to a 
nervous or depressed kind of personality). The doctors interviewed would, 
therefore, use these social categories to legitimise differences in diagnostic and a 
different attitude towards their patients - that would range from a prescriptive 
activism to a prescriptive prudence, whether an elder person or an active person 
was consulting them. 
They also made an extensive list of symptoms,19 in which symptoms of 
depression and anxiety often come side by side; actually, they most frequently 
include anxiety as a symptom of depression, except in specific situations. What is 
interesting about the symptoms they describe it is they could be seen as normal in 
different circumstances, they are both physical and behavioural (doctors talk about 
somatisation), and they are mixed with social and personality features. Doctors 
actually say it is often hard to know whether the person is ill or just reacting to 
something in a natural way, but often solve it by mixing different clues that can go 
from mental symptoms to social ones. In doing this, they go from individualising 
the patient (the each case is a different case rationale) in their discourse, to 
standardising him or her in their daily practice. 
Doctors also establish two distinct types of depression: major and minor. The 
first is heavy, severe, mostly incurable, easy to diagnose; the latter is a light 
depression, less severe, happening as a reaction to a stressful and unstable 
environment. It is harder to diagnose, as the mildness of symptoms make it harder 
to distinguish between normal and abnormal. However, in spite of the difficulties, 
doctors admit to have diagnosed some kind of mental illness in the majority of the 
cases.  
Therefore, we believe to be looking at a form of psychomedicalisation since the 
behavioural and psychological states of the patient are pathologised, escaping 
traditional explanations, as moral and religious ones. Doctors also use categories 
connected to social performativity, pathologising their patients’ personality and 
performance, as described by St-Hilaire and Featherstone,20 hence justifying the 
diagnose, and the prescription of psychopharmacs, in an extensive list of situations.  
 
5. Modalities of Psycho-Pharmaceuticalisation 
Most doctors interviewed do not consider that psychopharmaceuticals have 
significantly changed the course of mental illness, but have revolutionised the way 
in which it is experienced. According to this, most of the doctors said that these 
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types of drugs were more prescribed now than at the beginning of their 
professional careers, replacing other therapeutic strategies. 
As such, in the data collected from the interviews, prescribing comes as a way 
to solve the uncertainty that often appears when they meet a patient with a 
psychological condition: while doing it, doctors are (i) communicating with the 
patients, (ii) saying their symptoms must be treated, but also (iii) confirming their 
own diagnostic.21 Thus, when unsure if a patient is clinically depressed or anxious, 
they would prescribe a tranquillizer or an antidepressant and, if it worked, doctors 
would confirm their intuition was right. On the contrary if the patient did not get 
better they would know s/he was not depressed or anxious (or they would assume 
those medicines were not the right ones and would prescribe a different one). 
Hence psychopharmacs are, first, the main therapeutic solution used by these 
doctors to treat mental suffering, but also a therapeutic proof when uncertain 
diagnoses arise, meeting both medical and social expectations of quickness and 
immediate results. 
However, doctors have shown different ideologies whether they were talking 
about tranquillizers or antidepressants. In fact, tranquillizers have a different and 
ambivalent status when these doctors decide to prescribe: we can say they are the 
main vehicle of psychopharmaceuticalisation, since the doctors stated that they 
usually prescribe tranquillizers before they prescribe antidepressants, seeing them 
as less dangerous when used in short periods and having a quicker (overnight) 
result than the antidepressants (which usually take a month, at least, to have 
therapeutic effects). Thus, doctors use tranquillizers with a two-fold purpose: to 
confirm their diagnostic, and to assure the patient feels better more quickly, 
making him/her more compliant with the therapeutic strategy prescribed and with 
the doctor’s orders on the whole. Nonetheless, doctors are aware of the addictive 
effect of tranquillizers, moreover when its massive use has been considered a 
public health problem in the last years,22 but minimise the risk in favour of the 
benefits and the necessity of improving the patients’ condition. That is possible, in 
a typical reproduction of the pharmaceuticalisation rationale, with the use of 
psychopharmaceuticals, as other strategies are seen as less effective. 
 
6.  Psychiatrists and GPs: Reciprocal Perceptions on the Medical 
Management of Mental Illness 
Knowing that (i) both psychiatrists and GPs assist patients with depression or 
anxiety, and (ii) both specialities are the main prescribers of antidepressants and 
tranquillizers, I have asked the doctors what they thought about the other medical 
speciality, i.e. I have asked GPs questions about psychiatrists’ practice, and vice 
versa when talking to psychiatrists. They both pointed out that the main difference 
between both medical specialities is the stage of the illness and that obviously 
reflects on the type and amount of medication. They also stress the particular type 
of knowledge and specialisation each of them had: more frequently psychiatrists 
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emphasised the technical knowledge they had on mental illnesses, while GPs 
emphasised the empathy and long-time relation they had with the patients, stating 
that would allow them to know the patient better than psychiatrists do. In doing so, 
they also justify a division, among both specialities, of the medical work and 
responsibility of managing mental illness: psychiatrists say they possess a deeper 
and more specialised knowledge, and hold GPs accountable for the increase of 
antidepressants and tranquillizers’ prescription - since they are the ones who deal 
with lighter cases of depression (more frequent and more amenable to 
tranquillizers and antidepressants). On the other hand, GPs say they have a broader 
knowledge of all medical specialities and can choose better for the patient as a 
whole, as an example they argue that psychiatrists use too many and too heavy 
drugs, making the patient unable to engage in normal activities. 
The data collected on the differences between the specialities was very 
interesting but incomplete, since that was not the main subject of our work. 
Consequently, we would suggest further investigation on professional dominance 
and division of work within the medical profession, particularly between 
psychiatrists and GPs, as that could draw a clearer picture on how our society is 
managing mental illness, in whole, and what professional resources are available to 
those who suffer mentally, whether mildly or not.  
 
7.  Main Conclusions 
Although a thorough investigation of the results of this study is beyond the 
scope of this short chapter, a number of important conclusions may be drawn. A 
more detailed analysis may be found in my MSc thesis23 (ISCTE, Instituto 
Universitário de Lisboa, 2011).  
To conclude, first and not surprisingly, medication is still the main therapeutic 
solution used to manage mental suffering, even when doctors think the symptoms 
are mild. Therefore, prescribing antidepressants and tranquillizers underline the 
medical ideology of depression and anxiety as being physical, chemical, and 
neurological conditions, also when the doctors refer to social causes. In fact, even 
in uncertain cases, pharmaceuticals emerge as a way to prove a medical diagnostic, 
and therefore they are a perfect example of extending medicalisation to uncertain 
symptoms/situations as they are not only used as a treatment, but also as a 
therapeutical proof. 
Secondly, doctors suggest two hierarchical levels of illness (major and minor 
depression): one is severe and obviously pathological, the other is milder and its 
symptoms bring more doubts during the diagnostic process. However, in these 
doctors’ points of view (and therefore ideologies), it is perfectly justified to 
diagnose this milder version of depression as an illness and treat it with drugs, as 
they must act before the first, mild, symptoms evolve to worse conditions, 
specially when they argue that we are living in an ill environment - leading many 
people to mental illness. In this case, then, social conditions are said to be more 
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important than neurological or genetic ones, even though they also assume the way 
to solve them is a chemical and not a social one. Therefore, medical intervention, 
in what a doctor called tristisse,24 suggests a readjustment of individuals’ 
behaviour to normality-related expectations and hence a typical feature of the 
medicalisation process. 
Thirdly, the demarcation of expertise among the medical profession gives new 
clues for the area of sociology of professions, particularly on how medical 
profession and medical services is organised, but also on how mental illness is 
being professionally managed. Although psychiatrists say that GPs are responsible 
for the prescription of drugs in non-relevant cases (clinically speaking), when they 
say that minor depressions should be treated by GPs since they are generically 
prepared to diagnose them, psychiatrists are also legitimating, as the specialists on 
mental illness, those blur and somewhat uncertain diagnostics. They are also 
legitimating pharmaceuticalisation and giving away their responsibility of 
managing minor depressions, saying they should only deal with serious mental 
illnesses.  
In this context, although more investigation is needed to confirm this 
exploratory data, psychomedicalisation seems to be put in practice through 
psychopharmaceuticalisation, and this tendency is legitimated by both specialities, 
even though only one of those is said to have the practical responsibility for it. 
Hence, psychomedicalisation appears in two forms: one that objectively 
pathologises mental suffering and should be treated by psychiatrists (severe mental 
illnesses); the other reframes and handles social problems in a medical way (light 
to mild mental illnesses), related to the important role GPs have in preserving 
public health, aiming to foster a better social performance among the general 
population. 
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1 European Commission, Green Paper: Improving the Mental Health of the 
Population: Towards a Strategy on Mental Health for the European Union, 2005, 
accessed February 7, 2011, 
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2 INFARMED: National Authority of Medicines and Health Products, Medicines 
Statistics: 2009 Report, accessed February 7, 2011, 
http://www.infarmed.pt/EstMed-2009.pdf. 
3 See Johanne Collin, Marcelo Otero and Laurence Monnais, org. Le Médicament 
au Coeur de la Socialité Contemporaine: Regards Croisés sur un Objet Complexe 
(Québec: Presses de L’Universitè du Québec, 2006); and Nikolas Rose, The 
Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First 
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Competitiveness of the EU Market and Industry for Pharmaceuticals, Final Report 
(2009), Vol. II, Rotterdam, accessed October 27, 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/docs/vol_2_markets_innovation_regulation_en.pdf. 
5 See Marcelo Otero, ‘Nervosité D’inadaptation: une Folie Sociale Nécessaire?’, in 
Le Médicament au Coeur de la Socialité Contemporaine: Regards Croisés sur un 
Objet Complexe, eds. Johanne Collin, Marcelo Otero and Laurence Monnais 
(Québec: Presses de L’Universitè du Québec, 2006), 67-88. 
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7 Irving Kenneth Zola, ‘Medicine as an Institution of Social Control’, in A 
Sociology of Medical Practice, eds. Caroline Cox and Adrianne Mead (London: 
Collier-Macmillan, 1975); Peter Conrad, The Medicalization of Society (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007). 
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Progress and Prospects’, Sociology of Health and Illness 30, No. 6 (2008): 813-
824; John Abraham, ‘Pharmaceuticalization of Society in Context: Theoretical, 
Empirical and Health Dimensions’, Sociology 44, No. 4 (2010): 603-622. 
9 Abraham. ‘Pharmaceuticalization of Society’, 604. 
10 For an extended discussion on this see Simon J. Williams, ‘New Developments 
in Neuroscience and Medical Sociology’, in The New Blackwell Companion to 
Medical Sociology, ed. William C. Cockerham (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 
530-551. 
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Sociales 12, No 1 (2009), accessed September 8, 2010, 
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12 Rose, The Politics of Life Itself. 
13 For more on this discussion, see St-Hilaire, ‘De L’usage Plastique des 
Antidépresseurs’. 
14 Ibid., 5. 
15 Indeed, the matter of choice has hovered frequently over these individuals as a 
moral conviction. As this would lead to an extensive theoretical discussion, I 
would suggest looking further into the works of Georges Canguilhem, Le Normal 
et le Pathologique (Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 1999 [1966]); Erving Goffman, Stigma: 
Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (New York: Touchstone, 1986); or 
Michel Foucault, Les Anormaux: Cours au Collège de France, 1974P1975 (Paris: 
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17 See Conrad, The Medicalization. 
18 I have decided not to include excerpts of the interviews to avoid unfortunate 
misunderstandings, since they are in Portuguese. However, I would welcome any 
further discussions on the data I have collected, if you would like to contact me via 
e-mail: joana.zozimo@gmail.com. 
19 A somewhat extensive list of symptoms was collected from the interviews, after 
analysis: dry mouth, to tremble, sweating hands, and tachycardia, as anxiety 
symptoms. Apathy, seeing life as pointless, lack of pleasure in any activity, crying 
easily and frequently, not being able to work, suicidal tendencies, angst, sadness or 
depressive humor, feeling guilty, relational difficulties (being self-centered), 
carelessness with hygiene or with their own appearance, irritability, 
hypersensitivity, emotional lability or mood swings, as depression symptoms.  
20 St-Hilaire, ‘De L’usage Plastique des Antidépresseurs’; Featherstone, ‘The 
Body’. 
21 See S. Whyte, S. Van der Geest and A. Hardon, Social Lives of Medicines 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
22 See Cláudia Furtado and Inês Teixeira, Evolução da Utilização das 
Benzodiazepinas em Portugal Continental entre 1999 e 2003, Observatório do 
Medicamento e Produtos de Saúde - Direcção de Economia do Medicamento e 
Produtos de Saúde (Infarmed, 2005), accessed September 21, 2011, 
http://www.infarmed.pt/Estudo-BZD.pdf. 
23 You can find the entire text of my thesis, in Portuguese, following this link: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10071/3494.  
24 This expression has no direct English equivalent, but refers to a fairly mild mood 
of sadness. 
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The Power of Madness: A Marxist Critique of 
Social Constructionism 
 
Bruce M. Z. Cohen 
 
Abstract 
With the recent proliferation of categories of mental illness and an increasing 
acceptance within western society of such categories as evidence of real disease, 
this chapter is a timely reminder of the social constructionist challenge to the 
existence of mental illness, and thus the validity of psychiatric practice as a whole. 
With reference to some of the key research on categories of mental illness, it is 
argued that while the social constructionist understanding of the discourse of 
mental illness as a myth and psychiatry as an institution of social control remains 
valid, the explanatory power of the approach is limited. While social 
constructionism can explain increasing professional power as part of state 
surveillance and control of populations, it cannot account for tensions and 
disagreements within psychiatry nor processes that appear counter-productive for 
psychiatry such as the occasional demedicalisation of (some) mental illness 
categories over time. To fully understand western psychiatry, the chapter argues 
that we need to conceptualise this profession as an ideological state apparatus that 
conforms and functions to the needs of capital and the ruling classes. This is 
illustrated through a survey of some of the Marxist writings on medicine and a 
demonstration of how this can work within the field of psychiatry. It is concluded 
that further critical work around the idea of psychiatric hegemony could be most 
productive in light of the forthcoming publication of the DSM V. 
 
Key Words: Social constructionism, Marxism, DSM, ideological state apparatus, 
psychiatric hegemony. 
 
***** 
 
1.  Introduction  
Despite a significant amount of critical work being produced by social 
scientists of mental health over the past fifty years, there continues to be a lack of 
Marxist analysis on the subject; with this chapter, I hope to stimulate some debate 
and more critical work in this direction. My argument here is that, to fully 
understand the institution of psychiatry, we need to conceptualise it as a part of the 
hegemonic system of ideological state apparatuses. Whereas social constructionist 
theory can aid our understanding of psychiatry as an institution of social control, it 
does not successfully acknowledge the processes of capital as the dependent 
variable on which the profession is based and continues to be legitimatised. The 
chapter will begin by surveying some of the available evidence on the validity of 
the mental illness concept before proceeding to a short discussion of social 
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constructionism, drawing on the work of Thomas Szasz. Utilising ideas from the 
neo-Marxist scholars Gramsci and Althusser, I will then outline my concept of 
psychiatric hegemony, a process of professional claims-making which serves the 
needs of the ruling classes by depoliticising the struggles of the disadvantaged, 
increasing surveillance and control of deviant populations, and reproducing the 
dominant norms and values of the elite. Some brief examples are drawn on to 
illustrate how this concept works in practice. 
 
2.  Background 
In noting the proliferation of mental illness within modern society, Peter 
Morrall cites a 2008 report from the World Health Organization which suggests 
that the illness has grown to endemic proportions and is becoming the number one 
global health issue.1 The place of psychiatry as the expert and ultimate authority on 
mental illness appears secure, with the profession expanding into new areas of 
social life, as well as encouraging the expansion of related groups of psy-
professionals.2 This expansion has happened despite Thomas Szasz’s on-going 
social constructionist critique of mental illness as a myth and psychiatry as a 
pseudoscience.3 In fact, the questioning of the fundamental validity of the medical 
health project appears to have dissipated over the past thirty years with the rise of 
neoliberalism and the reorientation of social scientific endeavours to other areas of 
research. Thus, it is timely to reassess the case of social constructionism within the 
area of mental health as well as some of the problems of this approach. First, I will 
briefly outline some of the evidence that demonstrates the continued need to 
problematise the institution of psychiatry and categories of mental illness.  
Following other disciplines in medicine, psychiatry is predicated on a scientific 
understanding of nature. Under this medical naturalism, it is assumed that mental 
abnormality is real and exists in the world, externally and independently of 
diagnosticians.4 Thus, categories of mental disorder are ‘naturally occurring 
phenomena embodied in their sufferers.’5 This is noted in the first part of the 
definition of a mental disorder given by the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA) in the fourth edition of their Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM), where it is stated that a mental disorder is ‘[a] clinically 
significant behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an 
individual.’6 However, for mental disorders to be valid they must also be globally 
and trans-historically applicable7 and unfortunately the evidence has been less than 
supportive of psychiatry’s claims for the validity of the concept.  
The history of psychiatry has been described by medical historian Andrew 
Scull as ‘dismal and depressing,’8 encompassing as it does incarceration, bizarre 
treatments and wayward theories of human behaviour. Though at first glance 
historical mental disorders such as Masturbatory Insanity, Drapetomania, Hysteria 
and Homosexuality may appear as evidence of the profession reflecting the 
dominant norms and values of wider society, they have been argued to be examples 
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ractitioners.  
of the false starts, early experimentations, and theoretical innovations of an 
emerging scientific discipline. It is suggested that this history is evidence of 
medical and scientific progress within the area of mental health to the current point 
where we know more about mental distress than ever before.9 Yet, problems in 
legitimacy of psychiatry’s vocation have remained.10  
Since the mid 1970 - and especially with the production of the DSM III in 1980 
- the APA has attempted to prove the validity of mental disorders by tackling the 
issue of reliability.11 This concerns the level of agreement among psychiatrists on a 
patient’s symptoms and final diagnosis; by inference, the greater the level of 
reliability, the more validity each mental disorder has. Following an extensive 
review of the studies on which the DSM III was based, Kirk and Kutchins point to 
some loose methodology and poor analysis which gives the illusion of higher 
reliability; in some cases the research actually demonstrated lower average levels 
of reliability between assessors than in previous studies. The authors concluded 
that ‘[d]espite the scientific claims of great success, reliability appears to have 
improved very little in three decades.’12 The implications for the DSM, on which 
psychiatry bases its claims to scientific rigour, are clear: ‘The latest versions of 
DSM as a clinical tool are unreliable and therefore of questionable validity as a 
classification system.’13 As Kirk and Kutchins have since documented, rather than 
attempt to tighten the classifications, DSM IV has actually loosened further the 
criteria by which a person can be defined as suffering from a mental illness.14 
While instability in the current categories of mental illness does not necessary 
confirm that mental illness is not real, other evidence can be drawn on to suggest 
that, at the very least, the concept remains problematic. 
While some scholars have questioned the validity (and purpose) of some of the 
newer categories of mental illness that have appeared with the third and fourth 
editions of the DSM, such as Gender Identity Disorder (GID),15 Social Anxiety 
Disorder,16 and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),17 David 
Pilgrim has focused on the major mental disorders of depression and 
schizophrenia. After outlining flaws within reliability testing, and contested 
evidence on aetiology and treatment regimes, Pilgrim argues that the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia ‘should be abandoned as worthless’18 and that depression should be 
considered as ‘scientifically dubious.’19 While aetiology, validity and predictability 
of the mental illness concept demonstrate serious doubts as to the real purpose of 
the mental health system, after a review of cross-cultural studies on mental illness 
showing better recovery rates in developing countries than in western societies, 
where psychiatry is better established, Eisenberg concludes that such 
understandings of mental illness are very much ‘mounded by the cultural envelope’ 
and shaped by the subjectivities of p 20
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3. Social Constructionism 
Sociologists have often drawn on a social constructionist framework to 
problematise psychiatry as an institution of social control; medicalisation scholars 
such as Peter Conrad, for example, have argued that psychiatric categories such as 
ADHD and GID medicalise deviant behaviour (such as young people disrupting 
school lessons, or girls who refuse to wear dresses), thus, ‘Nonmedical problems 
become defined and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of illnesses or 
disorders.’21 While such analysis usually notes that medicalisation serves the 
interests of the powerful, the focus is often on the specific processes by which 
medicalisation takes place and the professional interests and dynamics involved in 
a specific form of medicalisation, rather than offering a fundamental critique of all 
diagnostic categories. 
The social constructionist position on mental health has been most prominently 
argued by Thomas Szasz, who sees such medicalisation of deviant behaviour as 
serving,  
 
an obvious and pressing moral need … It enables the sane 
members of society to deal as they see fit with those of their 
fellows whom they can categorize as insane.22  
 
With the absence of any evidence for mental illness, Szasz’s explanation for the 
dominance of psychiatric professionals as experts of the mind is focused on the 
increasing power of the social state and the proliferation of bureaucratic 
institutions in modern society. He argues that modern society is dominated by the 
therapeutic state, which has replaced the pre-industrial theological order. Within 
this society, mental illness has been socially constructed to control deviant groups 
such as the poor, homosexuals, women and so on.23 Crucially, Szasz states that this 
situation is of mutual benefit for both psychiatry and politicians; 
 
[p]oliticians, pandering to the public’s ever-present fears of 
dangers, find the psychiatrists’ willingness to define deviance as 
disease and social control as treatment useful in their quest to 
enlarge the scope and power of the therapeutic state.24  
 
Szasz’s radical work on mental illness has been very important to sociologists 
of deviance in the understanding of power dynamics involved in promoting and 
reinforcing psychiatry’s position as the experts on mental health. Along with 
Szasz, I agree that mental illness has no empirical foundation and is thus a 
scientific illusion,25 likewise that we can consider psychiatry as an institution of 
social control which medicalises forms of deviance. However, the explanatory 
power of his ideas is too limited for a full analysis of psychiatry’s role within 
capitalist society. Szasz’s libertarian views on free will and non-state intervention 
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means his analysis is too vague on the question of power; to thoroughly answer 
why psychiatry has developed as it has, why there remains both internal and 
external tensions in the profession, and why categories of illness may expand as 
well as contract in different epochs, I argue that there is a need to conceptualise the 
institution of psychiatry as part of the hegemonic system of ideological state 
apparatuses. 
 
4. A Marxist View 
To understand psychiatry as part of the ideological state apparatuses of 
capitalism, I draw on Marx’s distinction between the economic base and what he 
termed the superstructure in capitalist society.26 The primary feature of the 
economic base is the relationship to the means of production; a clear distinction is 
made between the owners and controllers (the ruling classes) and the workers of 
the means of production (the working classes). It is a hierarchical economic order 
based on fundamental inequalities and exploitation, with the two social classes in a 
constant struggle for the control of resources - the ruling classes seeking to 
maximise profit while holding onto power, the working classes struggling for 
social justice and towards the overthrowing of the capitalist order. In contrast, the 
superstructure refers to the supporting institutions, such as governmental and legal 
organisations, which promote and reinforce the dominant ideology of the ruling 
classes.27 
While Marx gave primacy to the economic infrastructure, the superstructure 
serves an important role in the reproduction and proliferation of ruling class ideas. 
Neo-Marxist scholars such as Gramsci and Althusser have here stressed ‘the subtle 
“ideological hegemony” by which institutions of civil society (schools, church, 
family, and so forth) promulgate ideas and beliefs that support the established 
order.’28 Rather than through direct domination and control of the masses, this 
hegemonic power works through consent and persuasion.29 It is the intellectuals 
and professionals who are responsible for the legitimation of ruling class ideas 
within the public sphere, articulating such values as seemingly normal and 
common sense. Thus, Fontana comments that: 
 
the function of intellectuals is not only to create a particular way 
of life and a particular conception of the world, but also to 
translate the interests and values of a specific social group into 
general, “common” values and interests.30 
 
At the same time, it should also be noted that such institutions have a certain 
amount of independence from the ruling elites. This is a negotiated form of power, 
where there are possibilities for autonomy of operation and even dissent.31 Each 
institution has its own set of professional priorities, interests and values to protect 
from other competing groups, and sometimes this may bring about conflict with 
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ollows: 
the objectives of the ruling elites. Compromise is necessary in such situations so as 
not to threaten the fundamental economic base and current social order of 
society.32 Discussing the institution of medicine as part of hegemonic relations, 
Navarro summarises this issue as f
 
[m]edical knowledge is not produced and reproduced in the 
abstract but through agents and relations which are bearers of 
power relations of which class is a determinant one. To say this 
is not to say that medical and scientific knowledge does not have 
an autonomy of its own, but that autonomy takes place within a 
set of power relations which determines not only how medical 
knowledge is used ... but also what knowledge is produced and 
how that knowledge is produced.33 
 
It is under such an analytical framework that we can move to a consideration of 
psychiatry as part of what Louis Althusser called the Ideological State 
Apparatuses.34  
Despite the lack of validity of their practices, from being little more than 
asylum attendants/gaolers two hundred years ago, the profession of psychiatry has 
not only survived but also flourished with the advances in industrial and post-
industrial capitalism. This is more than simply coincidence and, due to the on-
going issues over the science of psychiatry, it cannot be claimed that this is in some 
way a sign of scientific progress. Rather, psychiatry’s introduction and progress 
mirrors the development of other ideological state apparatuses during the 
nineteenth century such as the criminal justice and education systems. The 
development of the medical discipline of psychiatry then reflects the needs of the 
ruling classes for an increasingly efficient and flexible labour force, which can be 
more effectively controlled in an increasingly complex society. Therefore, 
psychiatric technologies - including systems of classification such as the DSM - 
can be understood as part of the growing panopticism of capital.35 Psychiatry 
serves to legitimate and reinforce the dominant ideology of the ruling classes 
through the promotion of dominant values and norms such as individualism, work, 
the family and the reproduction of the labour force, consumerism, and the 
maintenance of inequalities and the status quo. As Ivan Illich has famously stated 
of medicine, it is ‘but a device to convince those who are sick and tired of society 
that it is they who are ill, impotent, and in need of technical repair.’36 One of 
psychiatry’s chief functions as an ideological state apparatus has been to 
pathologise the collective struggle of disadvantaged groups against ruling class 
interests. A salient example has been given by Jonathan Metzl who has described 
how an inordinate number of black men were diagnosed as schizophrenic and 
institutionalised for violent behaviour during the American civil rights protests of 
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the 1960s and 1970s.37 This confirms Navarro’s argument that medicine’s primary 
role is to legitimate ruling class interests while rationalising protest as sickness.38  
What we might then term as the psychiatric hegemony has particularly 
facilitated the legitimation and reproduction of dominant norms and values in the 
home, in the workplace, and at school. For example, psychiatry has helped 
normalise patriarchal relations through the production of highly gendered 
psychiatric diagnoses such as postpartum depression, premenstrual dysphoric 
disorder, borderline personality disorder and female orgasmic disorder. These 
categories have served to reinforce ascribed and socially accepted roles for women 
as obedient mothers, carers, workers, and sexual partners through the language of 
the DSM.39 Similarly, the increasing need for workers to be conversive, outgoing 
and assertive in neoliberal society has led to a number of new diagnostic 
classifications which seek to pathologise those whose personalities do not live up 
to these desired qualities.40 Thus, characteristics such as shyness and introversion 
are no longer acceptable attributes in the labour force; consequently, psychiatric 
hegemony has turned shyness into Social Anxiety Disorder41 and introversion into 
autism.42 Finally, as the demand for higher skilled workers has continued to grow, 
the need to appropriately regulate young people’s behaviour through ideological 
state apparatuses such as the education system have also increased. As Timimi has 
noted of the construction of ADHD, schools have become far more demanding 
social environments, involving greater levels of self-regulation of young people.43 
Those young people who do not meet these re-defined standards of normality in 
the classroom are being classified as in need of psychiatric treatment.44 
 
5. Conclusion 
The central argument of this chapter has been that the institution of psychiatry 
serves the ideological needs of the ruling classes. It follows the work of medical 
sociologists such as Vicente Navarro and Howard Waitzkin in demonstrating the 
ways that ‘Medicine promulgates an ideology that helps maintain and reproduce 
class structure and patterns of domination.’45 Without a structural analysis, which 
relates systems of social control to the mechanisms of power and capital, 
sociological critiques of psychiatry, such as social constructionism, will remain 
limited in their explanatory potential. On this basis, I hope this chapter will 
stimulate further work on what I have termed psychiatric hegemony including, for 
example, an analysis of neoliberal society with reference to the forthcoming DSM 
V classifications. 
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Part 2 
 
 
Making Sense of Madness through Literature 
The ‘Green-Eyed Monster’: Jealousy and Erotic Monomania 
in He Knew He Was Right and The Forsyte Saga 
 
Helen Goodman 
 
Abstract 
This chapter explores ideas of love and desire at the borderline of madness in late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century English literature. Although recent 
research by Helen Small and others has considered female madness in this area, the 
relationship between masculinity and jealous desire culminating in madness has yet 
to be examined. In doing so, however, it is necessary to avoid falling into what Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick has referred to as a ‘vast national wash of masculine self-
pity.’1 Depictions of men’s borderline or absolutely monomaniacal desire to 
control the female body become increasingly explicit in literature as we move 
towards the end of the nineteenth century. This desire culminates, in extremis, in 
the act of rape. Once made clear by Samuel Richardson in Pamela (1740), this 
threat of violence festered just beneath the surface of much mid-nineteenth century 
fiction, before emerging in the explicit narrative through proto-modernist 
characters such as Alec D’Urberville in Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles 
(1891) and Soames Forsyte in John Galsworthy’s The Forsyte Saga (1906-1922). 
The focus of this chapter is on Trollope’s He Knew He Was Right (1868-9) and 
Galsworthy’s A Man of Property (1906), part of The Forsyte Saga. It traces the 
development of Shakespeare’s depiction of jealousy as ‘the green-eyed monster’ in 
Othello in the period from 1860 to 1910. As early as 1621, Robert Burton 
identified ‘love-melancholy’ and jealousy as significant forms of madness.2 I argue 
that these two novels are grounded in nineteenth-century theories of monomania 
and erotomania, and Esquirol’s work in particular. I suggest that they frame the 
failed marriage plot primarily as a male plot rather than a female one and draw 
attention to the psychological limits on male agency in the period. In doing so, they 
form part of a wider interdisciplinary discussion of a crisis of masculinity within 
Victorian culture. 
 
Key Words: Love, madness, marriage, masculinity, erotomania, monomania, 
jealousy, passion, repression, divorce. 
 
***** 
 
Shakespeare’s Iago in Othello famously warns, ‘beware my lord of jealousy; / 
It is the green-eyed monster which doth mock / The meat it feeds on.’3 This 
chapter explores pathologised desire as madness in Anthony Trollope’s He Knew 
He Was Right (1868-9) and John Galsworthy’s A Man of Property (1906), the first 
part of The Forsyte Saga, tracing scientific and literary depictions of possessive 
desire. Ian Watt’s assertion in The Rise of the Novel (1957) that ‘The great majority 
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en suggested.   
of novels written since Pamela have continued its basic pattern, centring on 
courtship leading to marriage’4 has yet to undergo a thorough interrogation. A 
wedding closes off narrative possibilities, neatly tying up a novel’s plot.5 This 
chapter builds on Kelly Hager’s recent research on Victorian divorce, going on to 
argue that a trend towards failed-marriage plots gained force from the 1860s 
onwards - three decades earlier than has previously be 6
Literary depictions of male desire to control and subdue the female body 
became increasingly overt towards the end of the nineteenth century. Once 
illustrated in Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1740), the possibility of rape festered 
just beneath the surface of nineteenth-century fiction, before explicitly piercing the 
narrative in Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1891) and The Man of Property (1906). In 
The Woman in White (1860) Wilkie Collins reveals the secret administration of 
Count Fosco’s violence: ‘the rod of iron with which he rules her never appears in 
company - it is a private rod, and is always kept upstairs.’7 It is often suggested 
that the theme of marriage failure was established by modernist texts such as Mrs 
Dalloway (1925).8 Mary Poovey places this narrative shift earlier, with Thomas 
Hardy’s 1890s fiction, taking ‘as its subject marital unhappiness as well as bliss.’9 
This chapter, however, will argue that such plots emerged as early as the 1860s.  
In The Forsyte Saga, Galsworthy makes a shockingly frank contribution to 
debates about marriage based on servitude and mastery. Yet more controversially, 
Galsworthy exposes the tragedy of madness fuelled by sexual desire with ‘a man 
enslaved by his own possessive instinct, who couldn’t see the sky for it, or even 
enter fully into what another person felt!’10 By 1906, Galsworthy could portray 
marital rape: an act which I argue underlies concerns about marriage and a wife’s 
independence in earlier fiction.11 Similarly, and despite its early date, Trollope’s 
novel also subverts normative treatments of marriage in Victorian fiction, 
presenting monomania as fuelled rather than cured by marriage.  
Following the feminist tradition, the failed-marriage plot is widely understood 
to be concerned ‘primarily with the matter of female agency: it tends to revolve 
around a wife leaving her husband.’12 However, this view is predicated on the 
assumption that only female agency is restricted and problematised by nineteenth-
century marriage laws. I suggest that Trollope frames the failed-marriage plot 
primarily as a man’s plot. James Eli Adams has explained the critical shying away 
from masculinity studies, observing that it ‘has been resisted by those concerned 
that dwelling on the complexities and burdens of masculine identity would serve to 
obscure, and thereby to reinforce, the brute realities of male domination against 
which feminist analyses were and are in the first place directed.’13 It also risks 
falling into what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick terms a ‘vast national wash of masculine 
self-pity.’14 By examining pathological male desire, inherently exacerbating 
female oppression, this chapter begins to redress gender imbalances in studies of 
Victorian psychology, illuminating instances of male domination, while resisting 
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the assumption that women were the only victims of restricted agency in socio-
psychological terms. 
Trollope’s writing is deeply rooted in nineteenth-century psychological 
theory15 - most Jean-Étienne Esquirol’s term ‘monomania,’ a newly-identified 
form of insanity.16 This mania only showed itself when the patient thought or 
spoke about one particular subject: an idée fixe.17 Esquirol’s conceptualisation of 
erotic monomania or ‘erotomania’ explains that ‘ardent affections,’ becoming 
extreme, cause monomaniacal symptoms.18 Later definitions described the violent 
symptoms shown in Galsworthy’s account. John Quackenbos, for instance, writing 
a few months after Galsworthy, noted that erotomania, literally ‘raving love’, may 
remain in the imagination, or may be ‘grossly sensual,’ perverted and quite 
repulsive.19 
Jealousy as a forerunner of madness was explored previously in novels such as 
Charles Reade’s Griffith Gaunt (1866). Ellen Wood’s sensation novel St. Martin’s 
Eve (1866) discussed the theme occurring in a female character. The Spectator 
reviewed Wood’s novel, complaining that madness was trivialised, being used as a 
mere plot device, and that the author lacked ‘the power to create Othello, or the art 
to paint, as Thackeray or Trollope might have done, the morbid passion in its 
naturalistic nineteenth-century dress.’20 P. D. Edwards suggested that this review, 
together with Eliza Lynn Linton’s Sowing the Wind (1867) may have inspired 
Trollope to write He Knew He Was Right.21 In Trollope’s protagonist, the illness 
takes an Esquirolian melancholic, relatively chaste form, while Galsworthy’s 
protagonist, presented in this chapter as his literary successor, displays highly 
sexualised erotomania. 
He Knew He Was Right, the most detailed and extended portrait of male 
monomania in the Victorian canon, describes courtship in two pages, swiftly 
skipping to events two years after marriage, contrary to Watt’s generalisation. 
Suspecting incorrectly that his wife is conducting an affair with her aging 
godfather, Colonel Osborne, Louis Trevelyan gradually becomes mad with 
jealousy: a deterioration Trollope repeatedly parallels with declining masculinity. 
Here Trollope joins a contemporary cultural discourse which associates manliness 
with good health, physically and mentally, and perceives mental distress as 
weakness in masculinity. After Osborne’s first few visits to his wife, Trevelyan 
struggles with his irrationality: ‘Though he believed himself to be a man very firm 
of purpose, his mind had oscillated backwards and forward... by some feeling 
which pervaded him in reference to this man… his powers of mind and body were 
paralysed.’22 At the novel’s opening, his agency was maximised, having ‘all the 
world before him where to choose… a very pearl among men,’23 in stark contrast 
to the melancholic hermit, hiding from his wife near Siena a few months later. 
Trevelyan develops the symptoms of erotomania described by Esquirol, appearing 
‘dejected and pale.’24 Trollope’s diagnosis is explicit: Trevelyan is ‘mono-
maniacal’25 and, ‘in truth, mad on the subject of his wife’s alleged infidelity.’26 At 
 The ‘Green-Eyed Monster’ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
86 
Trevelyan’s death bed, his doctor observes that, ‘his patient’s thoughts had been 
forced to dwell on one subject,’ becoming ‘distorted, untrue, jaundiced… mono-
maniacal,’27 before the narrator announces that ‘At last the maniac was dead.’28  
Trollope’s letters reveal that during the writing of He Knew He Was Right he 
was in communication with psychologists, collecting material for his fictional case 
study. Furthermore, there is evidence that this channel of influence was reciprocal 
in nature, with doctors reading the novel as pseudo-authentic history of 
monomania. Trollope wrote to one physician, ‘I am gratified by the attention which 
your scientific analysis shows that you have given to the character of the 
unfortunate man which I attempted to draw in my novel,’29 demonstrating a two-
way exchange of ideas between literary and scientific disciplines. Trollope’s 
writing follows psychiatrists who insisted that monomania stemmed primarily from 
personal matters rather than heredity, such as Forbes Winslow and J. G. Davey. 
The heightened suspicion and physical decline that is observed in Trevelyan was 
central to the new conception of monomania as observed by Davey in 1855: ‘The 
vacillating countenance indicates the condition of the dismal mind; the eyes sunk 
in their hollow sockets… the looks restless and vacant.’30 
Galsworthy’s The Man of Property (1906), set from 1886-7, centres on Soames 
Forsyte, a wealthy solicitor and art collector, and his marriage to the beautiful Irene 
Heron. Galsworthy’s 1922 preface to the complete saga cites ‘tribal,’ ‘possessive 
instincts’ and a ‘sense of home and property’ as his primary concerns.31 Unlike 
Trevelyan’s, Forsyte’s suspicions about his wife’s infidelity are correct. 
Galsworthy’s publication followed key writings on the psychology of repression by 
Krafft-Ebing and Freud. Personal violation had been increasingly thinly veiled in 
the fiction of the preceding decades. The possibility of sexual violence haunts the 
narrative of sensation fiction on madness from the early 1860s. For D. A. Miller, 
rape can be figured as what Roland Barthes terms the ‘symbolic mode’ of The 
Woman in White. This vague fear is present during Anne and Walter’s first 
encounter, and later ‘What Fosco finally accomplishes when he reads Marian’s 
journal intime - is virtual rape.’32  
The Forsyte Saga’s later date enabled Galsworthy to expose what had been 
implied in earlier fiction. Although Irene’s rape takes place outside narrative space, 
one cannot doubt what the ‘incident of the night before’ entailed.33 The sight and 
sounds which haunt Soames afterwards are described with a searing clarity that 
was almost unthinkable for earlier writers. Galsworthy ironically writes, ‘The 
morning after a certain night on which Soames at last asserted his rights and acted 
like a man, he breakfasted alone,’34 ‘plagued by doubt.’35 
 
Had he been right to yield to his overmastering hunger… the 
recollection of her face… her terrible smothered sobbing… he 
was still haunted by the odd, intolerable feeling of remorse and 
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shame he had felt, as he stood looking at her by the flame of the 
single candle, before silently slinking away.36 
 
This assertion of legal rights is reconfigured by Soames’s guilt-wracked mind 
as a violent crime, utterly incompatible with his self-identity. Hearing from his 
housekeeper that Irene has left him, Soames’s state deteriorates. ‘The words “no 
message - a trunk, and a bag,” played hide-and-seek in his brain.’37 He feels his 
‘brain going round,’ tears ‘forced themselves into his eyes,’ and ‘the burning 
sickness of his jealousy seized him again… His power of decision again failed.’38 
Galsworthy dissects idealised Victorian male attributes of emotional restraint and 
rational decisiveness, twisting them with irony. Soames’s most decisive and 
apparently manly act is antithetical to the ideals of happy companionate marriage 
and gentlemanliness to which he aspires. 
The madmen in Trollope and Galsworthy’s novels represent a disturbing threat 
of violent attack coming from within the domestic space, contributing to a cultural 
re-evaluation of masculine identity towards the fin de siècle. By identifying the 
failed marriage plot’s emergence as early as the 1860s and reading the failed-
marriage plot in masculine terms, this paper has exposed some crucial difficulties 
in male agency, causing a crisis of agency for Victorian normative 
gentlemanliness. Representations of marital breakdown, erotomania, domestic 
violence and marital rape are crucial aspects of the failure of idealised domesticity, 
and illustrate the extensive heterogeneity of Victorian marriages. Such depictions 
rupture ideologies of domestic perfection, and present strong opposition to the 
traditional perception of the dominance of companionate marriage plots.  
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University of California Press, 1992), 145. 
2 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy: The Third Partition: Love-
Melancholy (New York: New York Review of Books, 2001), 3. 
3 Shakespeare, Othello (Oxford: Heinemann, 2000), III.iii. l. 165-7, 125.  
4 Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), 154. 
5 D. A. Miller has argued that novels ending in happy marriages, like Jane 
Austen’s, ‘inhibit narrative productivity’. Emma and Mr Knightley’s marriage, for 
instance, ‘must end the novel…otherwise, it would not be a “perfect” union’. D. A. 
Miller, Narrative and Its Discontents (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1981), 4.  
6 Kelly Hager, Dickens and the Rise of Divorce: The Failed-Marriage Plot and the 
Novel Tradition (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010). 
 The ‘Green-Eyed Monster’ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
88 
 
7 Wilkie Collins, The Woman in White (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 1993), 
174. 
8 For example, Emily Blair argues for a different area of continuity from Victorian 
novelists to Woolf, and writes that ‘Woolf’s depiction of femininity resonates with 
the depictions of Gaskell and Oliphant as she simultaneously reinvents the novel 
and revises the marriage plot’. Emily Blair, Virginia Woolf and the Nineteenth-
Century Domestic Novel (Albany: State of New York Press, 1997), 9. 
9 Mary Poovey, ‘Recovering Ellen Pickering’, Yale Journal of Criticism 13 (2000): 
448. 
10 John Galsworthy, In Chancery, The Forsyte Saga (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 514. 
11 Just fifteen years before the publication of this section of the saga, Hardy’s Tess 
of the D’Urbervilles scandalised readers with its portrayal of the raped woman as a 
morally pure victim. Galsworthy’s Irene is similarly innocent of all blame for the 
violence she experiences. 
12 Hager, Dickens and the Rise of Divorce, 8. 
13 James Eli Adams, Dandies and Desert Saints (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1995), 3. 
14 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1992), 145. 
15 This field of psychology was not, however, a new one. In 1621 Robert Burton 
identified ‘love-melancholy’ and jealousy as significant forms of madness. 
16 Jean-Étienne Esquirol, Mental Maladies; a Treatise on Insanity, trans. E. A. 
Hunt (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1845). Other medics of the period were 
broadly in agreement with Esquirol’s outlines. In J. C. Prichard’s influential 
treatise (1837) he defined monomania as a form of insanity ‘in which the 
understanding is partially disordered or under the influence of some particular 
illusion, referring to one subject’. J. C. Pritchard, A Treatise on Insanity and Other 
Disorders Affecting the Mind (New York: Arno Press, 1973), 16. 
17 The Oxford English Dictionary notes that in 1897 the term ‘monomania’ had 
become outdated. 
18 Esquirol, Mental Maladies, 335. 
19 John Quackenbos, ‘Erotomania, Infatuation, Moral Perversion’, Hypnotic 
Therapeutics in Theory and Practice (n. p.: Harper and Brothers, 1908), 201.  
20 Anon, The Spectator (3 February 1866), 135.  
21 P. D. Edwards, Anthony Trollope: His Art and Scope (Hassock: Harvester Press, 
1966), 115. 
22 Anthony Trollope, He Knew He Was Right (London: Penguin, 2004), 23. 
23 Ibid., 9. Trollope quotes from Paradise Lost, xii.  
24 Esquirol, Mental Maladies, 336.   
25  Ibid., 796. 
Helen Goodman  
_______________________________________________________ 
89 
 
26 Trollope, He Knew He Was Right, 325. 
27 Ibid., 796. 
28 Ibid., 820. 
29 N. John Hall, ed., Letters of Anthony Trollope, Vol. II (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1983), 1011. 
30 J. G. Davey, ‘Lectures on Insanity, Delivered at the Bristol Medical School 
During the Summer Session of 1855: Lecture II’, The British Medical Journal (20 
July 1855): 674. 
31 Galsworthy, Preface, The Forsyte Saga, 5. 
32 D. A. Miller, ‘Cage Aux Folles: Sensation and Gender in Wilkie Collins’s The 
Woman in White’, in The Making of the Modern Body: Sexuality and Society in the 
Nineteenth Century, eds. Catherine Gallagher and Thomas Lacqueur (London: 
University of California Press, 1987), 116. Marian is ‘firmly abandoned by 
Walter’s erotic interest and forcibly seduced by Fosco’s… perhaps the most 
important fantasy feature of rape is the reaffirmation of the rapist’s unimpaired 
capacity to withdraw, the integrity of his body (if not his victim’s) recovered intact. 
(Fosco, we recall, returns to Marian the journal he has indelibly signed, and she, 
eventually, is stuck with it)’.  D. A. Miller, The Novel and the Police (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 181. Hardy also considers this 
kind of imprint left by rape, questioning why Tess Durbeyfield should have been 
so doomed: ‘Why it was that upon this beautiful feminine tissues, sensitive as 
gossamer, and practically blank as snow yet, there should have been traced such a 
coarse pattern as it was doomed to receive’. Thomas Hardy, Tess of the 
D’Urbervilles (London: Penguin, 2003).  
33 Galsworthy, The Forsyte Saga, 253. 
34 Ibid., 249. 
35 Ibid., 251. 
36 Ibid., 250. 
37 Ibid., 271. 
38 Ibid., 271. 
 
Bibliography  
 
Adams, James Eli. Dandies and Desert Saints. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1995. 
 
Anon. ‘Madness in Novels’. The Spectator, 3 February 1866.  
 
Austen, Jane. Emma. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.  
 The ‘Green-Eyed Monster’ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
90 
 
Blair, Emily. Virginia Woolf and the Nineteenth-Century Domestic Novel. Albany: 
State of New York Press, 1997. 
 
Burton, Robert. The Anatomy of Melancholy. New York: New York Review of 
Books, 2001. 
 
Castronovo, David. The English Gentleman: Images and Ideals in Literature and 
Society. New York: Ungar, 1987. 
 
Collins, Wilkie. The Woman in White. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 1993. 
 
Davey, J. G. ‘Lectures on Insanity, Delivered at the Bristol Medical School during 
the Summer Session of 1855: Lecture II’. The British Medical Journal (20 July 
1855). 
 
Edwards, P. D. Anthony Trollope: His Art and Scope. Hassock: Harvester Press, 
1966. 
 
Esquirol, Jean-Étienne. Mental Maladies; a Treatise on Insanity. Translated by E. 
A. Hunt.  Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1845. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. The Psychopathy of Everyday Life. London: Penguin, 2002. 
 
Frost, Ginger S. Living in Sin: Cohabiting as Husband and Wife in Nineteenth-
Century England. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2008.  
 
Gallagher, Catherine, and Thomas Lacqueur, eds. The Making of the Modern 
Body: Sexuality and Society in the Nineteenth Century. London: University of 
California Press, 1987. 
 
Galsworthy, John. The Forsyte Saga. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
Hager, Kelly. Dickens and the Rise of Divorce: The Failed-Marriage Plot and the 
Novel Tradition. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010. 
 
Hall, John N., ed. Letters of Anthony Trollope, Vol. II. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1983. 
 
Hammerton, A. James. Cruelty and Companionship: Conflict in Nineteenth-
Century Married Life. London: Routledge, 1992. 
 
Helen Goodman  
_______________________________________________________ 
91 
 
Hardy, Thomas. Tess of the D’Urbervilles. London: Penguin, 2003. 
 
Landels, William. The Marriage Ring: A Gift-Book for the Newly-Married and for 
Those Contemplating Marriage. London, Paris and New York: Cassell, Petter, 
Galphin & Co., 1883. 
 
Langland, Elizabeth. ‘Nobody’s Angels: Domestic Ideology and Middle-Class 
Women in the Victorian Novel’. PMLA 107, No. 2 (March 1992): 290–304. 
 
Linton, Eliza Lynn. Sowing the Wind. London: Tinsley Brothers, 1867. 
 
Markwick, Margaret, Deborah Denenholz Morz, and Regenia Gagnier, eds. The 
Politics of Gender in Anthony Trollope’s Novels. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2009.  
 
Miller, D. A. Narrative and Its Discontents. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1981. 
 
—––. The Novel and the Police. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1988. 
 
Milton, John. Paradise Lose. London: Penguin, 2000. 
 
Poovey, Mary. Uneven Developments: The Ideological Work of Gender in Mid-
Victorian England. London: Virago Press, 1989. 
 
—––. ‘Recovering Ellen Pickering’. Yale Journal of Criticism 13 (2000): 437–452. 
 
Prichard, James Cowles. A Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders Affecting the 
Mind. New York: Arno Press, 1973. 
 
Quackenbos, John. ‘Erotomania, Infatuation, Moral Perversion’. Hypnotic 
Therapeutics in Theory and Practice. n.p.: Harper and Brothers, 1908. 
 
Reade, Charles. Griffith Gaunt; or, Jealousy. New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1873. 
 
Richardson, Samuel. Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001. 
 
Shakespeare, William. Othello. Oxford: Heinemann Press, 2000. 
 
 The ‘Green-Eyed Monster’ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
92 
 
—––. As You Like It. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
Showalter, Elaine. The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 
1830-1980. London: Virago Press, 1987. 
 
Small, Helen. Love’s Madness: Medicine, The Novel, and Female Insanity, 1800-
1865. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 
 
Surridge, Lisa. Bleak Houses: Marital Violence in Victorian Fiction. Athens, OH: 
Ohio University Press, 2005. 
 
Tosh, John. A Man’s Place: Masculinity and the Middle-Class Home in Victorian 
England. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007. 
 
Trollope, Anthony. He Knew He Was Right. London: Penguin, 2004. 
 
Tromp, Marlene. The Private Rod: Marital Violence, Sensation and the Law in 
Victorian Britain. Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2000. 
 
Von Krafft-Ebing, Richard. Psychopathia Sexualis. New York: Arcade, 1965. 
 
Watt, Ian. The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970. 
 
Wiener, Martin L. Men of Blood: Violence, Manliness, and Criminal Justice in 
Victorian England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Wood, Ellen. St. Martin’s Eve. London: Tinsley Brothers, 1866. 
 
Helen Goodman is a PhD research student in the English Department at Royal 
Holloway, University of London. Her thesis on madness and masculinity in 
Victorian literature and culture examines fiction, the popular press, medical 
writings, and archived medical records from London’s lunatic asylums. 
Shackles of a Distant Self and the Damning Complicit 
 
Bernadette V. Russo 
 
Abstract 
The social construction of mental illness is often wielded as one of the most 
pervasive and effective instruments of colonisation, not only serving to separate the 
individual from society, but also the individual from the self. This chapter will 
explore the rationales, mechanisms, and effects surrounding those women who fall 
prey to insanity and those women who become complicit in deeming others as such 
through TsiTsi Dangarembga’s Nervous Conditions, as well as Charlotte Gilman’s 
‘The Yellow Wallpaper.’ Nervous Conditions, set in the 1960s in Zimbabwe, 
follows the story of a young Shona girl, Tambudazi, fighting to be educated and 
yet maintain her Shona identity. Dangarembga parallels Tambudazi throughout the 
story with her cousin Nyasha, who is raised in a completely hegemonic 
environment, struggles to rediscover her Shona identity, ultimately becomes 
anorexic, and is sent to a sanatorium. On the other hand, ‘The Yellow Wallpaper,’ 
set in 1890s England, narrated by the main character, follows a young married 
woman, who is constantly coerced by her physician husband to believe she suffers 
from a ‘nervous condition.’ Through the narration of her journal, her descent into 
actual madness is disclosed. The two works selected afford vastly differing 
contexts, plots, and characters, and yet reflect the same underlying dynamics 
regarding the colonisation of the female gendered space and the social 
constructions of insanity. These differences serve to illustrate and affirm the 
insidious patterns of colonisation of the female gendered space through the social 
construction of insanity.  
 
Key Words: Madness, female gendered space, colonisation, nervous conditions. 
 
***** 
 
1.  Introduction  
The social construction of mental illness is often wielded as one of the most 
pervasive and most effective instruments of colonisation, as it not only serves to 
separate the individual from society, but also the individual from the self. This 
chapter will explore the colonisation of the female gendered space through the 
rationales, mechanisms, and effects surrounding those women who fall prey to 
insanity, as well as the dynamics of those women who become complicit in the 
reinforcement of the patriarchal standards. This will be considered through TsiTsi 
Dangarembga’s Nervous Conditions and Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s ‘The Yellow 
Wallpaper.’ Intentionally disparate, the two works I selected afford vastly differing 
demographics, contexts, plots, and characters, yet reflect the same dynamics 
regarding the colonisation of the female gendered space and the social construction 
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of insanity. As a review of the existing analytical literature will reveal, the issue of 
the colonisation of the female gendered space is not new or ground-breaking, nor is 
the consideration of the social construction of insanity as a mechanism of control. 
What, then, is the significance of this chapter? Through this chapter, I endeavour to 
explore the expression of these dynamics across demographics and temporality, 
adding a crucial dimension which I term the ‘damning complicit’ through the 
vehicle of literature. 
This chapter makes an important distinction between madness and insanity. 
Since the Age of Reason, the modern concept of ‘madness’ has been synonymous 
with behaviour showing irreverence and a lack of judgment, that aligns with 
contemporary standards of decorum and reason.1 This construct is often ascribed to 
males for severely aberrant conduct that disrupts the stability of the social status 
quo, such as seen with libertines.2 While the medicalisation and labelling of 
unwanted behaviour is somewhat similar for men and women, a far more 
invalidating and disempowering process is reserved for the female gendered space. 
The term ‘insanity’ and its various subcategories, such as hysteria and neurosis, 
imply mental defect incompetence, or an inability to reason, and are most often 
employed when referring to aberrant female behaviour. This difference in labelling 
underscores the difference in the perception and approach by society to unwanted 
conduct between men and women, with madness focusing on behaviour and 
insanity invalidating mental state, indicative of the specific dynamics involved in 
the use of insanity as an implement of subjugation of the female gendered space.  
The social construction of insanity is employed as a tool of hegemony and 
serves both as deterrent and discipline for aberrant female behaviour. In Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault posits that the body serves as a 
metaphor of political power and that the social constructions of disease and 
confinement serve as mechanisms of control over those paradigms of power.3 
Given the medicalisation of the female gendered space, the body becomes the site 
of contested power for those women who choose to rebel against the normative 
standards established by the patriarchal society. The three major forms of control 
over the body according to Foucault are hospitals, asylums, and prisons. Here I 
focus on the dynamics associated with the implementation of asylums as a form of 
control. Like the native intellectual described by Fanon, the female intellectual 
must choose to either accept the normative standards that colonise and subjugate 
her, or rebel and descend into a separation from society and its construction of 
reality. Through a combination of psychosocial dynamics, the female is forced to 
choose between being othered and accepting subjugation. To be othered in this 
instance is to accept the label of insanity, which becomes internalised and 
integrated into the individual’s identity, thereby delivering the female into the 
realm of the hysteric whose perceptions and constructions of self are invalidated by 
the very standards that define her. Conversely, subjugation entails the acceptance 
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of the role and obedience to the behavioural standards deemed by the mainstream, 
patriarchal society as normal or sane, and the loss of self.  
Fanon describes this dynamic through his analysis of the experience of colonial 
hegemony for the native intellectual in Black Skin, White Mask and The Wretched 
of the Earth. He explains that the native intellectual comes to a point in awareness 
where he must choose to either hate his own skin to accept and be accepted into 
mainstream Anglo society, or he must choose to reject mainstream Anglo society 
and embrace his identity, becoming sociopathic in the process. Fanon contends that 
this leads to the neurosis, or nervous condition, encountered by the native 
intellectual.4 These two elements, the invalidation and the othering from 
mainstream society and the separation from self, unite to form an effective tool of 
hegemony and colonisation of the female gendered space just as with the native 
intellectual.5 Women must acquiesce and obey the regimen of behavioural 
expectations associated with their designated roles or face alienation from society 
and self. 
 
2.  A Consideration of Nervous Conditions 
Nervous Conditions, set in 1960s Zimbabwe, follows the story of a young 
Shona girl, Tambudazi, fighting to be educated and yet maintain her Shona 
identity.6 Dangarembga parallels Tambudazi, who is raised in a poor Shona 
village, throughout the story with her cousin Nyasha, who is raised in a completely 
hegemonic environment and struggles to rediscover her Shona identity, ultimately 
becomes anorexic, and is sent to a sanitorium. The two girls function as a binary 
main character although the story is told from Tambudazi’s perspective. Though 
there are several other female characters that also experience various nervous 
conditions, the emphasis of this analysis will focus on the binary main characters.  
At the level of Fanon’s original explanation of nervous conditions, this binary main 
character serves as an allegory of the native intellectual’s choices: complete 
assimilation, loss of self, and ultimate insanity when trying to reclaim a 
disconnected identity in the character of Nyasha; or, maintain ethnic identity and 
female gendered space, conquer the demons of hegemony, and ultimately advance 
while preserving identity in the character of Tambudazi. In Nervous Conditions, 
Dangarembga extends Fanon’s interpretation of the native intellectual’s 
experiences of colonisation, post-colonisation and the subsequent hegemonic 
institutions that permeate the postcolonial society to include the voice of the female 
gendered space.7 The title itself is indicative of Dangarembga’s intention to 
explore and expose the neurosis associated with these effects as describe
on.   
There are several women that may be considered in Nervous Conditions; 
however, I shall focus primarily on two of the main female characters and the 
primary damning complicit. Nyasha is first encountered in the story as she enters 
adolescence. As the story progresses, she fights against the normative social values 
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, this forms the division from self, Fanon’s previously discussed state 
of 
milated and absorbed into the machinery of the 
ainstream patriarchal society.   
3. 
of both the Shona culture and the British culture, rejecting gender role constraints 
regarding power and sexuality. This division of self from society is exemplary of 
the dynamic described by Fanon regarding the native intellectual.8 Babamuruku, 
Nyasha’s father, himself a metaphor for both hegemony and the patriarchal society, 
continuously attempts to tame Nyasha’s nature into obedience and submission, but 
to no avail. Nyasha uses her body - specifically control over her weight - as a locus 
of power against Babamuruku, developing anorexia nervosa. The weight of a 
woman in the Shona culture is a reflection on the wealth of her family; hence, the 
more hefty a female’s weight, the higher status the family is considered to have. 
This, coupled with the sexual association between voluptuousness and femininity, 
underscores the symbolism of anorexia as a response to the colonisation of the 
female gendered space. Ultimately, there is a physical confrontation between the 
two as Babamuruku tries to force Nyasha to eat, regardless of her own appetite. He 
states, ‘She must eat her food, all of it. She is always doing this, challenging me.’9 
Nyasha mockingly devours the food and then proceeds to regurgitate it in the 
bathroom, signifying a rejection of her father’s power and reclaiming control of her 
own body. Here, Nyasha’s actions, as she later acknowledges, signify a choice: 
insanity in the form of anorexia over subjugation and submission to the patriarchal 
society; hence
neurosis.10 
The damning complicit in Nervous Conditions is represented by the character 
of Maiguru, Nyasha’s mother. She consistently attempts to reinforce the standards 
of conduct and expectations set forth by Babmuruku and all that he represents. At 
one point, she does acknowledge Nyasha’s plight and the validity of Nyasha’s 
arguments, but then immediately reverts to the part of damning complicit when she 
considers her own position. This dynamic, as discussed, is a survival mechanism. 
On the one hand, the complicit female comprehends the issues and empathizes 
with the insane female in a moment of enlightenment, yet she consciously then 
denies the moment and reverts to collusion with the hegemonic patriarchal 
structure in invalidating the reality of the allegedly insane female. Ultimately, the 
damning complicit female is assi
m
 
An Analysis of ‘The Yellow Wallpaper’ 
‘The Yellow Wallpaper,’ set in 1890s Victorian England and narrated by the 
main character, follows a young married woman, who is constantly coerced by her 
physician husband John to believe she suffers from a nervous condition. He brings 
her to a summer home retreat following the birth of their child to recover, 
indicating a condition that might now be construed as postnatal depression. She 
repeatedly attempts to tell him that she needs to be able to express and discuss her 
feelings by writing and socialising with others, but he quashes her attempts by 
patronising her with assurances that he knows best and that his actions are in her 
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h them to maintain and ensure Charlotte’s compliance with his 
dir
tially the same as described by Fanon regarding the native 
int
, Jane pulls back into her role and returns to compliance with 
hn’s directives. 
4. 
best interest. John goes so far as to enlist the assistance of his spinster sister who 
resides wit
ectives. 
Through the narration of her journal, her descent into actual madness is 
disclosed. The main character, Charlotte, is systematically stripped of those things 
that comprise her adult identity by her husband’s paternalistic dictates, ranging 
from her ability to write in her journal to her perception of her own state of health. 
Her husband repeatedly tells Charlotte that her thoughts and feelings are invalid, 
denigrating them as childish folly in the guise of caretaking. He paternalistically 
dominates her existence. Furthermore, he creates and girds a schism based on 
cognitive dissonance within Charlotte, as she struggles to reconcile her experience 
of oppression and his claims of love and care. This is perhaps one of the most 
effective forms of colonisation, separating the individual from his/her self. The 
mechanism is essen
ellectual.11  
Underscoring this interpretation of Foucault’s panopticon is internalised 
Gilman’s depiction of internalised oppression.12 Here, the role of the damning 
complicit is played by the character Jane, John’s sister, who is asked to observe 
Charlotte during the day, while John is at work. John directs her to not allow 
Charlotte to write, walk too much, be outside for too long, travel about the 
neighbourhood, or perform any strenuous activities. In addition to these duties, 
Jane must inform John of Charlotte’s behaviours and progress throughout the day. 
As Charlotte attempts to write in her journal, she must avoid being observed by 
Jane for fear that Jane will tell John. The few lines the character Jane does speak 
are to reinforce to Charlotte that John’s directives are for her own good - with one 
exception. Near the end of the story, as Charlotte is making her final descent into 
complete psychosis, Jane enters the room and sees a great deal of the wallpaper 
shredded and pulled from the wall. Charlotte tells Jane that she did it ‘... out of 
pure spite for the vicious thing,’ to which Charlotte recounts that Jane, ‘... laughed 
and said she wouldn’t mind doing it herself.’13 While the ‘vicious thing’ may 
indeed be the woman behind the wall paper, it may also be contended that the 
‘vicious thing’ is John, and that Jane’s response is an acknowledgement of both 
John’s role and a validation of Charlotte’s response. This analysis of the wallpaper 
is supported by several passages in the text that denote the yellow wallpaper to 
symbolise John. However, in line with previously noted behavioural analysis of the 
damning complicit
Jo
 
Conclusion 
Through this chapter, I contend that the medicalisation of female behaviour, 
specifically those labelled forms of insanity, is used as a tool of hegemony to 
institute and preserve female gender roles generated by the dominant patriarchy.  
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 a range of texts within the fields of postcolonial literature and 
ender studies. 
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Love and Music: Representations of Madness in Tolstoy 
and Nabokov 
 
Ekaterina Yasko 
 
Abstract 
This chapter aims to trace the interpretation of the phenomena of music and 
sensual love leading to insanity in writing by Leo Tolstoy and Vladimir Nabokov, 
whose views undoubtedly contribute to an understanding of the cultural 
significance of madness in general. In both stories passionate love and music 
function as indicators of insanity for the male protagonist. ‘The Kreutzer Sonata’ 
(1889) narrates the recollections of the main character’s murder of his wife, 
suspected of an affair with a violinist. Nabokov’s ‘Music’ (1932) parallels 
Tolstoy’s story in the adultery motif. The protagonist attends a piano concert, 
where he meets his former wife. Likewise, the narration focuses upon the 
disorienting and overwhelming effect of music and passionate love on the heroes' 
actions; however, it is remarkably contrasting in the after-effect. For both 
characters insanity engenders an entirely new emotional and spiritual state. 
Nonetheless, while rage and frenzy seize them both, ‘The Kreutzer Sonata’ results 
in the murder, while in ‘Music’ the protagonist’s transformation entails forgiving, 
and giving life instead of taking it. Sensual love never made sense for Tolstoy 
himself, whilst Nabokov never found meaning for music, calling it an unhealthy 
passion. For the heroes of the analysed stories love and music embody an illusory, 
inorganic reality, an unfamiliar language, inapproachable and maddening. Yet both 
writers turn to love and music motifs to illustrate the manifestations of insanity, 
which eventually gains transformative and sense-creating characteristics. 
 
Key Words: Love, music, madness. 
 
***** 
 
The phenomenon of music is complex and is linked to cultural, 
phenomenological, cognitive and artistic factors. To understand music in its fullest 
sense is to be willing to entertain a variety of perspectives. This chapter will 
explore the paradigm of love-music-madness in the stories by Leo Tolstoy and 
Vladimir Nabokov, whose views can undoubtedly contribute to the understanding 
of the cultural significance of madness.  
In ‘Musical Worlds: New Directions in the Philosophy of Music’ (1998) Philip 
Alperson observes, that ‘philosophers have wondered at music’s ability to stir and 
express the deepest recesses of human beings, at the place of music in human 
affairs in general.’1 The way the authors in question use the motifs of love and 
music to illustrate their maddening effect on the main character is essential for the 
understanding of the characters’ motifs and behaviour. Tolstoy’s views on music 
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illustrate a close connection between artistic and ethical experience. The principal 
question for the writer was whether the work of art is valuable, whether such 
experience is worth it.2 In the writer’s view, the problem was primarily the value 
of music, only sincere music can reveal something; moreover, music in general 
must serve the common good. The major function of music is to evoke love: music 
in Tolstoy’s system is irreversibly related to the concepts of Truth, Love and 
Beauty, highly appreciated by the writer. Tolstoy is known for his never-ending 
attempts to penetrate the Truth, the Essence. The author denies beauty as a 
criterion in music, in his view Art should express eternal values and ideals. Music 
must be sincere: the meaning of music is constantly reinventing, reconstructing 
itself. It should assist the achievement of the organic unity of mankind.  
It is important to note that, while Tolstoy was a connoisseur of music, Nabokov 
constantly emphasised his ignorance in this field. Nonetheless, Nabokov’s 
observation of music is incredibly precise and profound. With his sceptical attitude 
towards music, Nabokov often places music in the very mechanism of his prose, 
making it contribute to the general apprehension of his works as well as to the 
stylistic effect. As Penelope Gouk notes in ‘Music’s Pathological and Therapeutic 
Effects on the Body Politics,’ the influence of music is ‘perhaps, greater than that 
of any fine arts.’3 Similarly, in Tolstoy’s stories music expresses an excess of 
something, as if splashing out from the very depths of human soul, producing a 
particular effect on the main character, altering his views, shattering his personal 
world. It functions as a manifestation of an alternative world, an epiphany, as 
something unremembered, as reminiscence of something that has never existed. In 
the same way, music in Nabokov’s work is described in terms of a recollection of 
the protagonist’s past. The story itself is based on the main character’s recollection 
of life with his former wife before she committed adultery. 
Although Victor, the protagonist, is not able to fully comprehend the music, it 
contains some specific and personal meaning for him.4 Indeed, it brings back the 
recollections he is eager to leave in his past, it disrupts the balance he has taken 
pains to establish: ‘he tried to ward off the thunder and rush of the past with trivial 
thoughts.’5 Here music corresponds to a recollection, alongside with the acoustic 
background of Victor’s reminiscence, the rush of the waves: music here is a 
reconstruction of memory, a sudden stroke of intuition. It is notable that Victor 
foresees the coming break-up with his wife, and Nabokov portrays this coming to a 
close motif with the help of musical imagery: 
 
The music must be drawing to a close. When they come, those 
stormy, gasping chords, it usually signifies that the end is near. 
Another intriguing word, end... Rend, impend...Thunder rending 
the sky, dust clouds of impending doom.6 
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The paradigm of love-music-madness marks the reversion to the hero’s 
unconscious. Hence we come across the reminiscence motif, which unites all the 
three phenomena: ‘I must start all over again, trying to forget everything, 
everything that had already been almost forgotten, plus this evening on top of it.’7   
There is a close connection of music and the physical, emotional state of the 
hero. Nabokov employs the images of the pulsating rhythm of music and the 
protagonist’s heartbeat. We should also point to the musicality of the very 
language of the writers: 
 
We’ll be happy forever - what melody in that phrase, what 
shimmer! The last many-clawed, ponderous chords another, and 
just enough breath left. For one more, and, after this concluding 
chord, with which the music seemed to have surrendered its soul 
entirely, the performer took aim and, with feline precision, struck 
one simple, quite separate little golden note. The musical barrier 
dissolved.8 
 
The ponderable sounds here correspond apparently to the heaviness of the past 
Victor cannot help carrying.  
L. Addis stresses the issue of the power of music: he speaks about motion and 
emotion as sharing etymology.9 Music inevitably implies dynamics, it engenders 
transformation. It is as eternal changing, fluidity, like the image of the sea in 
Nabokov’s story, an eternal flow. Likewise, love is traditionally conceived as 
something idealistic, constant and ultimate, whereas it actually possesses the 
characteristics of a process that the characters fail to fix. Music gives a new 
sensation of life for Nabokov’s character, a mystical sensation, a sense of 
authenticity. It is noteworthy that Nabokov describes music in spatial terms (vaults 
of sound). Moreover, it possesses dynamic nature; it is compared to a black forest 
of ascending notes, a slope or gap. 
Tolstoy’s main character, Pozdnyshev, conveys his fears and worries to the 
music: he does not hate the music but himself. Music becomes a symbol of anxiety, 
whereas Nabokov’s portrayal of music is not intelligible for both heroes, music 
signifies an unknown, alternative reality. Nabokov persistently switches the focus 
from describing reflections of the characters towards characterising music as 
imaginary and immaterial. The author portrays music as ghostly, imaginary, and 
unattainable: the barrier of sounds remained just as high and impenetrable. This 
situation seems maddening to the main character: he is captured in the world, 
which is utterly unfamiliar to him, disturbing and disorienting. Moreover, he sees 
his former wife, whom he has been trying to forget for two years, among the 
listeners. The moment Victor notices his former wife in the room, his heart starts 
beating, disorderly, as if contradicting the music. Thus, the heartbeat, as a symbol 
of the real life, contradicts here the power of the ghostly music. Music, as well, 
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seems to be the patter of a conversation in a strange tongue: everything slips and 
merges. A famous Tolstoy’s passage from ‘Kreutzer Sonata’ illustrates a dreadful 
effect of music: 
 
A terrible thing is that sonata, especially the presto! And a 
terrible thing is music in general. What is it? Why does it do 
what it does? They say that music stirs the soul. Stupidity! A lie! 
It acts, it acts frightfully (I speak for myself), but not in an 
ennobling way. It acts neither in an ennobling nor a debasing 
way, but in an irritating way.10 
 
For Nabokov’s protagonist, music is like a mirage, it is illusory, and he 
experiences an uncomfortable feeling of unreality. Both Pozdnyshev and Victor 
become aware of the new world opening for them with the music. Victor confesses 
that new sentiments, new virtualities, of which he was formerly ignorant, had 
developed in him. For Victor the experience of music proves to be painful and 
disturbing. Likewise, Pozdnyshev observes the music’s subversive influence on his 
wife: ‘everything was directed against her, especially that abominable music.’11 
The magic of music, drawing back the memories, is as painful to him as it is a bliss 
he is actually sorry to lose. Victor’s attempts to overwhelm his love, to gain a full 
insight into it, fail. He cannot possess his wife completely: 
 
She was velvetsoft all over, one longed to gather her up the way 
one could gather up a foal and its folded legs. Embrace her and 
fold her. And then what? What could one do to possess her 
completely? I love your liver, your kidneys, your blood cells. To 
this she would reply, “Don’t be disgusting.”12 
 
Similarly, Victor fails to comprehend music, which remains unattainable for 
him. It should be taken into consideration that although both narratives centre on 
the topic of love and adultery, it is music, included in their titles, which reveals the 
true nature of the characters’ behaviour. It is transformative in its essence: even 
though the characters themselves are not engaged in it immediately, they are 
deeply affected by it. In ‘The Kreutzer Sonata’ love functions as the reason for the 
consequent dramatic events. At the same time, the main character considers music 
to be the pretext for the alleged adultery and his eventual frenzy. Pozdnyshev finds 
his wife’s beauty particularly disturbing: ‘she had acquired that provoking beauty 
that stirs men…The very sight of her was enough to frighten one.’13 The same way 
as passionate love and music, the main character finds his wife’s attractiveness 
madding. Pozdnyshev acknowledges the typical character of such a situation and 
does not blame his wife for it. He emphasises that the fault was not in her, she was 
like everybody else, like the majority. In the same way, the adultery only functions 
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in the narrative as a pretext for the main character’s murder of his wife. 
Pozdnyshev speaks of the commonness of the ‘spiritual killing’ in every 
household: ‘the imbeciles! They think that I killed my wife on the 5th of October… 
It was long before that I immolated her, just as they all kill now.’14  
Pozdnyshev’s insane condition starts developing with an increasing feeling of 
hatred. He repeatedly emphasises the inevitable cohesion of love and hatred: ‘our 
mutual hatred was again concealed beneath an access of sensual desire,’15 
although, of course, it is the passionate and sensual part of love the author implies 
here. It is highly significant that Nabokov’s protagonist does not differentiate 
between spiritual and physical sides of love, relating his state of being in love to 
bliss, something very complete, highlighting its integrity. Notably, however, love 
is portrayed as something unfathomable for Victor.  
Both stories share the imprisonment motif, developed in different ways. It is 
bliss (however strange and insane) for Victor to be trapped by the music in the 
same space with his former wife: 
 
Victor realized that the music, which before had seemed a 
narrow dungeon where, shackled together by the resonant 
sounds, they had been compelled to sit face-to-face some twenty 
feet apart, had actually been incredible bliss, a magic glass dome 
that had embraced and imprisoned him and her, had made it 
possible for him to breathe the same air as she; and now 
everything had been broken and scattered, she was disappearing 
through the door, Wolf had shut the piano, and the enchanting 
captivity could not be restored.16 
 
Again, here music creates a blissful captivity. Victor cannot embrace music and 
love, on the contrary, music and love here is the overwhelming element, possessing 
his mind and soul. Music creates a common context for him and his wife. The 
imprisonment motif in Tolstoy’s story reflects the insanity and absurdity of the 
whole situation the main character finds himself in: 
 
We were like two galley-slaves fastened to the same ball, cursing 
each other, poisoning each other’s existence, and trying to shake 
each other off. I was still unaware that ninety-nine families out of 
every hundred live in the same hell, and that it cannot be 
otherwise.17 
 
Although in ‘The Music’ adultery is committed in real terms, it entails no desire of 
revenge from the part of the protagonist. Victor does not feel anger towards his 
wife, contrariwise, he is granting her forgiveness: 
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How silly it would have been to think of killing her. Live on, 
live. Live as you are living now; as you are sitting now, sit like 
that forever. Come, look at me, I implore you, please, please 
look. I’ll forgive you everything, because someday we must all 
die, and then we shall know everything, and everything will be 
forgiven so why put it off? Look at me, look at me, turn.18 
 
It is also noteworthy that, unlike Nabokov’s story, ‘The Kreutzer Sonata’ bears 
no reference to an actual case of adultery. Pozdnyshev murders his wife, while 
Victor is eager to regain his formers wife’s love, feeling the insanity of their being 
apart. In Tolstoy’s story the state Pozdnyshev has to live in presents such an insane 
condition for the main character, that he considers no other way out, but to destroy 
the outward source of his anxiety - namely, his wife. Pozdnyshev describes 
jealousy as one of the most disruptive elements, leading to the hero’s insanity: 
 
Oh, what a frightful feeling of jealousy! I do not speak of that 
real jealousy which has foundations (it is tormenting, but it 
promises an issue), but of that unconscious jealousy which 
inevitably accompanies every immoral marriage, and which, 
having no cause, has no end. This jealousy is frightful. Frightful, 
that is the word.19 
 
Here, again, the author links the phenomenon of jealousy to the problem of the 
immorality of non-spiritual love. He ascribes madness to the fact that the majority 
of people live immorally. However, Pozdnyshev confesses in the artifice of this 
pretext:  
 
If the pretext had not been jealousy, I should have discovered 
another. The whole tragedy was due to the fact that this man 
came into our house at a time when an immense abyss had 
already been dug between us, that frightful tension of mutual 
hatred, in which the slightest motive sufficed to precipitate the 
crisis.20 
 
Hence, his wife’s alleged lover was not the true reason for the main character’s 
behaviour. In the course of time, Pozdnyshev feels nothing but hatred towards his 
wife. Eventually, the desire to get rid of the source of his anxiety, his wife, starts 
evolving in his mind, turning into a fixed idea for the main character: 
 
Thousands of plans of vengeance, of ways of getting rid of her, 
and how to arrange this, and act as if nothing had happened, all 
this passed through my head. I thought of these things, and I 
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smoked, and smoked, and smoked. I thought of running away, of 
making my escape, of going to America. I went so far as to 
dream how beautiful it would be, after getting rid of her, to love 
another woman, entirely different from her. I should be rid of 
her.21 
 
It is notable that in the course of the development of his wife’s relationship 
with the musician she played together with, Pozdnyshev, in an incongruent 
manner, maintains this musical alliance: 
 
And my hatred increases tenfold, but I do not dare to give it free 
force, because at the bottom of my soul I know that there are no 
real reasons for it, and I remain in my seat, feigning indifference, 
and exaggerating my attention and courtesy to HIM.22 
 
This ‘getting rid of’ motif develops rapidly, and Pozdnyshev, being utterly 
overwhelmed with his fixed idea, is still absolutely conscious of his every thought 
and action: 
 
In abandoning myself to my anger, I became steeped in it, and I 
wanted to commit some violent act to show the force of my fury. 
I felt a terrible desire to beat her, to kill her.23 
 
As we see, the main character is aware of every single moment of the murder, 
however, he does not seem to realise that he is actually killing: he rather perceives 
it as liberation, as release from the imprisonment of love and music: 
 
I perceived that I was completely mad, that I must be frightful, 
and I was glad of it. With a sudden impulse, and with all my 
strength, I dealt her, with my left elbow, a blow squarely in the 
face. And the reply must correspond to the condition into which I 
had lashed myself, and which was increasing and must continue 
to increase. Rage has its laws.24 
 
In the original Tolstoy uses the musical term crescendo. The main character’s 
madness develops gradually, first shifting from the spells of hatred to those of 
passionate love, and finally culminating in the persistent desire to get rid of the 
object of his enragement. Only after the fit of rage and madness is over does 
Pozdnyshev realise he actually murdered a real person: ‘then only, when I saw her 
dead face, did I understand all that I had done. I understood that it was I, I, who 
had killed her.’25 It is also significant, that Pozdnyshev concludes his story with 
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repetition of  forgive me, the words he could not utter looking at his dying wife. He 
seems to be showing repentance for the murder.  
The stories analysed are unified by the adultery motif, but solved in different 
ways. In the story by Nabokov, the protagonist is willing to forgive his wife: ‘I’ll 
forgive you everything, because someday we must all die, and then we shall know 
everything, and everything will be forgiven so why put it off?’26 In his analysis of 
‘Anna Karenina,’ Nabokov links the motif of passionate love to that of death. And 
in ‘The Kreutzer Sonata’ the music motif, together with that of passionate love, is 
related apparently to the death motif. Moreover, passion here leads to a crime. In 
Nabokov’s case, music gives an impulse to the inner transformation, 
metamorphosis of the main character. 
Tolstoy called music a ‘stenography’ of feelings: he was endlessly trying to 
figure out the mystery of music and its hypnotic impact. In ‘The Kreutzer Sonata’ 
music becomes source of anxiety; it signifies a rupture to the irrational and 
uncontrollable. Mechanical, spiritless love is egoistic in its essence. The author 
develops two types of his heroines (and two types of love, respectively): self-
giving, sacrificial, and fatal, disruptive. While Tolstoy demarcates distinctly 
sensual and spiritual love, Nabokov links the phenomenon of love to the 
otherworldly. The experience of love is linked to the opportunity of penetrating the 
divine, higher reality. It is not reduced to the earthly; music and love should bring 
an opportunity for a transformation. They give a clue to the essence of human 
existence. 
It should be noted that in Tolstoy’s case ethics is strongly associated with 
aesthetics, whereas Nabokov’s ethical standpoint seems to be not so strongly 
articulated in the text. However, Nabokov succeeded the nineteenth-century 
tradition at both moral and ideological levels, rethinking and redefining its 
experience. The writer detested ‘The Kreutzer Sonata,’ being strongly opposed to 
Tolstoy’s didacticism.27 ‘The Music’ is often interpreted as a response to ‘The 
Kreutzer Sonata’s’ didactic essence. However, in spite of the deliberate non-
didactic character of Nabokov’s story, the author does not turn away from the 
ideals, shared by Tolstoy: Love and Beauty remain major aesthetic criteria for both 
writers. 
 
Notes 
 
1 Alperson Philip, Musical Worlds: New Directions in the Philosophy of Music 
(University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1998), 1. 
2 Budd Malcolm, Music and the Emotions: The Philosophical Theories (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), 121. 
 
Ekaterina Yasko 
__________________________________________________________________ 
109 
 
3 Penelope Gouk, Music’s Pathological and Therapeutic Effects on the Body 
Politics: Representing Emotions: New Connections in the Histories of Art, Music 
and Medicine (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 191. 
4 Lisa Zunchine, Nabokov at the Limits: Redrawing Critical Boundaries (New 
York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1999), 77. 
5 Vladimir Nabokov, Short Stories (Vintage International Edition, Random House, 
NY, 1997), 196. 
6 Ibid., 198. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Laird Addis, Of Mind And Music (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 1. 
10 Leo Tolstoy, The Kreutzer Sonata and Other Stories (Rockville, Maryland: Arc 
Manor, 2008), 65. 
11 Ibid., 64. 
12 Nabokov, Short Stories, 198. 
13 Ibid., 52. 
14 Ibid., 54. 
15 Tolstoy, The Kreutzer Sonata and Other Stories, 33. 
16 Nabokov, Short Stories, 199. 
17 Tolstoy, The Kreutzer Sonata, 50. 
18 Nabokov, Short Stories, 198. 
19 Tolstoy, The Kreutzer Sonata, 40. 
20 Ibid., 54. 
21 Ibid., 55. 
22 Ibid., 40. 
23 Ibid., 63. 
24 Ibid., 77. 
25 Ibid., 82. 
26 Nabokov, Short Stories, 198. 
27 Steven Kelmann, Torpid Smoke: The Stories of Vladimir Nabokov (Amsterdam: 
Editions Rodopi, 2000), 67. 
 
Bibliography 
 
Addis, Laird. Of Mind and Music. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004. 
 
Alperson, Philip. Musical Worlds: New Directions in the Philosophy of Music. PA, 
University Park: Penn State Press, 1998. 
 
 
Love and Music 
__________________________________________________________________ 
110 
 
Budd, Malcolm. Music and the Emotions: The Philosophical Theories. New York: 
Routledge, 1992. 
 
Gouk, Penelope. Music’s Pathological and Therapeutic Effects on the Body 
Politics: Representing Emotions. New Connections in the Histories of Art, Music 
and Medicine. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005. 
 
Kelmann, Steven. Torpid Smoke: The Stories of Vladimir Nabokov. Amterdam: 
Editions Rodopi, 2000. 
 
Nabokov, Vladimir. Short Stories. New York: Vintage International Edition, 
Random House, 1997. 
 
Tolstoy, Leo. The Kreutzer Sonata and Other Stories. Rockville, Maryland: Arc 
Manor, 2008. 
 
Zunchine, Lisa. Nabokov at the Limits: Redrawing Critical Boundaries. New 
York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1999. 
 
Ekaterina Yasko is a postgraduate student at Moscow City Pedagogical 
University (MCPU), Russia, currently studying the problem of evil in American 
nineteenth-century literature. 
 
Samuel Beckett’s Radio Drama: Making Sense of a 
‘Radio Panopticon’ 
 
Tzu-Ching Yeh 
 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates obscure, maddening confinement in Rough for Radio II, a 
radio play by Samuel Beckett, as well as the apparatus of radio itself. Rough II is 
replete with images of violence, torture and confinement, which suggests the 
milieu of psychiatry. The display of overt power, which is evidently invoked in this 
play, justifies my reason to place Michel Foucault’s argument at the centre of my 
debate. The examination of the milieu in Beckett’s radio plays, invoking 
Foucault’s notion of Panopticism, is two-fold: the surveying system and the 
institution of the internalised visibility. First, this chapter will examine how 
Beckett uses surveillance as disciplinary power in Rough II. Then, I will argue how 
Beckett’s confined protagonists develop their internalised surveillance of 
themselves. Critics in David Lyon’s edited volume of Theorizing Surveillance 
(2006) repeatedly exploit Foucault’s Panopticism as a framework to investigate 
surveillance. However, their focus on actual visibility, such as the application of 
CCTV, is more in line with Jeremy Bentham’s design of panoptic architecture. In 
contrast, Foucault’s notion of Panopticism is the internalisation of visibility that 
comes to the fore. The application of a panoptic implement, thus, can be implanted 
in an alternative fashion, as long as internalised vision can be triggered. I will 
investigate the application of radio to consider whether the discipline of 
internalised visibility is illuminating based on Foucault’s Panopticism. In short, I 
want to question if Beckett’s radio plays can be studied in the light of Foucault’s 
Panopticism, by inquiring whether the nature of radio can be considered a panoptic 
apparatus, which I will dub a radio panopticon. 
 
Key Words: Samuel Beckett, Michel Foucault, radio, Panopticism, visibility, radio 
panopticon, Rough for Radio II. 
 
***** 
 
1.  Introduction: Extension of Foucault’s Panopticism in Modern Technology 
Surveillance study under the rubric of Michel Foucault’s Panopticism has 
prevailed among scholars in recent years, and its famous example is found in 
George Orwell’s Big Brother in Nineteen Eighty-Four, published in 1949. 
Surveillance study proliferates in sociology in recent years due to its relevance to 
society. Critics have developed new approaches in surveillance studies based on 
Foucault’s concept of Panopticism especially in Discipline and Punish, by 
incorporating new technologies. David Lyon, for example, has compiled a series of 
surveillance studies by associating Foucault’s Panopticism with different means of 
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modern or contemporary technological applications. Lyon points out that critics 
spot deficiencies in Foucault’s regime of surveillance studies due to its failure to 
incorporate electronic technology in the contemporary era; hence, he calls for 
extension of surveillance theory to surpass the limitation of Foucault’s 
Panopticism.1  
Kevin D. Haggerty rightly indicates that there is ‘a host of other key qualities 
and processes of surveillance that fall outside of the panoptic framework’2 in the 
light of new technological developments. Expanded notions of Panopticism are 
thus put into play to accommodate various new technologies. As a result, a wealth 
of new panoptical proposals results in coinages such as super-panopticon, 
electronic panopticon, post-panopticon, neo-panopticon, omnicon, industrial 
panopticon, global panopticon, cybernetic panopticon, and so forth.3 The demand 
for remodelling Foucault’s power of surveillance is necessary to better 
accommodate innovation in technology in modern society. According to 
Haggarty’s observation, ‘Alternative models of surveillance are apparent in 
[Foucault’s] works on biopower.’4 Foucault manages to remodel the iconic notion 
of surveillance involving technology. In his discussion of ‘biopower’ Foucault 
stresses how technologies are ‘used for analysing, controlling, regulating and 
defining the human body and its behaviour’ under the principle of disciplinary 
power.5 The employment of ‘biopower’ relies on the engagement of institutions 
which can control people to ‘make them “docile bodies.”’6 Foucault’s ‘biopower’ 
is created when the agent of power is mediated by technology, which is also 
realised in the technology of radio. If biopower is included as an alternative to 
Panopticism, instead of limiting its application to the original model of panoptic 
architecture, it opens the possibility to incorporate new technology in surveillance 
study. 
Substantial research has been undertaken to study surveillance in relation to 
Foucault’s Panopticism, and a growing fascination has arisen among Foucault’s 
scholars to explore new developments in technology. However, I have observed a 
misreading or a misleading approach among critics and commentators who refer to 
Foucault’s Panopticism interchangeably with surveillance study. I intend to argue, 
in the first instance, that critics (especially among sociologists) abuse Foucault’s 
Panopticism based on a conceptual confusion with Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. 
The English philosopher and social theorist, Jeremy Bentham, designed the 
Panopticon, a type of prison building, to allow an observer situated in the central 
tower, to observe all prisoners in the peripheral ring, without being seen.7  
Bentham’s design of the Panopticon is, in essence, different from Foucault’s 
application of Panopticism based on a contrasting application of visibility (which I 
will discuss next). Nevertheless, critics accurately point out the possibility to apply 
Foucault’s Panopticism to new technology. Therefore, I want to question if Samuel 
Beckett’s radio plays can be studied in the light of Foucault’s Panopticism, by 
inquiring whether radio can be regarded as a panoptic apparatus. 
Tzu-Ching Yeh 
__________________________________________________________________ 
113 
2.  The Trap of Visibility 
Surveillance studies often employ visual inspection reciprocally with 
Foucault’s Panopticism. Critics apply Foucault’s Panopticism when combining 
surveillance with new technological applications, and underscore the mechanism of 
visibility, or the gaze. The position of actual watchers for supervision is 
highlighted, and this consequence proves problematic. For instance, Haggerty 
suggests ‘it matters enormously who is actually conducting surveillance;’ he thus 
criticises that ‘the panoptic model provides no sustained account of the role or 
importance of the watchers.’8 He accuses Foucault of failing to investigate the role 
of the overseer in the panoptic apparatus. However, I consider it misleading to 
focus on the identity of the watcher instead of on the purpose of Foucault’s 
surveying system. I will therefore discover the purpose of visibility to clarify 
Foucault’s concept. 
Foucault’s Panopticism is in debt to Bentham’s Panopticon (published in 
1787), and he quotes extensively from Bentham’s panoptic architecture in 
Discipline and Punish. Bentham’s design of a penal architecture highlights the 
‘overseeing gaze’ to gain ‘“all-seeing” power.’9 Surveillance is tied to visibility in 
Bentham’s Panopticon because the confined object ‘is seen, but he does not see’ 
the observer within the tower.10 In principle, power is created when prison guards 
are assumed to watch prisoners, while its supervision on each prisoner remains 
unverifiable: 
 
Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall 
outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. 
Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being 
looked at at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may 
always be so.11 
 
The prisoner cannot confirm if the director is watching him, he assumes that he is 
being watched at all times. That is, the power incurred from visible confined object 
and invisible subject of the director aims at disciplining prisoners’ automatic sense 
that they are being watched.  
Foucault shows delight that Bentham’s design of Panopticon manages ‘to 
induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the 
automatic functioning of power.’12 Prisoners are caught in their own suspicion of 
always being watched, and discipline themselves automatically. With this 
automatism at work,  
 
it is at once too much and too little that the prisoner should be 
constantly observed by an inspector: too little, for what matters is 
that he knows himself to be observed; too much, because he has 
no need in fact of being so.13  
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The observer does not have to be there at all, as long as the observed are rightly 
or falsely convinced that they are being watched. This mirrors Foucault’s notion of 
the internalised ‘inspecting gaze’ when one becomes ‘his own overseer, each 
individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself.’14 Foucault 
treats the panopticon as a machine or a mechanism of power that extracts 
conceptual discipline from Bentham’s architecture. Thus to him, the panopticon 
‘must be understood as a generalisable model of functioning’ in the representation 
of ‘a pure architectural and optical system,’ instead of a fixed notion of a ‘dream 
building.’15 This is different from Bentham’s Panopticon because Foucault’s is a 
conceptual discipline of the Panopticism. He focuses more on the function and 
effect of surveillance in terms of the self-inspecting gaze, than on the architecture.  
Foucault is reluctant to pay attention to the actual gaze as well as to identify the 
inspector because Panopticism stresses the internalised inspection induced from a 
confined individual. Surveillance under the principle of Panopticism aims at 
establishing the automatic inner gaze. In the light of such internalisation, it seems 
rather irrelevant to stress the role of the external inspector, other than the confined 
individuals themselves as their own internal inspectors. Although visibility is 
addressed in Discipline and Punish, sensorial engagement is not the purpose for 
the exercise of power. Panopticism, in fact, dispenses with the actual gaze 
altogether due to internalisation, which meets the economical end that is also 
encompassed in the panoptical mechanism. Having pointed this out, I intend to 
focus on Foucault’s Panopticism and its internalized monitoring system, which 
should not be restricted to the sensorial engagement as proposed by surveillance 
studies. What is more, this internalised visibility in Panopticism may be applied to 
radio, which is what I shall investigate next. 
 
3.  ‘Radio Panopticon’ 
The application of a radio as an expanded notion of Panopticism, at first glance, 
may appear inappropriate since the employment of the gaze or visibility in relating 
to surveillance seems impossible for a radio apparatus. However, if as Foucault 
suggests, ‘the “media” of opinion, a materiality caught up in the mechanisms of the 
economy and power in its forms of the press, publishing, and later the cinema and 
television,’ then it may be that Panopticism can be applied to these technologies.16 
Neve Gordon argues that visibility, in relation to surveillance and disciplinary 
power, can be examined both ‘in the sense of being seen and heard’ among the 
different forms of power that Foucault’s theory also includes.17 According to 
Foucault, ‘visibility is a trap’ because it overemphasise the function of gaze and 
visibility, whereas it should be taken as a mechanism of power within a concrete 
institution. The function of the gaze is technical, and visibility is considered a 
mechanism of automatic self-inspection from within.18 For this reason, radio, as a 
mechanism of Panopticism, may not contradict the purpose of observation. Radio 
enables listeners to monitor the behaviour of the radio programme by analysing 
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every sound or voice coming out from the radio. In other words, radio potentially 
involves a panoptic function as a monitoring device to impose docility of 
disciplinary power on the subjugated. I will argue that the apparatus of radio can be 
equivalent to the principle of Panopticism. I will examine how such observation 
works for radio, and how the subjugated are coerced when mediated by radio in 
Beckett’s radio drama, particularly in his Rough for Radio II.  
If visual gaze facilitates surveillance in a panopticon, audibility in terms of 
listening to the radio broadcast may invoke a similar impact, which is what I term 
radio panopticon. Both surveillance and listening fulfil the purpose of monitoring 
within the mechanism of Panopticism. Hence, if surveillance studies can adapt the 
application of Panopticism with new technologies such as CCTV or camera, it can 
be argued that its application to radio, which can only be engaged by the ear, can 
also be sustainable. Coercive discipline and monitoring are both revealed in 
Beckett’s radio plays. In Rough for Radio II, Fox is disciplined under Animator’s 
control for performance. Animator and Stenographer observe and record Fox’s 
actions and speeches to the utmost detail. Similarly, Music and Voice are being 
observed by He in Rough for Radio I. Words and Music are given orders by Croak 
in Words and Music. In Cascando, Opener controls Voice and Music by opening, 
closing, and having them play together. What commonly exists is a central figure 
that observes, controls, makes demands, and compels performance from the 
objects. 
‘The prison,’ according to Foucault, is ‘the place where the penalty is carried 
out,’ and ‘the place of observation of punished individuals.’19 Hence, in the 
location where coercion of disciplinary training and punishment takes place, the 
working of surveillance is also institutionalised. The aim of ‘regular observation’ 
within the apparatus of confinement is to place ‘the patient in a situation of almost 
perpetual examination.’20 Naturally, in order to pass judgement based on the 
conduct of the confined prisoners, it is necessary to work out a system to observe 
their behaviour, and to examine the outcome of their work. It is in this way that the 
director can determine what sort of punishment or training should be enforced. 
Therefore, ‘The practice of placing individuals under “observation” is a natural 
extension of a justice imbued with disciplinary methods and examination 
procedures.’21 There is a careful detailed observation noted down by Stenographer, 
together with Animator’s statement that ‘I have my own method’ in his session 
with Fox in Rough for Radio II.22 This example echoes the programme of 
Panopticism when ‘[a] meticulous observation of detail, […], for the control and 
use of men’ involves ‘a whole corpus of methods and knowledge, descriptions, 
plans and data.’23  
In fact, Foucault proposes ‘a system of supervision’ in which the role of 
surveillance is two-fold - the material tasks and the surveillance.24 The role of the 
supervisor is to assign the subjugated object to perform an allocated task or work, 
and to document the manner and detailed action in the process of work being done. 
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Such material task is carried out in Rough for Radio II when Dick has Fox whipped 
to recall memory from the past, and the surveillance follows suit when Fox’s 
reactions of weeping or screaming and the passage of his recollections are 
observed and recorded. Surveillance must exercise a dual function, because ‘the 
questionnaire without the examination and the examination without the 
interrogation were doomed to an endless task: it belongs to neither to fill the gaps 
within the province of the other.’25 Therefore, the mechanism of surveillance 
anticipates a conclusive resolution from observation both during the process of 
conducting tasks, and during an interrogation concerning the result of work done. 
What matters between the execution of tasks and surveillance is efficiency. In 
Rough for Radio II, Stenographer pays particular attention to the time and reminds 
Animator the time remains before the session with Fox terminates. A time-limit in 
Animator’s session with Fox is cautiously announced when Stenographer kindly 
reminds Animator that ‘you [Animator] could not have waited a moment longer, 
time is up.’26 Hence, the duration of punishment is thus put into particular focus: 
‘it must be adjusted to the “useful” transformation of the inmate during his term of 
imprisonment. It is not a time-measure, but a time finalized.’27 
What is more, the session with Fox is of regular occurrence. When Animator 
encourages Fox by stating ‘I hope you have a refreshing night and will be better 
inspired today than heretofore,’ it also shows that Fox is in a constant examination 
under Animator’s supervision.28 When Animator says to Stenographer ‘Tomorrow, 
who knows, we may be free,’ they are reciprocally conditioned by Fox’s 
progress.29 The timetable indicates the schedule for Fox’s sessions with them and 
his intended progress. For Foucault, the time-table supplements the enforcement of 
power in surveillance. The application of ‘time-table’ is an efficient way to 
‘establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, regulate the cycles of repetition’ 
in order to supplement the procedure of surveillance.30 The effect of ‘constant 
supervision, the pressure of supervisors, the elimination of anything that might 
disturb or distant’ highlights the efficiency of surveillance.31 The drill of task 
giving, observation, examination, and the economised time control to exercise 
disciplinary power with regularity aims at obtaining individual intelligibility, as is 
the case with the system that Animator has imposed on Fox. This is the agenda 
bestowed in Foucault’s mechanism of Panopticism, but the problem is, such 
intelligibility is not promised in Beckett’s work. 
Where there is insertion of disciplinary power, there is a power relation. In the 
mechanism of surveillance, power is distributed in a hierarchical order. In Rough 
for Radio II, Animator is a higher authority than Dick, and Dick is above Fox in 
status. In a similar vein, hierarchy is also revealed in the opposing status between 
Croak and Music or Words in Words and Music, or between Opener and Voice or 
Music in Cascando. This formation of hierarchy is employed in Foucault’s view 
when ‘the chief inspector’s surveillance of his staff and the constant watch kept 
over everyone through the windows of the tower, an unbroken succession of 
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observations recalling the motto: each comrade becomes an overseer.’32 
Confinement must be supervised to achieve the panoptical effect.33 Hierarchical 
surveillance buttresses the entire mechanism of a panopticon, because this is how 
order is made, and the task designated. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
I have so far discussed the exercise of Foucauldian disciplinary mechanisms 
within the content of Beckett’s radio plays. I would now like to try a bolder, more 
experiment extension of this argument to examine the role of these plays on the 
radio. We might say - to extend my analogy here - that radio plays, mediated by a 
radio, are the subjugated prisoner to be examined. This effect may also bear upon 
the way Beckett composes his radio plays. Just as the existence of an actual 
overseer in Foucault’s panoptic system is unnecessary, so the actual radio 
broadcasting does not guarantee an audience. Perhaps no listeners are listening to 
the programme at all. However, when writing his radio work, Beckett is aware of 
his target audience, editors and the like, in the first place. His radio plays, then, are 
intended for those who will engage with them when they’re finished. As an 
experienced playwright, Beckett is conscious of the fact that once his radio plays 
are released, he will automatically receive feedback or censorship. Hence, 
Beckett’s creative process is disciplined or we might even say ‘coerced’ by his 
awareness that he will be monitored by his audience. For instance, Martin Esslin 
views Rough for Radio II as Beckett’s meta-creative process, and views the 
Animator as his conscious ‘Critical faculty’ that shapes the outcome of his work.34 
Esslin argues that the role of the Animator implies ‘the conscious, critical part of 
the artist’s mind’ and that it ‘falls victim to the temptation to cheat and to insert 
material which is not a genuine product of his inner voice into the finished text.’35 
Echoing the effect of the Panopticism that highlights the overseeing gaze, Beckett, 
in the light of his radio plays, has inserted an internalised examination when he 
overhears his creativity. The impact of Panopticism is at work during Beckett’s 
creative process of his radio work. 
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Madman or Visionary: The Deconstructed World of the Sci-Fi 
Writer Philip K. Dick 
 
Elaine Pigeon 
 
Abstract 
Initially, the controversial writings of the science fiction author Philip K. Dick did 
not sell well. As a consequence, he was relatively unknown at the time of his death 
in 1982, shortly before the release of Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner, adapted from 
Dick’s 1968 novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? The film soon gained 
cult status and Dick’s reputation as a genius began to spread. In this dystopian yet 
deeply moving novel, set after World War Terminus, Dick questions what it means 
to be human and in the process deconstructs the opposition between humans and 
androids. Dick was obsessed with the effects of technology and its potential to 
radically transform human existence. In A Scanner Darkly, a novel set in the 1990s 
but written in 1977, the distinction between the one doing the surveillance and the 
one being watched is blurred while the pitfalls of drug abuse are addressed. The 
tone of Dick’s work is often bleak and infused with melancholy. His concerns were 
philosophical as well as metaphysical, as evidenced in VALIS, a fictionalised 
autobiography in which Dick recounts the perplexing events that led to what he 
describes as his conscious contact with God. While almost all of Dick’s readers 
readily acknowledge his genius, some insist on labelling him as mad. Few however 
will deny that Dick’s brilliance lies in his lucid visions of a future that resonates 
with our present. His recent popularity attests to the uncanny insights his writings 
provide: insights that challenge the assumption of madness. 
  
Key Words: Science fiction, fantasy, technology, surveillance, deconstruction, 
empathy, madness, genius, visionary. 
 
***** 
 
Philip K. Dick was already a legend in the world of science fiction, but he was 
relatively unknown at the time of his death in 1982, just a few months before the 
release of Ridley Scott’s controversial Blade Runner (1982). Although initially not 
a commercial success, the film went on to acquire mythic status while obscuring 
the fact that it was based on Dick’s 1968 novel. Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep? is set in 2021 in ‘a futuristic dystopian police state’1 shortly after World 
War Terminus. Due to lingering radiation, most human survivors have emigrated 
to Mars along with sophisticated androids that serve as their slaves, but some rogue 
replicants have managed to escape and are hiding on Earth. Rick Deckard is a 
bounty hunter whose job it is to ‘retire’ them, but because these androids so closely 
resemble humans, it is extremely difficult to identify them. The latest androids, 
Nexus-6, are highly intelligent. What differentiates them from humans is that they 
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are incapable of feeling empathy for any form of life-at least not yet. Empathy, we 
learn, exists ‘only within the human community.’2 Dick interrogates what it means 
to be human and in the process, blurs the boundary between humans and androids. 
A professional killer, Deckard justifies his actions by reminding himself that 
androids are not human even though they desperately want to live. When he finds 
himself attracted to one, he begins to feel empathy for her, thus complicating his 
assignment. As a science fiction writer, Dick was obsessed with the effects of 
technology and its potential to radically transform human existence. However, the 
transformation Deckard undergoes is unexpected. As a consequence of the feelings 
he develops for Rachel Rosen, Deckard becomes more fully humanised: a 
transformation that leaves him feeling empathy for all creatures, whether human or 
android. Although he does destroy the six androids he set out to retire, he can no 
longer continue as a bounty hunter. While something of a rarity in science fiction, 
Deckard undergoes a spiritual awakening. Surprisingly, empathy and spirituality 
frequently figure at the heart of Dick’s fiction.  
Dick was born in Chicago in 1928 but grew up in California, where he spent 
most of his life, writing through the drug-crazed sixties and seventies, often fuelled 
by amphetamines and at times even boasting to have written while on LSD. A 
prolific writer, he wrote 121 short stories and published 44 novels, winning prizes 
such as the Hugo, science fiction’s most prestigious award. Nonetheless, Dick died 
longing for recognition and believed his inability to gain acceptance from the 
literary mainstream to be the tragedy of his life. Dick wrote at a time when science 
fiction was considered pulp fiction and not taken seriously. Consequently his 
reputation as ‘a drug addled nut’ did not help, although he occasionally encouraged 
it himself.3  
In an attempt to overcome his reputation and to gain recognition as a 
mainstream author, Dick wrote A Scanner Darkly, a harrowing account warning of 
the dangers of drug use. Written in the early 1970s and published in ’77, A Scanner 
Darkly is set in 1994 in California. The protagonist, Fred Arctor, is an undercover 
narcotics agent who poses as a small-time drug dealer, Bob Arctor. He lives in a 
nondescript suburban bungalow with two other dealers of Substance D. The ‘D’ 
stands for death, highlighting Dick’s illustration that drug abuse not only produces 
disillusionment and despair, but that it can also lead to death. So as not to arouse 
the suspicion of his roommates, Fred also ingests the substance, to which he 
quickly becomes addicted, thereby blurring the distinction between the one being 
surveyed and the one doing the surveillance. As reality becomes increasingly 
clouded, Arctor begins to wonder whether he is really Fred or Bob, which of 
course emphasises their mutual dependence. In addition, the already tense 
atmosphere in the house has generated paranoia. The other dealers assume that the 
phones are tapped, and one installs his own surveillance system, fearing someone 
may enter the house while they are out. The police have in fact already installed a 
system of six ‘holo-scanners’ (3D video recorders).  
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When Fred goes to another location to watch these holographic surveillance 
tapes, in order not to be recognised, he wears a scramble suit, an invention of Bell 
Laboratories. The ‘design consist[s] of a multifaceted quartz lens hooked up to a 
million and a half physiognomic fraction-representations of various people: men 
and women, children, with every variant encoded onto a superthinshroudlike 
membrane large enough to fit around an average human.’4 Effectively, the wearer 
of a scramble suit becomes ‘Everyman and in every combination … during the 
course of each hour,’ appearing as a mere blur that is impossible to identify.5 To 
eliminate evidence of his activity in the house, Fred also edits himself out of the 
tapes as he realises that he too is being observed by a ‘depersonalized it.’6 Back at 
the house, he thinks that something is being done to him in his own home by a 
mere thing, a machine.7 
 
What does a scanner see? He asked himself. I mean really see? 
Into the head? Down into the heart? Does a passive infrared 
scanner … see into me - into us - clearly or darkly? I hope it 
does, he thought, see clearly, because I can’t any longer these 
days see into myself. I see only murk. Murk outside; murk 
inside. I hope, for everyone’s sake, the scanners do better. 
Because, he thought, if the scanner sees only darkly, the way I 
myself do, then we are cursed, cursed again and like we have 
been continually, and we’ll wind up dead this way, knowing very 
little and getting that little fragment wrong too.8 
 
Indeed, as the world becomes ever murkier for Fred, he finally fails to recognise 
that he is also Bob Arctor, his other.  
At this point, Fred is sent for medical testing, and we learn that he has become 
brain-damaged as a result of ingesting substance D; the two hemispheres of his 
brain have separated causing them to send out conflicting information.9 The police 
psychologist who tests Fred explains that the left hemisphere is normally dominant 
and when damaged the right hemisphere attempts to compensate. In Fred’s case 
however, neither hemisphere is dominant, nor do they act in a complementary 
fashion. One tells him one thing, the other another. The psychologists call it ‘cross-
cueing;’10 it is ‘as if one hemisphere of his brain is perceiving the world as 
reflected in a mirror.... So left becomes right, and all that that implies.’ Fred thinks 
that it is like seeing the world through a darkened mirror, ‘a darkened scanner.’ But 
what he sees is not his own face. Rather, it is his face reflected back at him in 
reverse, as if ‘pulled through infinity.’11 Caught in an endless feed-back loop that 
reflects only a distorted surface, people and things are not what they appear to be, 
and Arctor is no longer able to see into himself or others. It is as if he has lost all 
sense of inner being and human connectedness. Fred wants to know if this 
condition is permanent or if he will recover if he stops taking Substance D.  
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Arctor is then sent to a place called New-Path for rehabilitation, but his 
condition continues to deteriorate. Here the narrative takes another turn: 
unbeknownst to the police, the farm where New-Path sends its long-term patients 
is where the plants from which Substance D is derived are secretly cultivated. 
New-Path is in fact a corporation that receives government subsidies for treating 
Substance D addicts, so the corporation wants to insure that their funding 
continues. Here Dick slyly provides a commentary on American culture, 
suggesting how law enforcement and to a certain extent government, unwittingly 
collude with industry, whose interests interfere with the direction of society.12 In 
addition, substance D functions as an appropriate metaphor for the delusional 
consumer culture of contemporary America. The story is not simply about the self-
alienation drug-taking leads to, but suggests that this is what American capitalist 
culture encourages in its members. In contrast to Deckard’s awakening, Arctor’s 
pathetic end is a powerful commentary on the spiritual deadness consumer culture 
produces. Even Arctor’s suburban home plays a key role in evoking the emptiness 
at the core of American culture. The dirt and disorder created by the drug dealers 
may contrast sharply with Arctor’s memories of the scrubbed, gleaming surfaces 
and order of married life, but the numbing monotony and predictability of that life 
led him to reject it outright. Despite the dialectic tension Dick continually draws 
on, for Arctor there is no transcendence, although Dick was apparently able to 
overcome his own drug use. In his author’s note following the narrative, Dick lists 
his friends who either suffered brain damage or died as a result of taking drugs. He 
cautions that the price paid for a good time is exorbitantly high.  
Not only did Dick survive his drug years; he also experienced a spiritual 
awakening, which he often refers to as ‘a divine invasion’ and which he fully 
addresses in his last three novels. The middle one is actually called Divine 
Invasion. In the first, entitled VALIS, Dick tells of his encounter with God: an 
encounter more commonly associated with fantasy than science fiction. According 
to the literary critic Tzvetan Todorov, when an event occurs that cannot be 
explained by the laws of nature, there are two possible solutions: either it is ‘an 
illusion of the senses,’ a product of the imagination, or else the event has indeed 
taken place. He emphasises that ‘the fantastic occupies the duration of this 
uncertainty.’13 Dick’s novel, which reads like a fictionalised autobiography, fully 
engages with this state of uncertainty. The narrative begins with Horselover Fat’s 
incarceration in a mental hospital following a determined suicide attempt. A year 
earlier, Fat had lost his fourth wife to mental illness. ‘It was like a plague,’ Dick 
writes. ‘No one could discern how much was due to drugs.’14 Fat was already 
deeply depressed when a female friend called asking for Nembutals so that she 
could kill herself. ‘Fat heard in her rational tone the harp of nihilism, the twang of 
the void.’15 After she threw herself out of a tenth floor window, Fat spent two 
months crying and watching TV and smoking ‘more dope’ as he slowly slipped 
into madness.16 A year later he attempted to kill himself but failed. A few years 
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later, ‘totally crazy with grief, Horselover Fat would slit his wrist …, take forty-
nine tablets of high grade digitalis, and sit in a closed garage with his car motor 
running - and fail there, too.’17 At this point, Dick intrudes in the narrative to 
explain that he is Horselover Fat, which he maintains is derived from the German 
translation of his name, and that he is writing from the third person point-of-view 
in an attempt ‘to gain much-needed objectivity.’18  
Two years earlier, Fat’s (or rather Dick’s) oral surgeon had given him a shot of 
sodium pentothal in order to remove an impacted wisdom tooth.19 When he got 
home, Fat ordered some oral pain killers. The young woman who delivered them to 
the house was wearing a gleaming gold necklace with a fish at its centre, which she 
informed him was ‘a sign used by the early Christians.’20 At that instant, Fat 
experienced a flashback in which he remembered himself as an early Christian 
hunted by the authorities in ancient Rome. A month later he started to see floating 
colours. At the end of two days ‘the vague colours began to rush towards him’ but 
‘abruptly froze into sharp focus in the form of modern abstract paintings, literally 
tens of millions of them in rapid succession.’21 Dick, as narrator, maintains that 
meta-circuits in Fat’s brain had been disinhibited by the fish sign. The peak 
experience, however, occurred when ‘a beam of pink light’ was fired directly at his 
head and eyes. Although he was temporarily blinded and his head ached for days, 
he instantly knew things he had never known.22 ‘He knew, specifically, that his 
five-year-old son had an undiagnosed birth defect and he knew what that birth 
defect consisted of, down to the anatomical details’ as well as ‘to the medical 
specifics to relate to his doctor.’23 The information turned out to be perfectly 
accurate and led to his child's life being saved.Subsequently Fat developed a theory 
that the universe is made out of information and that it had begun to communicate 
with him.24 This is why he called his novel VALIS, an anagram of Vast Active 
Living Intelligence System. To explain, Dick quotes from his journal, formally 
known and published as The Exegesis. In item number 36, he writes: 
 
We should be able to hear this information, or rather narrative, as 
a neutral voice inside us. But something has gone wrong…. So I 
say, we have become idiots. Something has happened to our 
intelligence…. The origin of the word “idiot” is the word 
“private.” Each of us has become private, and no longer shares 
the common thought of the Brain, except at a subliminal level. 
Thus our real life and purpose are conducted below our threshold 
of consciousness.25 
 
For the rest of the novel, Dick relates how he tried to re-establish contact with 
God. He meets up with the rock group Mother Goose who lead him to his new 
saviour, a mere child of two, but she dies. In trying to make sense of his 
experience, Dick considers various explanations and interpretations of what 
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happened to him. As one literary critic remarked, the shocking thing about Dick is 
that he actually believed this stuff! But Dick had anticipated this response as he 
readily admitted that what he was saying would sound insane. Nonetheless, he had 
this extraordinary experience to account for. Because every explanation he came 
up with led to a counter argument, in the end he had to accept the indeterminacy of 
what had happened. Thus Dick continuously deconstructs and blurs the boundaries 
between opposites, whether the binary opposition is constructed between human 
and android, intelligence and feeling, or truth and fiction. For Dick it is not a 
question of discriminating between madness and sanity; rather it seems that 
indeterminacy enables the intimate connection between creativity and divine 
inspiration. Thus it is not surprising that Philip K. Dick is now considered one of 
the most important American writers of the second half of the twentieth century. 
His work resonates with today’s reality in stunning ways. Dick feared that the 
effects of technology produced a flattening of affect - a numbing of our interior 
being and hence a loss of empathy, crucial to a peaceful existence. In the end 
mental suffering led Dick to embrace life’s central question: how to live.  
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Perversion, Madness and Crime in Young Italian Literature 
 
Daniela Chana 
 
Abstract 
At the end of the 20th century, a new literary movement emerged in Italy. Without 
being connected to each other, a group of young authors published astonishing 
debut novels which had three characteristic features in common: Firstly, they use 
colloquial and often coarse language - something very uncommon in Italian 
literature. Secondly, an experimental style is adopted, and thirdly, the plots deal 
with issues such as deviant sexual behaviour, madness, the consumption of drugs 
and brutal crime. Due to their interest in abnormal sexuality and violence, these 
authors were dubbed Giovani Cannibali (Young Cannibals) and sometimes 
referred to as Italian Pulp. In this chapter, I aim to further investigate two 
representatives of this literary movement: Simona Vinci and Isabella Santacroce, 
both born in 1970. Simona Vinci’s collection of short stories, In Tutti i Sensi Come 
L’amore (1999, published in English under the title In Every Sense Like Love), 
deals with different forms of deviant sexual behaviour using a very dry and 
distanced language that refuses to judge. The protagonists of her stories do not 
manage to find a compromise between their abnormal desires and the expectations 
of society. This moral conflict often makes them glide into self-destruction or 
crime. Not knowing what they do, they are usually surprised by their own criminal 
power. One of the most flamboyant representatives of this movement may be 
Isabella Santacroce who with her pen name refers to a murderer of the 17th 
century. By wearing gothic fashion and using rude language not only in her books 
but also in interviews, she very clearly shows one of the most important aspects of 
this movement, namely the protest against so-called intellectuality and the 
literature of elite. Unlike Vinci, she uses highly emotional language to write about 
her drug-addicted, perverse and criminal protagonists. 
 
Key Words: Italian literature, Vinci, Santacroce, Campo, Fubini, Nietzsche, 
Cannibali, perversion, morality. 
 
***** 
 
1.  Young Italian Literature in the 1990s  
In the late 1990s a significant number of young authors appeared on the scene 
whose debut novels and short stories had various features in common: coarse 
language, an experimental writing style, and plots dealing with crime, violence, 
death, consumption of drugs, deviant sexual behaviour and madness. Due to their 
macabre plots, these writers were dubbed Giovani Cannibali (Young Cannibals) 
and also referred to as Italian Pulp.1 One of these young authors, Rossana Campo 
(born in 1963), said that she was consciously using everyday language and vulgar 
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vocabulary in her novels because one of her main goals was to break with the 
Italian tradition of books written only for the intellectual elite.2 She complained 
about the low popularity of literature in Italy where few besides professors and 
scientists ever read books, and young people never stepped inside libraries.3 This 
observation illustrates how revolutionary the movement was in beginning to 
democratise the Italian literary market. In this chapter, I investigate widely 
divergent approaches to perversion, madness and crime in the work of young 
Italian authors.  
 
2.  Deviant Sexual Behaviour and Dangerous Morality 
In her short story collection In Tutti i Sensi Come L’amore (1999), the young 
Italian author Simona Vinci (born in 1970) writes about various types of deviant 
sexual behaviour and shows the dangers of normative morality. Since her 
protagonists are unable to find a compromise between their extraordinary desires 
and the moral convictions of society, they find themselves left unhappy and 
dissatisfied with themselves. For instance the nymphomaniac in the story 
‘Notturno’ decides to sew up her vagina with a needle and a thread in order to be 
able to control the urges of her body.4 It is evident that this sort of self-destructive 
behaviour only seems necessary to her for the sake of moral judgements which 
influence this woman’s self-image. Simona Vinci here, like in many others of her 
short stories and novels, stresses the conflict between body and mind, and  more 
precisely, between nature and civilisation. Each desire of the body is natural and 
only becomes dangerous when attacked by artificial morals. By this logic, morality 
is the offender, and the bodily desires are the victims who sometimes feel the need 
to fight back. This is also evident in Vinci’s novel Strada Provinciale Tre (2007) in 
which a young woman chooses to flee from civilisation and lead a nomadic life 
without possessions in order to be free from society’s expectations and judgements. 
She feels ashamed when she is caught eating voraciously at a buffet in the middle 
of a street festival and realises that the needs of the body have to be hidden in order 
to not scare away people.5 She reflects about how being on a diet and suppressing 
the feeling of hunger is considered ‘normal’ behaviour in today’s society where 
everything needs to be controlled, while eating is associated with an animal state.6  
Vinci here clearly agrees with the progressive ideas of philosophers such as 
Friedrich Nietzsche who emphasised the connection between morality and 
civilisation. According to more traditional thinkers like the German philosopher 
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), the ideas of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ were given by 
nature and equal to everyone.7 Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) took an effort in 
establishing a different point of view by revealing moral convictions to be emerged 
historically and interpreting their development as a story of decline.8 According to 
him, terms like ‘good’ and ‘evil’ were to be seen as instruments of power used by 
the weak to offend their oppressors.9 Since the tendency to value the weak and the 
poor and to criticise the strong and the fighting ones was regarded by him as an 
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obstacle to progress,10 he appreciated the revolutionary potential of breaking the 
laws and overcoming moral restrictions.11 Morality is therefore considered 
artificial and opposed to nature. Following his lines of argumentation, Hannah 
Arendt (1906-1975), too, pointed out the fragility of moral convictions. In her 
view, Adolf Hitler had established a new moral order in which the torturing and 
killing of various groups of men was not considered ‘evil’ but morally ‘good.’12 
Thus, she drew the conclusion that every human being was capable of committing 
crime and even murder.13 Moral convictions therefore are not natural. Simona 
Vinci draws on this way of thinking when confronting her protagonists with 
suppressing morals and focussing on how they suffer from them. 
 
3. Madness and Society 
In many of her short stories, Simona Vinci stresses how society takes part in the 
emergence of deviant behaviour. Madness is considered nothing more but an 
exaggeration to the extreme of so-called normal behaviour founded in society. For 
instance, the protagonist of ‘Cose’ (‘Things’) gets sexually excited by touching the 
surface of lifeless objects. She enjoys the feeling of various materials on her skin 
and loves sleeping naked on different cloths.14 Simona Vinci masterly manages to 
allow her readers to empathise with her protagonist by unfolding the dimensions of 
the woman’s madness in a very slow way in order to fool the audience for a while. 
In the beginning, the first-person narrator does not seem mad at all, talking about 
her break up with her boyfriend and how everything that remained from the 
relationship were a few personal possessions he had left back in her apartment.15 
When she is describing how she loves to touch these things with her fingers, most 
readers may still be with her and very well understand her emotional bond to these 
objects. But as the story further develops, we slowly begin to realise that the 
protagonist’s behaviour crossed the invisible line to madness which is mostly 
evident in the end when she kills herself in an attempt to get some sort of a special 
kick by applying a dangerous tincture all over her body.16 The readers realise how 
hard it is to draw the line between so-called ‘normal’ behaviour and deviance since 
the latter is unfolding so slowly. 
In one scene of this short story, the first-person narrator watches people at the 
sales on a Saturday afternoon and remarks the similarities between her own sexual 
relation to objects and these people’s lust for buying. She reflects about how these 
people are just like her, showing some sort of erotic pleasure when looking at the 
products, fighting for a good bargain and clutching their shopping bags with an 
empty gaze.17 So it becomes obvious that the so-called ‘perverted’ or ‘mad’ 
behaviour is nothing more but a variant of principles by which the society in which 
they occur is organised. Here Vinci agrees with the Viennese psychiatrist Leo 
Navratil who claimed that every psychosis mirrors the structure or the values of the 
collective in which it emerges.18 Thus, a sexual relation to objects as described in 
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‘Cose’ is only thinkable within a materialistic and capitalistic surrounding and 
might even be seen as a sad parody of it. 
Reflections about madness and society are not exceptional in young Italian 
literature, since, for instance, they can also be found in Rossana Campo’s 2001 
novel Sono Pazza di Te (I am Crazy for You). It tells the story of a young woman 
who after her release from a psychiatric clinic did not manage to take her life into 
her own hands and thus spends her days within lazy decadence. According to her 
and her friend Goli (another former inmate), being mad means not to fit into 
society. In a certain way, they are almost proud not to belong to the boring 
conformists.19 Madness here is associated with freedom and also social criticism. 
The protagonist realises that she does not know how to do the things other grown-
up women do,20 like wearing decent clothes and living in a stable relationship. She 
and her friend are convinced that the so-called ‘normal’ people are nothing but 
hypocrites21 who punish those who dare to communicate their true feelings and 
desires.22 The inmates of the psychiatric clinic are almost glorified as people who, 
unlike the ‘normal’ ones, do not wear masks or try to suppress others.23 A 
conformist lifestyle with stable relationships and working routine is regarded as a 
sort of boring imprisonment and therefore despised by the former inmates and their 
friends.24 In addition to this, Campo aims at the reader’s empathy when describing 
the painful treatment in the psychiatric clinic25 or the sad experiences in the 
protagonists’ past26 and thus clearly takes the mad peoples’ side. 
Similar thoughts are expressed in the 2004 novel Revolver by Isabella 
Santacroce (born in 1970). The protagonist, Angelica, is a young woman who tries 
to flee from the chaos in her promiscuous life by marrying a rather boring 
conformist. She forces herself to act like a perfect housewife, but soon she realises 
how she is breaking down under the pressure.27 The radical attempt to fit into 
society does not work for her. Interestingly, her husband as well suffers from it, 
since he had been urged by his mother to get married in order to stop the rumours 
about him being gay.28 Conformism therefore is associated with pressure and 
painful duty. 
 
4. Between Empathy and Voyeurism 
The main difference in the representation of deviant and self-destructive 
behaviour is between an empathetic approach on the one hand and a voyeuristic 
one on the other hand. Like Vinci’s books, Rossana Campo’s novel Più Forte di 
Me (Stronger than Me) is an example for the first type, while Isabella Santacroce’s 
novel Destroy fits better into the second category. In Più Forte di Me, Campo 
manages to make the readers empathise with her protagonist, a woman going 
through a divorce and addicted to alcohol. The second part of the book deals with 
her experiences in a detoxification clinic, and the readers can accompany her on 
the long way back into a new life. The motives for the protagonist’s self-
destructive behaviour are presented in a very plausible way. Campo very 
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hands.   
sensitively portrays the alcoholic’s fear of being insufficient and incapable to fulfil 
society’s expectations, and the readers can very well feel her insecurity when 
someone criticises her way of doing something.29 She feels inferior to other 
women who seem to manage their private life as well as their jobs and their looks 
without any difficulties.30 The readers understand that the protagonist is 
intimidated by the grown-up world consisting of contracts, bills and complex 
vocabulary and therefore prefers to withdraw from reality.31 Thus, her flight into 
addiction becomes quite comprehensible. In addition to this, Campo shows that the 
fate of her protagonist is not exceptional: the scenes in the detoxification clinic are 
highly interesting insofar as the readers are introduced to various stories of other 
addicts who turned to alcohol because of their incapability to take their lives into 
their own 32
Unlike Campo or Vinci, Isabella Santacroce refuses to provide any 
explanations that would make her protagonists’ behaviour understandable. Rather 
on the contrary, she seems to aim more at voyeurism. As a result, the readers find 
themselves in the paradox situation of knowing highly intimate details about the 
protagonists but never being able to feel really close to them. For instance, in her 
1996 novel Destroy, the readers are confronted with Misty, a young Italian girl 
who immigrated to London working as a prostitute for both men and women and 
mainly spending her days and nights consuming  drugs, alcohol and loud music. 
The novel is written in a fragmented style which often makes it hard to recognise 
any plot and understand the connection between different scenes. Forced to feel 
like drug addicts themselves, the readers all of a sudden wake up to new sceneries 
and another awkward situation by turning the pages and cannot help but wonder 
how they came here and why. Santacroce does not provide the voice of an all-
knowing (and sane) narrator who ties up the loose ends for the readers. The big 
number of missing links between the extremely short chapters of the novel makes 
it hard to understand the protagonist’s reasons and warm to her. In Destroy, we 
never learn about Misty’s past in Italy or the family she came from, we never get 
satisfying insights in her feelings and her thoughts. From Misty’s vocabulary, we 
gather that she is pathologically obsessed with sexuality33 but we never get a clue 
where this obsession comes from. Being prostitutes, she and her friend are used to 
emotionlessly fulfil the wishes of their clients, even if these seem perverted or 
ridiculous like writing four-letter-words on naked bodies while having a banana in 
the mouth and reciting poems.34 The only sentiments which are ever 
communicated are occasional repulsion35 and a few hints of loneliness, for instance 
when Misty posts her phone number all over tube stations in order to receive calls 
by strangers.36 As a result, the repeated descriptions of drug trips and sexual 
encounters with strangers lack sense and substance, Misty remains 
incomprehensible and mysterious. Unlike Vinci or Campo who provide their 
audiences with the possibility to understand their protagonists’ deviant behaviour 
and empathise with them, Santacroce rather makes the readers shake their heads in 
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wonder. Santacroce’s approach is therefore not philosophical but voyeuristic. 
While Vinci and Campo manage to reduce the distance between the reader and the 
mad or addicted protagonist, Santacroce rather enlarges it. But to be fair, this is not 
true for all of her novels. For instance, in Revolver it is much easier for the readers 
to sympathise with the protagonist. When thirty-year-old Angelica falls in love 
with a thirteen-year-old boy, there are many hints at her unhappiness and lack of 
love in her childhood37 that make her feelings more understandable. Especially in 
the last chapters, we learn about how she still suffers from having been abandoned 
by her parents as a child and how her sexual desire is caused by the wish to make 
up for her lost childhood.38 
It is crucial to mention that the author cannot be judged solely by her books, 
since she clearly puts an emphasis on her own image, rather following the 
conventions of the music business than those of the literary market. With her pen 
name referring to a murderess of the 17th Century39 and posing for photographs 
wearing spectacular Gothic fashion,40 she presents herself as a synthesis of the arts. 
Her novels are only a small aspect of her fascinating work. 
 
5. Mad Criminals 
Young Italian literature also shows serious approaches to mad criminals. The 
short story  ‘Insetto fra gli Insetti’ by Federico Fubini deals with a pick-pocket who 
does not steal just due to greed or in order to survive, but rather for a sense of 
power and a sort of sexual pleasure he derives from it. He enjoys touching the 
bottoms of women when stealing their wallet. Afterwards, when calling them on 
the phone and looking at their picture in their passport, he gets excited by 
connecting the three pieces of the women in his mind: the bottom, the face and the 
voice.41 Being in possession of something desperately wanted by the person on the 
other end of the line makes him feel superior.42 We learn that he still lives with his 
mother, a widow, and feels connected to her by some contradictory bond: he feels 
ashamed and moved at the same time when eating the dinner she prepared.43 The 
act of digestion is almost sexually loaded since he enjoys getting rid of the meal at 
the toilet the next day,44 experiencing ‘un piacere intenso, febbrile’45 (‘an intense, 
feverish joy’). 
He enjoys feeling invisible, completely disappearing within a crowd of people 
like an ‘insetto fra gli insetti’46 (‘insect among insects’). When paying something, 
he takes an effort in not touching the fingers of the shop assistant,47 for it would 
make him feel ashamed.48 In order to gain maximum joy, he chooses his victims 
very carefully: teenage girls must be avoided for it makes him feel sad to see the 
anticipation of future sufferings and bitterness in their faces.49 He therefore prefers 
grown-up women who do not remind him of the consequences of time.50 
Obviously, his choice of victims is corresponding to his own trauma, for he is still 
stuck in adolescence, time having flown by faster than he could grow mentally. 
Time turned him into an adult while in his mind, he still remained a child. 
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The author gives a hint at how sexually loaded the act of stealing is, when 
remarking that, for the protagonist, work as well as love was easier with a woman 
than with a teenage girl.51 By drawing this comparison, the psychopathological 
background is made evident. Of course, his preference of elder women also 
stresses the close bond to his mother. In the same contradictory way in which he 
can only get close to women by robbing their wallets, i.e. by actually doing harm to 
them, he feels torn between love, guilt and hatred towards his mother. He feels 
degraded by her bad meals but cannot help eating them, since her care makes him 
feel obliged.52 
 
6. Conclusion 
The novels and short stories discussed in this chapter show a tendency of young 
Italian authors to deal with difficult issues such as deviant sexuality, addiction and 
crime. Simona Vinci’s approach to these topics can be regarded as highly 
progressive, since the spirit of philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche or Hannah 
Arendt is evident in her work. Focussing on the downside of imprisoning moral 
standards, she manages to create sympathy for her mad and criminal characters. 
The same can be said about Rossana Campo’s novels, which are populated with 
likeable alcoholics and other social outcasts. They differ from Isabella 
Santacroce’s work that seems to primarily serve voyeuristic purposes. Federico 
Fubini’s short story ‘Insetto fra gli Insetti’ is another example for a serious, 
analytical approach to crime and madness. 
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Making Sense of Madness through Art 
and Personal Narratives 
Supercalifragilistic-Sick Imagination: The Experience of 
Generative Imagination in the Creative Process of 
Pathological Drawing 
 
Terryl Atkins 
 
Abstract 
The contemporary art world is one of the main places where excessive 
imagination, otherwise feared as delusional, is lauded. This will be a hermeneutic 
exploration of ideas of creative, or generative, imagination as applied to 
phenomenological and existential aspects of the artistic process in drawing and an 
examination of the recurring motifs in drawings by autistic savants and un-
medicated schizophrenics who spontaneously, often compulsively, start to draw. 
The imaging process in art-making is a way of orienting to the world of 
experience. Art objects exist as the embodied gestural and tangible residue of a 
process of active imaginative engagement. Schizophrenics are perhaps the most 
adept at an extreme form of divergent thinking - a high degree of which is 
considered necessary for novelty and creativity. In fact, studies have found that 
among first order relatives of schizophrenics are a significant number of 
professionals recognised for brilliance in their field. On the other hand, the acute 
observational skill of autistic savants, who draw in photographic detail scenes only 
glanced at once, is studied as holding the answers to creativity. Accurate rendering 
may be enticing but is not sufficient for the creative enterprise. The prehistoric 
evolutionary shift from manufacturing objects, whether tools, beads, etc. to 
drawing images on cave walls was an extraordinary leap in the mental imaging 
process. Drawing is one of the oldest activities of humanity, with drawings of 
animals on cave walls, many of the earliest found to date at 32,000 years old, 
executed with uncanny accuracy.1 The markers for schizophrenia have been in the 
human genome at a consistent rate for a very long time as well, suggesting a stable 
evolutionary purpose.2 Drawing together observations from a number of 
disciplines will help to illuminate this primary relationship between the compulsion 
to draw images and human intentionality in the creative process. 
 
Key Words: Creativity, imagination, art-making, drawing, schizophrenia, autism, 
phenomenology. 
 
***** 
 
1. The Evolution of Our Dreams 
To my knowledge, we are the only species on earth that is fascinated by visual 
puzzles, seeking out creatures or scenes in undulating smoke, random splatters, ink 
blots or coffee stains, finding faces in the wallpaper or patterns in the stars. Over 
the millennia, we have divined the intentions of the gods through practices 
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involving just this kind of speculation - augury, extispicy, haruspicy - and it has 
been suggested that this nonhierarchical, qualitative, animistic untangling of 
animal entrails and such may have been the first non-decorative painting 
configuring revelation in the patterns and shapes as they took form through 
suggestive movement on an amorphous ground.3 Our brains have developed in a 
highly camouflaged environment, and quick assessments of situations good enough 
to act upon were essential to make basic survival choices - feed, fight, flee, or 
procreate. Since we only have clear vision in about four degrees of visual arc on 
the fovea of the retina,4 the brain fills in the rest with plausible guesswork, but 
since the world we perceive is concrete and specific, our mental imagery mimics 
its particularity. We end up hallucinating a great deal of what we experience as 
vivid, detailed, indisputable reality.5 A number of neuroscientists now agree that 
the mind’s constant chatter between the cerebral cortex and the thalamus means 
that imagistic brain states we call dreams, fantasies, or hallucinations occur when 
there is no sensory input from outside of the self,6 ‘[t]hus waking consciousness is 
dreaming - but dreaming constrained by external reality.’7 The mind’s guesses 
become questionable only when deprivation of sight allows the mind to fill part of 
the visual field with the implausible, such as grotesque creatures or cartoon 
characters.8  
Despite the fact that constraints of exterior reality in consciousness barely 
suppress our continual flights of fancy, we have attempted throughout history and 
across cultures, in large numbers or in isolation, to manifest visions. We have 
pursued altered states of consciousness through the use of hallucinogens, the 
induction of trance or possession states or with rhythmical drumming and chanting. 
We meditate, starve, inflict pain, overindulge and deprive ourselves to see beyond 
reality. At a certain point in childhood development, the effects of imagination are 
so great that the intrinsic properties of the toy become moot - a stick becomes a 
hobbyhorse, a box becomes a ship.9 The first drawings of childhood may not look 
at all like what they represent even though the child is satisfied with the 
representational power of the result.10 The mind needs to imagine, and whether  
someone is present is a matter of degree. Ordinary people with sleep deprivation 
will hallucinate, essentially dreaming while awake. Regular dreaming may have 
evolved for the safe rehearsal of various strategies of life events which could then 
be used as a basis for adaptation to an unforgiving world.11 It is quite likely, 
therefore, that for us the un-illuminated life is not enough: we must encounter the 
imaginary to survive. 
Like Hammurabi listening intently to his god Marduc, in blind expectation, we 
see what we allow ourselves to see and we sense its truth, without debate.12 This 
forms the very basis of our sensibilities, dictating how we make sense of what the 
world offers, and why we would salivate over the sight of charcoal broiled steak 
but gag at the wriggling of live grubs though both would satisfy the need for 
dietary protein. When an image emerges in sensory experience and coalesces from 
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an unarticulated cloud of potential meanings, like a dream, it rarely remains stable, 
continuously oscillating between unmitigated experience and sense-making or 
seeing-as.13 Once a stable mode of comprehension is fixed, the point of view on 
the image and its context produce a picture which releases us from the discomfort 
of confronting the contingency inherent in the image. Images, in this sense, are 
inescapable and emotionally arresting, but not pictures. Picturing is that first step in 
exercising control over visual information, naming and narration each stabilising 
the experience a step further.14  
Optical illusions point directly to the perceptual confusion involved in making 
sense of a senseless array, or seeing-as, interpreting aspects of pattern from which 
things emerge. Possibilities are reduced significantly when the motley black and 
white blotches on the page miraculously become a Dalmatian dog in dappled 
sunlight, or we see the same picture as a duck one way and a rabbit the other. Once 
we realise the duck, or the rabbit, or the cat in the underbrush, or the constellation 
Orion, it becomes nearly impossible to un-see - to embrace the inchoate flux. The 
sequential nature of perceptual tricks like the duck/rabbit illusion means we can 
only apprehend each alternately. This aspect blindness causes the unattended 
aspect not only to recede, but to disappear altogether.15 As exemplified by this 
serial recognition, seeing is an active interpretation of what we experience.16 It 
becomes inevitable that through the choice and conflict of my perceptual intention, 
embracing one part negates another. This forms the foundation of my 
consciousness which subsequently leads to a sense of identity through action.17 I 
have formed a Gestalt in each instance, and this evolutionary trade-off is designed 
to push past ambiguity expediently because it is necessary for survival.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: J. Jastrow, ‘Duck/Rabbit Illusion’. ‘The Mind’s Eye’. Popular Science 
Monthly 54 (1899): 312.  
 
A great amount of effort is required to reverse this process and to allow a less 
focused overall awareness of array and a less coherent imagistic setting, both of 
which are extremely attractive to artists because of their generative imaginary 
potential. Rather than try to solve the camouflage, the artistic temperament 
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becomes entranced by suggestive possibilities. As human developments go, 
though, being caught up in possibilities of meaning when one should be 
considering escape does not demonstrate the most expedient survival strategy but it 
is essential for innovation. 
 
2. Imagination 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, imagination may be defined as 
‘the ability to form ideas or images in the mind,’ or as ‘the ability of the mind to be 
creative and solve problems.’18 As an artist, I am drawn towards the second choice, 
but I also realise that it would be impossible to solve problems, creative or not, 
without first having something in the mind with which to work. Contrary to merely 
completing or reproducing an image without change, generative imagination 
conjures something that did not previously exist through a dialectical synthesis. 
Although recent developments in neuroscience emphasise that what we experience 
as imagery are electro-chemical impulses with no images per se, I am compelled to 
insist as one of a species that experiences a vivid stream of highly articulated, 
sometimes inventive imagery, awake or asleep, that meaning cannot be explained 
away by science. Ironically, associative logic and divergent thinking - the very 
litmus tests of creativity - are the acclaim of people labeled psychotic in delusional 
thinking. Delusion itself is a significant cultural taboo attended by societal fear, but 
psychological signs can be significantly tempered by context. What may be 
considered undesirable delusion under some circumstances becomes significant 
cultural ritual, contemporary art practice, or online gaming under others. 
 
3. Picturing Processes of Autistic Savants and Un-Medicated Schizophrenics  
Autism and schizophrenia demonstrate pathological picturing processes at 
either end of a continuum.19 Autistic savants’ spontaneous drawings from memory 
of a world only glanced at feature detailed literal rendering as a Gestalt with 
photographic perspective, even though they often lack the ability to name or 
conceptualise the content of the resulting picture. Autistic savants who draw are 
often attracted to photographs, and some draw almost exclusively from 
photographs.20 Their drawings are often compared to photographs even though 
normal sight is not photographic nor is all photographic seeing similar due to the 
differing optics of lenses. To maintain a mechanical way of seeing the world would 
suggest that there is no conscious self making the perceptual adjustments that are 
normal to human vision. Some common symptoms of autism include impoverished 
language, pronominal deficiencies with an inability to point, complete disinterest in 
people and an aversion to being touched, fascination with photographs, the 
inability to imagine or pretend, selective attention, and a lack of will in choosing. 
Conversely, schizophrenics’ capacity for extreme divergent thinking results from 
their inability to filter out irrelevant sensory information. Generally, their picturing 
style is a dense, flat, schematic conglomeration and conflation of overworked 
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disparate figurative elements, repetitive patterning, and rows of written text or 
numbers. In a textbook example of horror vacui all surfaces are filled with a 
daunting tenacity and represent a running, if skewed, usually fantastical and 
grandiose, narrative. Discreet objects are juxtaposed into contrived scenes 
illustrative of inner speech and labeling. Schizophrenics can describe the elements 
of the drawing and their relationship to each other in narrative form. Essentially, 
these creations are speculative, the process serial, the person desperately trying to 
develop an understanding of the world without the capacity for Gestalt. These two 
diametrically opposed drawing styles, of the autistic savant and the un-medicated 
schizophrenic, reflect their contrasting mental traits. 
The onset of autism occurs early, with drawing beginning between the ages of 
three and ten. Because savants’ capabilities are startlingly realistic, they are often 
put into special programmes or have tutors, as was the case with Nadia who started 
sophisticated lifelike drawing at three and a half years, or Stephen Wiltshire at five, 
both exhibiting classic autistic symptoms including language deficit.21 By contrast, 
the onset of schizophrenia is generally late teen to early adult, with spontaneous 
drawing linked to the deterioration of their condition in an attempt to orient 
themselves despite dissolution of their experiential world. Such was the case with 
Adolf Wölfli at the Waldau Sanitorium in Bern, Switzerland. It appears that 
although schizophrenics’ drawing begins spontaneously, it is often undertaken 
significantly after the onset of the condition. Among the psychotic patients in 
reports by early twentieth-century psychiatrists Prinzhorn and Morgethaler, August 
Neter started drawing after six years of incarceration, Adolf Wölfli after a decade, 
and others, like the clockmaker, after thirty years in a mental institution.22 It 
became quite apparent that Wölfli’s drawing activity was a way of quieting the 
voices with which he constantly bickered and lessened his onslaught of violence 
towards other inmates usually over their noise and other real or imagined 
affronts.23 According to Rose, the rhythm of drawing highly repetitive decorative 
patterns was the general ordering principle that helped Wölfli from destabilising 
and essentially replaced his ego for the duration of the activity.24 
One early twentieth century psychotic patient, August Neter, described the 
hallucination that was the genesis of his drawing entitled Miracle Shepherd: ‘At 
first a cobra was in the air iridescent green and blue. And then came the foot (along 
the snake). Then the other foot came. It was made from a turnip.’25 It is typical of 
schizophrenic hallucinations that images appear, shift and reassemble, illustrating 
two opposing mental approaches: recombination through associative qualities of 
disparate objects and the subsequent desire to make meaning from the experience. 
Another description begins: ‘Once there was a beautiful skiff, this skiff had a 
feather as a sail; then a storm came and the skiff was upset, but it did not come to 
any harm’ followed immediately by an explanation, ‘One can compare the skiff to 
the small boat in which the disciples of Jesus were and from which they 
fished….’26 
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4. The Calcite Canvas 
Drawing is one of the oldest creative activities of humanity with pictures of 
animals daubed onto cave walls, the oldest to date recently discovered in Chauvet 
cave, France. Many of these 32,000 year-old drawings are executed with a realism, 
arguably, rarely again achieved in the deep caves of the Upper Paleolithic. In a 
contested archeological paradigm shift, this 1994 discovery at Chauvet advanced 
the idea that highly realistic drawing came first, followed by the trail of slow but 
steady stylisation and abstraction that marked the creative explosion of the Upper 
Paleolithic in Europe until parietal art was quite suddenly abandoned circa 11,000 
BCE. Thereafter, some of the first clear narrative scenes containing stick people 
chasing stick animals with sharpened sticks are painted and carved on open-air 
sites.27 This later open-air development illustrated hunting scenarios in a similar 
manner to the figures in drawings of many schizophrenics, and follows ‘the general 
rule that the closer an image is to magical thought, the less the semblance with the 
depicted is required.’28  
Creating drawings deep inside caves is a significant shift in intention from the 
previous fashioning of mobilary objects such as tools and beads. The nature of 
these drawings, almost entirely of large animals, is a hotly contested topic. The 
animals painted were rarely eaten, and so presumably only seen from afar. 
Nicholas Humphrey first made the connection between the artistic mind capable of 
the animal depictions in Chauvet cave and the picturing ability of the autistic 
savant Nadia, whose drawings were systematically studied in the early 1970s. The 
ensuing arguments engendered by this analogy placed language as a key problem. 
If, as many accounts suggest, anatomically modern humans (Homo sapiens) used 
propositional language similar to that of the present day, what function would such 
an autistic person fulfill and what need do drawings satisfy where words could 
suffice? Although I am unable to address the extensive language debate here, I 
agree with Humphrey’s assessment of the presence of an essentially autistic mind, 
based mainly on the eidetic ability to render mental images with incredible 
accuracy. Autistic savants are currently the only ones besides those with artistic 
training and years of practice, who are able to recreate images from memory 
precisely and they do so most often at the cost of language.  
Because of the astounding accuracy of so many of the animal images deep in 
Chauvet cave, the one main composite picture of a bison and woman is not given 
due consideration. Since it resembles so strongly a schizophrenic mode of picturing 
I believe another kind of artistic mind was active in Chauvet cave and responsible 
for similar creations in caves throughout the Upper Paleolithic period. The 
composite drawing on a stalactite in Chauvet combines the depiction of a female 
pubic triangle and legs with the head, shoulder and one leg of a bison in profile. 
Both conform stylistically to the object they cover, to each other and share a leg in 
the process. For Homo sapiens to picture animals on the cave walls in the first 
place was in great part through seeing-as. Coaxed by fire light and the undulating 
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surface of an extra-ordinary place, it would be fairly easy to see a bulging shape as 
a haunch or a flank of an aurochs, with strong evidence in many drawings of this 
exact situation, the environment aiding in an externalisation of mind. Given that 
the markers for schizophrenia in the human genome have remained at a consistent 
rate for a very long time, there appears to have been a stable evolutionary purpose, 
and that purpose may be indicated in composite drawings such as the bison/pubic 
triangle of Chauvet cave.29 I would suggest that the capacity for divergent 
thinking, finding affinities between aspects of unrelated things based on the 
similarity of sensed qualities, that which forms the very foundation of generative 
imagination, was the evolutionary advantage. Bringing together disparate elements 
into a cohesive picture sits at the intersection between experiencing an image and 
meaning-making. An associative orchestration of elements in a serial construction 
where one component of a figure is conjoined with a section of another figure in 
such a way that the portion of the first figure functions in two distinct ways, no 
matter how different the figures, perspectives, or, how bizarre the hybrid, expands 
the world of possibilities. In a man’s portrait where his stylish windswept 
pompadour may also function as a flapping fish or the wing of a bird, it asks the 
viewer to consider an extraordinary world, a changed world.  
If dreaming did evolve as a survival mechanism for an unpredictable and 
unforgiving world, then the externalisation of the picturing processes of our dreams 
through drawing has allowed us to capture, record, understand and share the 
results. The autistic mind that drew in Chauvet cave with such amazing accuracy 
has caught the social imaginary of the early twenty first century, perhaps because 
of a kind of realism perpetuated by photographic technologies. Nevertheless, it is 
the hybrid creature, part-bison, part-woman, that originates a thread of hybrid 
creatures throughout our history that have illuminated our myths, helped us 
transition into new states of consciousness through rites of passage, and allowed us 
to transcend the everyday. The mind that pictured hybrid creatures of the Upper 
Paleolithic foreshadowed the Mesolithic mind that depicted stick-figure hunting 
narratives, so much like the imaginary stick/gun of the child, that have covered 
open air sites the world over. The capacity to hold a fairly elaborate picture in the 
conciliatory space of the mind would have made the caves obsolete as an extension 
of mind. According to Crow, schizophrenia may have been the price Homo sapiens 
paid for the development of language.30 Rather than the spoken propositions with 
which humanity has imposed order on the world, communicating and recording it 
as knowledge, schizophrenics, instead, are incapacitated by the over-interpretation 
of the minutia of sensory experience and live in a disordered world. However, 
among first order relatives of schizophrenics there is a higher than normal 
proportion of professionals recognised for their brilliance in their field, as well as 
‘an increased risk of psychosis and related disorders in those who become eminent 
in the creative arts.’31 The compulsion to draw may very well have been an 
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absolute evolutionary necessity to order thought in an external, concrete way as our 
imaginations began picturing a more complex world.  
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Artistic Creativity as a Multiple Personality Order: The Case of 
Fernando Pessoa 
 
Katia Mitova 
 
Abstract 
Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935), the national modernist poet of Portugal, is famous 
for creating numerous authorial personae, which he called ‘heteronyms.’1 These 
heteronyms wrote poetry, poetic prose, philosophical essays, literary theory and 
criticism, and crossword puzzles. Pessoa relentlessly switched from one creative 
persona to another, and even had his impersonations write letters to each other. 
While indulging in the creative betweenness of his life, Pessoa sometimes felt he 
had reached the bottom of depression. He believed that his ‘tendency toward 
depersonalization and simulation’2 was caused by ‘a deep-seated form of hysteria, 
[or] pretended communication with diverse spirits,’3 but that his ‘insanity [was] 
made sane by dilution in the abstract, like a poison converted into a medicine by 
mixture.’4 Pessoa’s multiple personality order is defined as an interactive 
arrangement of multiple creative personalities generated spontaneously in the 
chaotic domain of the psyche, in response to the limitations of his self-imposed 
monadic existence. By allowing his heteronyms and their works to emerge 
organically from his personal experiences, Pessoa cultivated a positive attitude 
toward his own multiplicity. His heteronyms materialised not as negations of one 
another, as they would have in a case of an actual mental disorder, but in a creative 
rapport with one another. The case of Fernando Pessoa is presented as unique 
material for a study of artists’ ability to live with incongruent subjective 
perspectives and to make creative use of this plurality. In addition, the complex 
relationship between reality and fiction is discussed from an artist’s perspective. 
Other writers’ legacies (from Homer and Plato to Shakespeare and Kierkegaard) 
are identified as exhibiting the Pessoa Syndrome, which entails a conspicuous 
sense of nobodiness as a characteristic of the writer and betweenness as a property 
of the writing. 
 
Key Words: Creativity, betweenness, depersonalisation, dissociation, fiction, 
impersonation, nobodiness, open-mindedness, plurality. 
 
***** 
 
1.  The Condition of Nobodiness  
Conventionally, the author is understood to be a real person who signs his 
works and, thanks to the laws that protect intellectual property, benefits from their 
multiplication and distribution. However, the creative relationship between the 
work and its maker is more complex. The work happens between the authorial 
persona and the author’s person. The persona creates by using - selectively and 
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imaginatively - the experiences of the person. In this triangular relationship, the 
author is more than the authorial persona responsible for a particular work, albeit 
less than the entire person of the author.5 
Artists’ awareness of this peculiar betweenness of the creative process is often 
accompanied by a conspicuous sense of nobodiness. Homer’s Odysseus, the 
earliest Nobody, literally calls himself ‘Noman’6 in the Cyclops episode of the 
Odyssey and later returns to Ithaca disguised as nobody, a beggar. Within the epic, 
Odysseus constructs several identities by telling his half-false, half-true Cretan 
stories.7 Unlike the warrior Odysseus of the Iliad, the Odysseus of the Odyssey, 
mostly a storyteller, vanishes between his supposed actual experiences and their 
narrative metamorphoses. Importantly, Odysseus’ nobodiness is perceived as an 
adaptive advantage rather than as a mental or moral flaw or as an aesthetic 
insufficiency of Homer’s epic. 
Keats writes about poets’ proneness to annihilating their own identity by a 
chameleon-like absorption of other, more ‘poetic’ identities.8 Emily Dickinson 
delights in the meeting of another Nobody: ‘I’m Nobody! Who are you? / Are 
You—Nobody—Too?’9 Walt Whitman asks - and answers - with self-assurance, 
‘Do I contradict myself? / Very well then I contradict myself, / (I am large, I 
contain multitudes.)’10 Nietzsche describes inspiration as an involuntary 
experience of absoluteness and freedom, in which the writer’s self disappears.11 
Joyce’s character, Stephen Dedalus, proposes that through the creative process the 
personality of the artist ‘refines itself out of existence.’12 T. S. Eliot sees poetry as 
‘an escape from personality.’13 Faulkner wishes for a ‘markless’ life that could be 
summarised in one sentence, ‘He made his books and died.’14 Jorge Luis Borges 
fantasises about Shakespeare speaking to God:  
 
I who have been so many men in vain want to be one, to be 
myself. God’s voice answered him out of a whirlwind: I too am 
not I; I dreamed the world as you, Shakespeare, dreamed your 
own work, and among the forms of my own dream are you, who 
like me are many, yet no one.15 
 
Czeslaw Milosz’s memorable line, ‘I am no more than a secretary of the 
invisible world,’16 developed by J. M. Coetzee in his novel, Elizabeth Costello, 
expresses the artist’s attempt at moral neutrality: ‘That is my calling: dictation 
secretary. It is not for me to interrogate, to judge what is given me.’17 A fervid 
statement by Joyce Carol Oates summarises the many facets of this collage of brief 
quotes on writer’s nobodiness:  
 
While writing exists, writers do not - as all writers know ... No 
one wants to believe this obvious truth: the artist can inhabit any 
individual, for the individual is irrelevant to art. (And what is 
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ssoa explains:  
art? A firestorm rushing through Time, arising from no visible 
source and conforming to no principles of logic or causality).18 
 
Writers’ nobodiness, manifested as a contradictory, fluid, or missing self, is not 
limited to the duration of the writing process. Depending on the vehemence of their 
engagement in that process, writers may remain in a state of nobodiness for longer 
periods of time outside the writing process. For incessant writers like Fernando 
Pessoa, nobodiness may become the only mode of existence. 
 
2.  The Case of Fernando Pessoa 
Pessoa, whose surname means person in Portuguese, was born in Lisbon and 
died there in 1935, at the age of 47. From age seven to seventeen, he lived in 
Durban, South Africa, where his step-father was the Portuguese Consul. English 
was the language of Fernando’s education there, and it became - for a long time - 
the language of his literary ambitions. Once back in Lisbon, Pessoa almost never 
left his city. He had one romantic relationship, recorded in letters, but remained 
unmarried and always lived with his family. Earning his living as a part-time 
translator and spending most of his time in bars and cafés provided him with a 
circle of acquaintances, but he had no intimate friends.19  
Pessoa’s legacy is a trunk containing more than 25,000 documents, signed by 
about 75 different names that imply different writing personae. Among the 17 more 
distinct ‘heteronyms,’20 as Pessoa called his impersonations, were the poets 
Alberto Caeiro, Ricardo Reis, and Álvaro de Campos. Semi-heteronym Bernardo 
Soares wrote prose intended for The Book of Disquiet. Alexander Search wrote 
poetry in English. Orthonym Fernando Pessoa, or Pessoa as himself, wrote poetry 
and prose in Portuguese and English. The most prominent heteronyms had 
biographies and horoscopes. Pe
 
A pseudonymic work is, except for the name with which it is 
signed, the work of an author writing as himself; a heteronymic 
work is by an author writing outside his own personality: it is the 
work of complete individuality made up by him, just as the 
utterances of some character in a drama would be.21 
 
Throughout his life, Pessoa appears to have followed the ‘rules’ put together by 
his early English-writing heteronym, Alexander Search: 
 
1. Make as few confidences as possible. Better make none, but if 
you make any, make false or indistinct ones... . 
2. Dream as little as possible, except where the direct purpose of 
the dream is a poem or a literary work... . 
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9. Organize your life like a literary work, putting as much unity 
into it as possible.22 
 
Prose-writing heteronym Bernardo Soares adds another rule to this manifesto 
of self-sufficiency: ‘Enlarge your personality without including anything from the 
outside - asking nothing from other people and imposing nothing on other people, 
but being other people when you have need of others.’23 The leitmotif of Soares’ 
reflections, collected in several editorial versions of The Book of Disquiet, is not-
acting, indeed, not-living outside of the imagination. 
Pessoa’s writing, published and unpublished, together with his life, can be 
considered a sui generis literary work that bears certain characteristics of poetic 
drama, as Pessoa himself stated.24 This is a minimalist poetic drama, unfinished 
and fragmentary, strikingly aware of its own fictionality. It exemplifies the 
composite, contradictory, fluid, missing self of the artist - not a fictional character, 
not a metaphor, but a living Nobody. Because Fernando Pessoa himself was not a 
composite creation, but a real denizen of Lisbon, and because he was also a 
profoundly self-aware artist, the writings found in his trunk presented us with a 
unique opportunity to examine the creative condition of nobodiness and 
betweenness. 
 
3. Sane Insanity? 
Pessoa described his condition as ‘a relentless, organic tendency toward 
depersonalization and simulation,’25 a result of ‘a deep-seated form of hysteria,’ or 
‘hysterical neurasthenia.’26 The latter he defined as ‘pretended communication 
with diverse spirits’27 as well as ‘insanity made sane by dilution in the abstract, 
like a poison converted into a medicine by mixture.’28 The latter also happened to 
be Pessoa’s definition of genius.29 In 1908, when Pessoa was only twenty, his 
heteronym, Alexander Search, wrote: ‘One of my mental complications - horrible 
beyond words - is a fear of insanity, which itself is insanity.’30 At about the same 
time, heteronym Charles Robert Anon complained: 
 
[T]hey say I wish to be extraordinary. They neglect to analyse 
the wish to be extraordinary. They cannot comprehend that 
between being and wishing to be extraordinary there is but the 
difference of consciousness being added to the second. It is the 
same case as that of myself playing with tin soldiers at seven and 
at fourteen years; in one [moment] they were things, in the other 
things and playthings at the same time; yet the impulse to play 
with them remained, and that was the real, fundamental psychical 
state.31 
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In a real letter to his real friend, Mário de Sá-Carneiro, Pessoa, writing as 
himself, describes his present state as ‘the bottom of a bottomless depression,’ and 
‘one of those days in which I never had a future.’32 Yet there are lines in this letter 
that make the complaint ambiguous:  
 
What I’m feeling isn’t true madness, but madness no doubt 
results in a similar abandon to the very causes of one’s suffering, 
a shrewd delight in the soul’s lurches and jolts.33  
 
Sá-Carneiro committed suicide; the depressed Pessoa outlived him by almost two 
decades. Obviously, Pessoa managed to dilute his insanity (or fear of insanity) and 
to convert the poison into a potion, a pharmakon. But what was the poison, what 
was the thinner, and how did Pessoa fight the fire of madness with the fire of 
creativity? 
It can be argued that what Pessoa experienced was not a mental disorder per se 
but a state close to his idea of madness, an awareness of being ‘extraordinary’ and 
a clear wish to be so despite the loneliness this special status entailed. He was 
captivated by the intensity of madness but balanced successfully at its edge, 
concurrently a participant in this ‘unstageable tragedy’34 and its observer. The 
pharmakon was the saudade, a feeling of inexplicable yearning and solitude that he 
encountered both as a man and as a man of letters.35  
Pessoa first experienced deep loneliness at the age of five when his father and 
brother died within less than a year. He coped with the trauma by inventing an 
epistolary friend: 
 
I can remember what I believe was my first heteronym, or rather, 
my first nonexistent acquaintance - a certain Chevalier de Pas - 
through whom I wrote letters to myself when I was six years old, 
and whose not entirely hazy figure still has a claim on the part of 
my affections that borders on nostalgia. I have a less vivid 
memory of another figure ... who was a kind of rival to the 
Chevalier de Pas. Such things occur to all children? Undoubtedly 
- or perhaps. But I lived them so intensely that I live them still; 
their memory is so strong that I have to remind myself that they 
weren’t real.36 
 
Pessoa’s literary isolation, probably a result of his aspirations to be much more 
than a Portuguese modernist and avant-garde writer, seems to have had a similar 
effect on him. He prophesied the coming of a new literary master, a ‘Supra-
Camões,’37 who would relegate great old Camões to a secondary status: ‘We are 
not Portuguese writing for Portuguese ... We are Portuguese writing for Europe, for 
all civilization.’38 And who were the ‘we’? Perhaps in the beginning Pessoa had in 
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mind a movement of poets and artists who would embrace his idea of a new 
creative approach called sensacionismo, or sensationism, descending from French 
symbolism, Portuguese transcendentalist pantheism, and the spirit of futurism.39 
With time, however, he must have realised that no one else was eager to venture on 
this path. It was he, Fernando Pessoa, who was destined to make up for - or to 
make up - a whole literary movement and create a new Portuguese art in which, as 
heteronym Álvaro de Campos put it, ‘Europe would see and recognize itself 
without recognizing the mirror.’40 
Pessoa was uniquely predisposed to fulfil that formidable task:  
 
This tendency to create around me another world ... began in me 
as a young adult, when a witty remark that was completely out of 
keeping with who I am or think I am would sometimes and for 
some unknown reason occur to me, and I would immediately, 
spontaneously say it as if it came from some friend of mine 
whose name I would invent, along with biographical details, and 
whose figure - physiognomy, stature, dress and gestures - I 
would immediately see before me.41 
 
Besides revealing the spontaneous nature of the heteronyms’ creation, this 
recollection is a testimony to the peculiar orderliness of Pessoa’s creative mind. It 
seems paradoxical that ‘the man who never was’42 had such a strong sense of his 
personality that he would find certain thoughts incompatible with his own pessôa, 
or person. This paradox, however, is only apparent. Pessoa possessed a common 
sense of consistency of thought and plausibility of character. Unlike ordinary 
people, however, he did not reject whatever occurred to him in contradiction to his 
prevailing vision of himself. Instead of unconsciously reducing his consciousness 
in order to make it cohesive, he reordered it to create room for different kinds of 
minds and talents. Thus Pessoa did not lose his identity - he developed a multiple 
identity. 
Multiple identity may sound like a contradiction in terms because, 
traditionally, identity is associated with wholeness and consistency. Dissociative 
identity is not considered to be identity in the strict sense of the word but, rather, 
lack of identity, a dysfunctional mental condition. Individuals with dissociative 
identity disorder could become aware of their alternative personalities by keeping a 
journal. To such individuals, however, writing would be a tool, or a memory 
support of sorts. Pessoa, conversely, became an individual with multiple 
personalities through his heteronymic writing. Thus, a suitable diagnosis for 
Pessoa would be a condition that we may name multiple personality order - a self-
aware existence in betweenness, in conjunction with depersonalisation, or a sense 
of nobodiness. 
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4. Pessoa’s Multiple Personality Order 
Pessoa seems to have been thrilled by this existence on the edge of madness, 
smoothened by the joys of creativity - and of wine, which eventually led him to 
cirrhosis and death.43 Being an artist, he did not try to curb his imagination. His 
aesthetic system did not - and could not, by its very nature - include an opposition 
between reality and fiction. He even managed to turn the real Fernando Pessoa into 
a kind of heteronym, thus creating the illusion of an independent, self-sufficient, 
self-organising world without a mastermind.  
How did the physical man, Fernando António Nogueira de Seabra Pessôa, 
handle his condition so successfully without controlling it? Such a question makes 
sense only if we assume that mental equilibrium is almost synonymous with self-
control and that a lack of such control leads to chaos. Self-control, however, is not 
an absolute good, nor is chaos merely disarray and confusion. At the heart of the 
urge to control lies a vision of perfection. Perfection, however, is reductionist by 
nature; the perfect must be complete and changeless. Metaphorically, perfection is 
ultimate loneliness. Pessoa would indeed have had a severe form of dissociative 
disorder if he had tried to control the creation and existence of his heteronyms. 
Instead, he let them emerge, in an organic way, from the undefined realm of his 
betweenness. He let them be, simultaneously. Or, to use Pessoa’s vocabulary, with 
time, some heteronyms, ‘attracted’ more and more ‘witty remarks’ that seemed to 
be out of character for Pessoa himself; other heteronyms remained sketchier. Like 
life and unlike a work of fiction, the world Pessoa created had no beginning, and it 
had no closure. In this world, death had no power to stop a well-developed 
heteronym from writing - Alberto Caeiro, for example, wrote poems for a whole 
decade after his demise at the age of 26. 
Pessoa’s multiple personality order can thus be defined as an interactive 
arrangement of multiple creative personalities generated spontaneously in the 
chaotic domain of the psyche, in response to the limitations of his self-imposed 
monadic existence. In order to attain the self-confidence necessary for social 
realisation, most people focus only on experiences and thoughts that accord with 
who they want to be. Thoughts, emotions, and other experiences that do not fit are 
remembered in a repressed or modified form. By contrast, artists, who do have the 
leisure to impersonate in the realm of fiction, may develop the ability to live with 
incongruent subjective perspectives - a form of genuine open-mindedness. The 
artist’s psyche tends to preserve experiences in their original, fluid form, without 
judging or sorting them. Consequently, the more open the psyche to 
accommodating strange subjectivities and multiple perspectives the stronger its 
creative potential. 
 Undoubtedly, there is a price to be paid for containing multitudes: mental 
breakdowns, depressions, and suicides mark the lives of numerous artists.44 But the 
magnificent achievements resulting from artists’ ability to depersonalise and 
impersonate - an ability most of us had in childhood and blocked later in order to 
Artistic Creativity as a Multiple Personality Order 
__________________________________________________________________ 
162 
grow up - should make us reconsider the understanding of mental wellness as a 
clear-cut self-identity. Finding oneself, especially finding oneself too early, might 
have a negative impact on one’s creativity. 
 
5. The Pessoa Syndrome 
 As demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter, the condition of nobodiness 
is by no means unique to Fernando Pessoa. Betweenness, on the other hand, might 
seem more elusive in other artists. Easily detectable in works with traits of 
metafiction, it is only implicitly present in writing that produces the illusion of a 
slice of life, but can be found in the feedback between some literary characters or 
events. 
 The Pessoa Syndrome seems to be an apt name for the nobodiness and 
betweenness in the legacy of visionary writers45 such as Homer and Plato, 
Shakespeare and Kierkegaard, Melville, Nabokov, and Philip Roth. Recognizing 
the Pessoa Syndrome in the works of such writers would minimize the 
reductionism in the critical reception of their ideas and artistry. For, even when 
particular passages of their writings seem unambiguous, these writers’ legacies, in 
their entirety, resist elucidation - like madness.  
 Due to the limited scope of this presentation, it should suffice to mention just a 
few instances of resistance to elucidation among the classics of Western literature: 
In the Homeric epics, it is not possible to clearly define the role of fate or to tell 
precisely when Penelope recognises Odysseus in the beggar who has come to bring 
tidings about her husband’s return. The multiple Socratic identities Plato created in 
his dialogues while cunningly hiding himself do not fit in one cohesive 
philosophical doctrine; in other words, Plato was not a Platonist. Shakespeare’s 
plays voice just about every possible aesthetic, philosophical, or religious idea the 
West has ever entertained; however, it is impossible to discern the author’s 
individual voice in this polyphony. Despite Kierkegaard’s claim that his 
pseudonymous works were meant to seduce his readers only in order to make them 
appreciate his religious doctrine, it is the space between the aesthetic, the ethical, 
and the religious that he seems to occupy - a realm, in which his readers feel lost 
and enchanted.46  
Literature, according to Shoshana Felman, is ‘that which suspends the answer 
to the question of knowing whether the madness literature speaks of is literal or 
figurative.’47 The more a text is mad, the more it resists interpretation, and the 
more literary it is.48 As Pessoa’s multiple personality order demonstrates, we might 
do well to align with this stance on the relationship between literariness and 
madness and dwell in its possibilities.49 
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Letters of John Keats, ed. Grant F. Scott (Cambridge, MA: 2002), 194-196. 
9 Emily Dickinson, The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson, ed. Thomas H. 
Johnson (New York: Little, Bown and Company, 1960), 133. 
10 Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass and Selected Prose (London: Everyman, 1994), 
79. 
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None’, in On 
the Genealogy of Morals. Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 300-301. 
12 James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (New York: Penguin, 
1993), 233. 
13 T. S. Eliot, ‘Tradition and Individual Talent’, in The Sacred Wood (New York: 
Barnes & Noble), 58. 
14 Both quotes are from William Faulkner, ‘Letter to Malcolm Cowley of 11 
February 1949’, in Selected Letters of William Faulkner, ed. Joseph Blotner (New 
York: Random House, 1977), 285. 
15 Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Everything and Nothing’, in Collected Fictions, trans. 
Andrew Hurley (New York: Viking, 1998), 320. 
16 Czeslaw Milosz, ‘Secretaries’, in New and Collected Poems (1931-2000) (New 
York: Ecco, 2003), 343. 
17 J. M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello (New York: Viking, 1998), 199. 
18 Joyce Carol Oates, ‘JCO and I’, Antæus 73/74 (1994): 45. 
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19 See L. C. Taylor, ‘Life and Times’, A Centenary Pessoa, 115-158. 
20 See note 1. 
21 ‘Nothing But a Name: A Conversation with Chris Daniels and Dana Stevens’. 
22 Pessoa, The Selected Prose, 17. 
23 Fernando Pessoa, The Book of Disquietude by Bernardo Soares, Assistant 
Bookkeeper in the City of Lisbon, trans. Richard Zenith (New York: The Sheep 
Meadow Press, 1996), 139. 
24 Pessoa, ‘Letter to Gaspar Simões of December 11, 1931’, in The Selected Prose, 
246. 
25 See note 2. 
26 See note 3. 
27 See note 4. 
28 Pessoa, The Selected Prose, 254. 
29 Pessoa, ‘Erostratus’, in A Centenary Pessoa, 281. 
30 Zenith, ‘The Artist as a Young Man and Heteronym’, in Pessoa, The Selected 
Prose, 8. 
31 Charles Robert Anon, ‘Three Prose Fragments’, in Pessoa, The Selected Prose, 
12-13. 
32 The two quotations are from Pessoa, ‘Letter to Mário Sá-Carneiro of March 14, 
1916’, in The Selected Prose, 90-91. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Saudade has no English equivalent. It describes a state of longing and 
lonesomeness and is considered a uniquely Portuguese emotion. 
36 Pessoa, ‘Leter to Adolfo Casais Monteiro of 11 January 1935’, in The Selected 
Prose, 255. 
37 Darlene J. Sadlier, Introduction to Fernando Pessoa: Modernism and the 
Paradoxes of Authorship (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998. 
38 Ibid., 67. 
39 Ibid., 42-43. 
40 See note 21. 
41 See note 36. 
42 The papers presented at the First International Symposium on Fernando Pessoa 
in 1981 were published under the title The Man Who Never Was. 
43 Lisboa, A Centenary Pessoa, 157. 
44 Carl Jung, Psychology and Literature, The Collected Works (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press), v. XV, 101. The idea is developed at length by 
Anthony Storr, ‘Genius and Psychoanalysis: Freud, Jung and the Concept of 
Personality’, in Genius: The History of an Idea, ed. Penelope Murray (New York: 
Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1989). 
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45 A discussion of the visionary mode of artistic creation, as opposed to the 
psychological model, is available in Jung, Psychology and Literature, The 
Collected Works, v. XV, 89-91. 
46 For an exploration of the ‘Pessoa Syndrome’ in the works of Homer, Plato, 
Dante, Shakespeare, Kierkegaard, Melville, Nabokov, Borges and other writers see 
Mitova, ‘Erotic Uncertainty’. 
47 Shoshana Felman, Writing and Madness (Literature / Philosophy / 
Psychoanalysis), trans. by Martha Noel Evans and the author (Palo Alto, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), 253. 
48 Ibid., 254. 
49 A paraphrase of Emily Dickinson’s ‘I Dwell in Possibility—/ A fairer House 
than Prose—/ More numerous of Windows—/ Superior—for Doors’, in The 
Complete Poems, 657. 
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The Hysteric as Mad: Unfolding an Exquisite Corpse 
 
Eleanor Bowen and Laura González 
 
Abstract 
Despite its disappearance from the diagnostic manuals and the consulting room, 
hysteria has had a recent cultural resurgence as films, books, and papers update its 
meaning for our society, marked by dissent, struggle and uncertainty. Its migration 
into new, more medically manageable conditions (including dissociation, 
conversion, or post-traumatic stress disorder) highlights the common elements to 
all forms of hysteria: a struggle with gender, a manifestation of symptoms in the 
body, and the asking of a question - Che vuoi, or, ‘What do you want from me?’ 
We put forward the idea that hysteria is a process, a state of mind, rather than a 
condition, and that its relationship to femininity and the body - following Juliet 
Mitchell’s argument - is the reason it has disappeared from the medical vocabulary. 
Yet, this state captures something inherently human, ambivalent and conflicted. It 
names, defines and understands something elusive. Our chapter will question 
hysteria as madness in relation to an epistemology that, according to Christopher 
Bollas, is depraved.1 Even though it seems to be a state impairing the mind’s 
judgment as the body takes over, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan placed the 
production of knowledge within the hysteric in his theory of the Four Discourses.2 
The hysteric knows what the master, the university and the analyst do not. We will 
argue that hysteria as madness relates to the visionary aspect of the state, to the fact 
that hysterics articulate and know in the body, that which does not want to be 
known. In order to safeguard a symbolic universe, hysterics are labeled mad, 
possessed, delusional, or simply as acting out their symptoms. The outcome of this 
struggle is visual and performative, so we will draw on visual examples - from our 
production, and that of others. These implicate the body and the gaze, therefore, a 
witness, creating a space for discourse. 
 
Key Words: Hysteria, madness, psychoanalysis, performance, photography, 
possession, drawing. 
 
***** 
 
I watched Andrzej Zulawski’s 1981 film Possession last night.3 I return to it 
often, about once a year, and, every time, I get stuck in the same scene. Although I 
watch until the end credits roll, my mind is thinking about a three-minute segment. 
Anna (or Helen, for this is a strange film), played by Isabelle Adjani, comes off a 
U-Bahn train. While walking on the underground passages leading into the street, 
something odd happens to her. The episode starts with laughter, which becomes 
more and more extreme. She throws herself against the walls and the floor. She is 
carrying some shopping, eggs and milk, which get spilled all over her. They even 
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come out of her mouth as she kneels on the floor, uttering guttural cries from her 
stomach and holding on to her blue dress, to the piece of fabric between her legs. 
This image of her, and the sound - which I can only describe as when laughter is 
not so funny anymore - haunt me for days afterwards. I am fascinated and repelled 
by it. I should not be surprised, for the film’s title alludes to this. Possessions can 
be both liberating - for one can let go, let someone else do the work - and scary - 
for one is not oneself anymore. Yet her eyes, her mouth, her whole body, in fact, 
seem to react as if she suddenly attained insight, then and there. It feels as if she 
got a joke that no one else did; jokes, it is known, are a manifestation of the 
unconscious. She reminds me of Blanche or Augustine, Dr Charcot’s star hysteric 
patients, whom he treated at the Salpêtrière hospital in Paris in the nineteenth 
century.4 Like them, Anna seems to know something that amuses her.5 
 
I am looking at the kneeling figure of a girl in a drawing I made many years ago. 
The figure derives from an altarpiece by Grunewald, and is of such violence that I 
was riveted. I called my drawing Possession, asking ‘Whose?’ Now I am looking 
again and discover online that this image (which I took to be that of an exorcism) 
actually depicts a saint healing a young girl of epilepsy, a condition that, like 
hysteria, possesses the whole person through the body, and must, therefore, be 
itself possessed, cast out.  
The saint’s thumb locks over her lower jaw, opening the mouth, pushing the 
head back in a whiplash motion to release the demon. Her hands fly open, distorted 
and disempowered as the demon convulses heavenward. The demon itself is 
disempowered by a face-off with light as it emerges from the dark cavern of her 
mouth, smashing into daylight. The girl’s eyes twist back and sideways as though 
something in her mind is convulsing also, turning inward.  
In The Invention of Hysteria, Georges Didi-Huberman6 problematises the role of 
photography as deployed at the Salpêtrière to demonstrate the physically distorting 
symptoms of hysteria. I am looking now at a photograph of Charcot’s patient, the 
fifteen-year-old Augustine, posed for a portrait in her normal state. Showing a 
slightly self-conscious adolescent girl, this photograph was taken to act as a 
measure for all of the others in which she appears convulsed in various states of 
hysteria. 
However, photography then was a slow process, and states of ‘normality’ 
tended to be taken under the duress of waiting. 
 
In the moments of waiting I try to do what he says but my arm and neck are 
aching, so I keep moving and that makes him sharp. ‘Be yourself,’ he snaps. And I 
am, but time is going by. My jaw hurts and my face is beginning to freeze. 
When you go, leaving the chair (and a memory of somebody holding the back of 
your dress) you're so thankful to be away from the endless need of that man for 
your time, for you to ‘stay just as you are.’  
For what? What is it he’s after? 
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‘What is it he’s after’ echoes the question Lacan put in the hysteric’s mouth: 
Che vuoi?, translated as ‘What do you want from me?’ It is addressed to the Big 
Other, whomever that might be.7 In your drawing, it could be a certain kind of 
knowledge, represented by the doctor, the voice of authority. The young girl might 
be a bona fide hysteric going through the epileptoid phase Charcot describes.8 
Doctors used what they call pelvic massages to induce a hysterical paroxysm as 
potential treatment; a way, as it is put, to release the demon.9 
Note that we are writing very defined gender roles for hysteria. Its feminine 
specificity, its relation to the womb, might be the main reason one cannot be a 
hysteric anymore, as the condition has left diagnostic manuals. Yet there were, and 
are, many hysteric men, although these tended to be called hypochondriacs.10 
Others think that hysteria was just not a helpful word, given that its definition 
contained over seventy-five pages of symptoms.11 It was just too much, so it was 
chopped up into sizeable chunks and replaced with the more medicalised terms 
conversion, somatic, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Nitza Yarom, however, 
writes that hysterical - a term she favours over hysteric - ‘... is a state of mind and 
an interpersonal, intersubjective event with unique characteristics.’12 From this, it 
follows that hysteria might be inherent and possible in every one of us, given the 
right context. Therefore, the hysteric is not mad, just hysterical. Why then hide her, 
admit her long term at the Salpêtrière, or treat her as possessed, epileptic, 
dependent?  
I do not want to deviate from the visual and into the psychological too much, 
for we are both artists who want to demonstrate that the visual and the hysteric can 
unveil knowledge. Did you know that Sam Taylor-Wood made a work on hysteria 
in 1997? Like your drawing, it has body but not voice. Someone has stuck a thumb 
in her throat13 but, like Anna/Helen, she also appears to be laughing. 
 
In Taylor Wood’s eight minute film Hysteria, a woman laughs until she cries. The 
track is silent so we do not know what kind of sound (if any) is emitted.14 Sustaining 
this activity clearly strains the actor, and this shows in her physiognomy. Forehead, 
mouth and neck muscles clench, and, at times, she lifts her hands as if to hold her 
head in place.  
As in previous works, Taylor Wood extends the photographic image, making it 
temporal, so, ‘laugh’ becomes laughing, ‘cry’ becomes crying. In so doing, she 
elicits state from stasis, ek-stasis. This is not a progression because it goes 
nowhere although one notices a turnaround in the woman’s demeanor, an entropic 
inwardness corresponding with the exhaustion of the actor. This is a breach in the 
image, a cutting off as if a giving up of the self. To what? To the director’s 
instruction, the demands of the role. Broken in two, she is beside herself.  
This is no commonplace piece of theatre. It is ecstatic Dionysian enactment. 
The god of wine and theatre is also the god of death, taking us out of ourselves 
temporarily, but returning us in the end. However, for many acting out at the 
Saltpêtrière there was no return. 
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Didi-Huberman examines the same photographs, those ‘indisputable 
documents’15 that Charcot used as proof. He detects a ‘certain moment’16 when the 
mutual benefits of staging hysteria (life for the women, information for researchers, 
and stardom all round) produced a paradoxical situation. For the ‘more the hysteric 
delighted in reinventing and imaging herself … the more a kind of ill was 
exacerbated,’17 and ‘consent turned to hatred.’18 
In The Cry, Augustine is starting an attack, on her back, facing upwards with 
mouth open in a perfect crescent (somebody has blacked in the shape).19 In other 
images, such as Ecstasy and The Call, she is more specifically posed.20 At first, 
inmates were complicit mediums for the voracious researching gaze, happy 
performing such subjects to camera, but Didi-Huberman believes there came a 
turning point.21 The Cry shows something real: she is ‘… wailing, madly crossing 
her legs, ripping at her straitjacket … cutting herself off. A cry was the last place she 
could turn.’22 
From laughter to crying, from ekstasy to wailing, all in the space of three to 
eight minutes. How? Why? Hysteric patients have a reputation of malingering, of 
being untrustworthy, of inventing symptoms and talking nonsense. They were seen 
- and sometimes taken advantage of - but not heard.23 Like Taylor Wood’s video, 
their track is silent to others. Julia Borossa argues that hysteria comes from a 
relationship to gender where the sufferer is seen either to conform too well - a 
victim - or to reject her role - a rebel - and that it is this ambiguity of position24 that 
provides the key to a state that is visionary, as I will explain. Possession is not only 
possession by a spirit. It can also mean custody and ownership. The hysteric has 
something the doctor wants, and this she both desires and rejects. 
In his Four Discourses, Jacques Lacan ascribes knowledge production to the 
Discourse of the Hysteric.25 This theory examines an agent in relation to an other 
in situations of conflict or power. He sets four stable positions and four wandering 
elements, which he assigns to the different places, usually through an anti-
clockwise movement. The elements are: a split subject (represented by S), a 
signifier that does not make sense, a symptom (S1), knowledge (S2) and the object 
cause of desire (a).26 This is what the positions and the Discourse of the Hysteric 
look like: 
 
agent  –––––––>      other  S  –––––––> S1 
––––––     ––––––––––– –––           ––– 
truth   < ––//––  production  a   < ––//––  S2 
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The hysteric speaks as a split subject (she knows this) from a position of desire.  
She addresses her question to the other, her symptom, which binds her to who 
she is. One of the relations - between agent-hysteric and other-symptom - is 
impossible, and the second - the lower one, between knowledge and desire - is 
impotent. Knowledge is the product, but the product is lost.27 How can the hysteric 
articulate knowledge other than through her symptom? What is she to do with that 
knowledge? Is the hysteric mad, or too dangerously insightful to be taken 
seriously? Perhaps this is the ‘depraved epistemology’ Christopher Bollas wrote 
about.28 Still, this knowledge is a mystery, an effort not only to be seen, pretty as 
the symptoms are, but also heard. As Gérard Wajcman wrote, ‘While knowledge 
cannot articulate the hysteric, the hysteric ushers the articulation of knowledge. 
Intending to talk about hysteria, we found that hysteria made us talk.’29 We have 
become patients again. 
 
So, my turn to reply.  
Reply - repli, a folding back, withdrawal or return - like our conversation, which 
strikes me as being like little waves, over and back. Without an image, I am slightly 
panicky and wonder how to find a way forward. What you have given me is a 
backward/forward diagram, threading of articulacy. From this, I understand how the 
articulation of the split subject goes nowhere, for that which it addresses is the very 
symptom that portrays and betrays it. Like a photograph, it binds her to who she is, 
and the movement is circular. Seeking an image, I remember The Waves, Virginia 
Woolf’s anti-novel which she envisaged as an image, setting off circular rhythms 
across the page like a little ship turning and turning. This (as Lacan would say, 
following the trajectory of discourse ‘as a signifying articulation’30) is language sent 
out, not in a linear way, but circulating, making sense, a rhythm of words with which 
Woolf articulates the tacit knowledge she calls ecstatic.31 Taken out of the big 
picture, it is a language of relations.  
Richer’s ‘synoptic table of the great hysterical attack,’32 supposedly taken from 
the Saltpêtrière photographs, is an index of tiny drawn shapes set out in columns, 
like a manuscript of some kind. Looking closer, it becomes apparent that these are 
women in various states of disarray. Shockingly, ridiculously mimicking, miming the 
classical paintings they see on the hospital walls - a benevolent goddess, or the 
Virgin Mary gazing heavenwards. 
Then, getting desperate, or perhaps simply carried away, you are showing off, 
sticking your feet in the air or behind your head, doing a backward flip.  
Manic, mad, insensible. The body’s articulation here is (unlike the straight-
forward line of Lacan’s speech act)33 distorted, speech-less. The line of articulation 
rebounds incessantly between subject (hysteric) and symptom (in this case 
represented by her photograph), yet we want to find in imagery a way out, a space 
for discourse, for the voice[s] of hysteria. Charcot’s inscription of symptoms is a text 
that speaks in the doctor’s voice: ‘Période de clownisme, Période les attitudes 
passionelles, Période de délire.’34 Yet, she is miming something, ‘The agent suffers 
the truth rather than delivering it.’35  
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As a functionary of truth, the subject may expose truth by means other than 
speech. Charcot’s pupil, Freud, picked up his master’s baton, but instead of running 
forward, he realised he had to go back: 
 
… Analytic experience is based on the fact that … we do not 
know what we say: what we intend to say is not the truth of what 
we say: the agent of speech conveys a meaning unknown to 
him.36 
 
Now a series of staccato images, like a little filmstrip, comes to mind. First, there 
is my grandmother blowing raspberries in the middle of conversations, making silly 
noises, repeating what my grandfather says, incessantly, going on and on. Even as 
a small child, I am embarrassed on her behalf. It is not funny. Then, there is the 
catatonic wife of the angry guy in American Beauty, who says nothing and stares 
ahead indifferently, and the American housewife in The Hours (based on Virginia 
Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway) who is reading Mrs Dalloway in the 1950s, and who bins a 
birthday cake in front of her young son. The filmstrip goes on, and still we are left 
with our question. How will the hysteric ever articulate knowledge other than 
through her symptom, and what will she do with that knowledge? 
 
Writing, about hysteria is our symptom. What does this chapter want from us? 
We perform, to each other, and for others, in waves, like the hysteric attack. We go 
through the phases, the Périodes of Charcot,37 but, after one spiral, we arrive at the 
same place. The arrows in the Discourse of the Hysteric have motion, but the 
double oblique lines make us retrace our steps, go back to where we came from. 
Each time you reply, I write 300 words and, because we have to stop our chapter 
becomes more a snapshot, an impression of the here and now, than a worked out 
solution to the problem of the hysteric and her knowledge. We could go on forever.  
The hysteric may be considered mad, but in the strict sense of the term, she is 
not. She is neurotic, not psychotic; she has not foreclosed the reality principle. For 
Augustine, Anne/Helen and all the other hysterics in our conversation, the battle 
between reality and pleasure - the two principles of mental functioning38 - is 
played out in their bodies, with reality swept under the carpet when they rebel, and 
pleasure mortifying them from the inside when they take up the role of victim. 
However, the conflict, both intrapsychic and intersubjective, is what brings 
unconscious knowledge, and that can also be found in the works of art we make, 
and in those discussed here. 
What would you say if we gave voice to Sam Taylor Wood’s video? Its lack 
still troubles me. By silencing her, she is made to look mad, but she is not. Here is 
my proposition: let us watch Hysteria with the soundtrack to Marina Abramovic 
and Ulay’s AAA-AAA,39 and, as viewers, return the voice to the woman while 
expressing our own in a kind of shouted conversation. If this had happened at the 
Salpêtrière, if Charcot, Freud, and the other [male] doctors had taken up the 
position of the one who is only supposed to know,40 the history of hysteria might 
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have perhaps worked out differently, but we cannot change that. Let us listen and 
express at the same time. Let the sound move us. The encounter, I hope, will make 
us laugh and cry too. Thus, by living this experience in the body, by bearing this 
contradiction, we may come to know. 
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15 Didi-Huberman, Invention of Hysteria, 287. 
16 Ibid., xi-xii. 
17 Ibid., xi. 
18 Ibid., xii. 
19 Figure 45 in Ibid., 113. 
20 Ecstasy is Figure 64 in Ibid., 147; The Call is Figure 60 in Ibid., 143. 
21 Exploring this turning point is the main argument of Didi-Huberman’s work. 
Ibid., xii. 
22 Ibid., 287. 
23 Julia Borossa, Ideas in Psychoanalysis: Hysteria (Cambridge: Icon books, 
2001), 26. 
24 Ibid., 51-53. She explains it as ‘hysteria manifested itself as both a pathological 
effect of patriarchy and its subversion’. 
25 Lacan, Other Side of Psychoanalysis. In the other discourses, desire (the 
Discourse of the Master), symptoms (the Discourse of the Analyst) and split 
subjects (the Discourse of the University!) are its product. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Bruce Fink, ‘The Four Discourses’, in The Lacanian Subject: Between Language 
and Jouissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 129-137. 
28 Bollas, Hysteria, 19. 
29 Gérard Wajcman, ‘The Hysteric’s Discourse’, The Symptom 4 (Spring 2003), 
accessed June 7, 2012, http://www.lacan.com/hystericdiscf.htm. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Virginia Woolf, The Waves (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
32 Figure 46 in Didi-Huberman, Invention of Hysteria, 118-119. 
33 Wajcman, ‘The Hysteric’s Discourse’. 
34 Didi-Huberman, Invention of Hysteria, 292. 
35 Wajcman, ‘The Hysteric’s Discourse’. 
36 Ibid.  
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37 Paul Richer, Etudes Cliniques sur la Grande Hystérie ou Hystéro-Épilepsie, 
cited in Didi-Huberman, Invention of Hysteria, 292. 
38 Sigmund Freud, ‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’, in 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 
XII, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001 [1911]), 213-226. 
39 AAA-AAA is a recorded performance by Marina Abramovic and Ulay, created in 
1977. Its score, which Marina explains at the beginning of the video is: ‘We are 
facing each other, both producing a continuous vocal sound. We slowly build up 
the tension, our faces coming closer together until we are screaming into each 
other’s open mouths’. 
40 For a definition of the subject-supposed-to-know, see Dylan Evans, An 
Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1996), 
199-200. 
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Oni the Demon: Living with Schizophrenia 
 
Claire McCurdy 
 
Abstract 
When an abusive schizophrenic rules a family, he also makes all the rules. Echoing 
that ruler’s delusions, all that was normal may become abnormal and all that is 
abnormal, normal. It is like living in a concentration camp. If you challenge the 
Commandant, you might find yourself hanging off the barbed wire fences. A flock 
of giant birds - eagles - are perched on my head. Their claws are ripping my flesh! 
Ripping into my skull, my head and face! In a letter to me, my father spelled out his 
delusions with brutal clarity. Driven by delusions, Dad had become like a raging 
oni, a Japanese demon in a Noh play.1 Like the actor in Musume Dojoji (The 
Young Maiden at Dojo Temple), Dad was wearing a mask. Indeed, many masks. 
And masks eventually slip. And they fall. Revealing what is hidden. The pillar of 
church and community was an abusive paranoid schizophrenic. The onset of 
schizophrenia is typically in the teens. Images of Dad from the same time stare 
coldly, rigidly, and emptily into the lens. It was not until Dad had married and had 
children, however, that the demon really emerged. Schizophrenia grips one like a 
praying mantis and eats the individual alive from the legs right up to the head. It 
will goad one first to twitch and cringe from other people as though they are 
monsters. But after a while, a person grows into his or her power. Rage consumes 
him. He becomes a demon - in Japanese, an oni, turning on those who have 
tormented him - and consuming them. 
 
Key Words: Schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, abuse, concentration camp, oni, 
demon, Musume Dojoji, Noh, Kabuki, mask, Tamasaburo Bando. 
  
***** 
 
When a schizophrenic rules a family, he makes all the rules. All that was 
normal may become abnormal - and all that is abnormal becomes normal. It is like 
living in a concentration camp. If someone challenges the Commandant, he might 
find himself hanging off the barbed wire fences. 
A flock of giant birds - eagles - are perched on my head. Their claws are 
ripping my flesh! Ripping into my skull, my head and face! My father spelled out 
his delusions in a letter to me. He all but named himself as a raging oni, a Japanese 
Noh demon. 
I first gained an appreciation for Noh plays in Japan, particularly the play 
Musume Dojoji (The Young Maiden at Dojo Temple):  
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A Kabuki adaptation of the famous Nô play ‘Dôjôji’ [which was] 
performed for the first time in the 3rd lunar month of 1753 in 
Edo at the Nakamuraza and is still performed today.2 
 
I was stunned to recognise a figure that seemed very familiar to me. The central 
figure, a woman (played by a man, as has been Noh custom for four hundred years) 
appeared at the beginning of the play wearing the mask of a young woman. She 
was beautiful, charming, and serenely smiling, but this actor’s lovely bland mask 
was completely deceptive. The lovely mask hid an intense secret destructive rage. 
 
 
 
Image 1: Musume Dojoji (The Young Maiden at Dojo Temple), as ‘The Serpent 
Woman’. Painting on silk.3 
 
In the play, Musume Dojoji, the actor practices several quite literal layers of 
deception in order to gain access to a closed temple bell dedication ceremony.4 A 
man wearing a beautiful woman’s mask and woman’s kimono (robe) impersonates 
a man wearing a man’s kimono and then again returns to the portrayal of a woman 
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wearing woman’s robes, donning and shedding kimono as the occasion demands. 
The false faces, the layers of deceit, the cruel grimacing rage barely concealed 
underneath the smiles: this actor could so easily be my abusive schizophrenic 
father.  
When I was a child, my father displayed a serene, jovial, contented mask to the 
world; he was upright, smoothly smiling, handsome, and a seemingly self-
confident scion of a wealthy family. He appeared to be a fine husband and father, 
and a pillar of the church and community.  
Dad’s self-confidence was rooted in his belief that God spoke to him. His 
churches supported him in this delusion. His friends - preachers, pastors, and 
ministers - especially those of a patriarchal and mystical turn of mind - all said the 
same thing: 
 
Your father is a very blessed, gifted, and remarkable man. We 
are all lucky to have your father as a member of this 
congregation. You are very lucky to have him for a father! 
 
As long as he was in an environment which he could control, even throughout 
an increasingly tense and rapid series of job and locale changes, Dad remained 
relatively stable and was able to keep his benign mask intact to the public. When I 
was around ten, Dad went to work for Dartmouth College, and he moved the 
family to the nearby village of Thetford, Vermont. Thetford was a village of 
eccentrics, academics, and artists. There were maybe twenty households set around 
a New England village green, with a white steepled Congregational Church. In my 
memory, it was a true community. For a brief time, we were happy there. 
It was a lovely, shining time for me. After years of isolation and depression in 
school, I had found friends. I attended a one room schoolhouse where I was treated 
very kindly, and where I was so far ahead of my classmates that I skipped a grade. 
It did wonders for my self-esteem.  
It is often said that if an abused child can find just one kindly protective adult 
friend, it makes all the difference. In Thetford, I found a real friend, a British 
colonel in his 60s.  
A writer, brilliant, kind, and funny, he was the storyteller at the annual village 
fete. Everyone loved him. He seemed simply to have loved me, to have enjoyed 
my company, to have respected my intelligence, and to have given me 
unconditional love and affection. He wrote funny, charming limericks and hid 
them in trees for me to find.  
The happy years did not last.  
Like the actors who have portrayed Musume Dojoji, Dad was wearing a mask; 
and masks eventually slip. They fall, revealing what is hidden. The pillar of church 
and community was an abusive paranoid schizophrenic. 
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Schizophrenia’s onset is typically in the teens. Dad’s family made guarded 
references to him as ‘Poor Dear Jackie’ when he was a young man. Photographs 
from the same time reveal him staring coldly, rigidly and emptily into the lens. It 
was not until Dad had married and had children, however, that the demon really 
emerged. 
Schizophrenia grips the individual like a praying mantis and eats him alive 
from the legs right up to the head. It will goad someone first to twitch and cringe 
from other people as though they were monsters, but after a while the rage 
consumes the person. He becomes a demon - in Japanese, an oni. The oni turns on 
its tormentors - and consumes them.  
Dad had begun to wage war on his children from their infancy. He routinely 
beat all three of us children and our mother - in places where it did not show. It is 
also likely that when I was an infant he attacked me sexually. Psychiatrists have 
estimated that the attacks began after my twin brothers were born when I was 
between the ages of two and four. They say that when a woman, exhausted by 
caring for new babies, denies sex to her husband, he often reaches out for the 
nearest alternative. I was handy. 
I struggled hard not to believe this assessment, but apparently this is a common 
abomination. Psychiatrist Bruce Perry, one of the leading experts in the field of 
sexual abuse of the infant child, cited in a South African study, states: ‘Father to 
daughter incest in infancy is the most destructive form of incest, as well as the 
most common.’5 Perry says that if the relationship between father and daughter is 
corrupted by sexual abuse, the child will have endless pain and trouble for the rest 
of her life.6 The capacity for intimacy, trust, touch, and bonding will all be 
fundamentally damaged. Furthermore, the victim of early incest may not have any 
cognitive memory and be completely unaware of the source of her fears.7   
Also, I have a typical bipolar memory. Where pain and shame are concerned, 
my memory simply shuts down. The traumatic memories my brothers and I share 
are buried deep. We knew that we feared our father. Much later, we knew that we 
hated him, but we did not know why.  
After yet another of Dad’s jobs had gone down in flames, we learned why.  
My father could no longer hide behind his bland serene face. The rage and 
delusions of schizophrenia, and the urge to destroy, were inscribed on his face for 
those who could see.  
Dad, in his letter: A flock of giant birds - eagles - are perched on my head. 
Their claws are ripping my flesh! Ripping into my skull, my head and face! He was 
describing his rebirth as an oni driven by rage and pain - a demon.  
The actor, Tamasaburo Bando, an onnagata (male actor who portrays women 
in Noh and Kabuki plays)8 has transformed himself from a lovely young woman 
into an oni - a serpent woman, or demon. This oni’s facemask, hair, and body are 
red, eyes glaring, hair in a wild mane, and its teeth were sharpened to points.  
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 From the time the mask slipped, and the demon-Dad emerged, the house and 
the family within it became a war zone. A family headed by an abusive parent is 
the very opposite of a caring, loving family. Everyone is fighting and clawing for 
very life. Given the chance, each will turn on the others.  
What about our mother? Did she not defend her children? Well, no, she did not. 
The father was judge, jury and executioner. That was how she had been raised. 
When I finally asked her about it, she said,  
 
But I thought this was the way you brought children up. That was 
how I was brought up. That was how you dealt with bad 
children. You gave them a good thrashing. 
 
‘Come on Mom,’ I said. ‘How bad could a child of six be?’ Her face went 
blank, and she turned away. 
My world was therefore a constant battleground. Parental violence or 
schoolmate threat engendered chronic severe anxiety. Neither home nor school was 
a safe place.  
Nature did, however, eventually intervene. As the three of us reached our teens, 
Dad’s beatings did not work anymore. He was confronted by three teenagers, two 
of whom had become large, strong and confident enough to fight back - and to win. 
In one memorable case, my brother grabbed Dad by the collar and lifted him off 
the floor, yelling in rage. It was a lesson. Dad lost this battle. Perhaps we too could 
win! In any case, we were all about to escape to college and a world far away from 
Mom and Dad. 
My trials, however, were not over. The locus of my battle had shifted inward. 
Roughly twenty years later, I was diagnosed as having bipolar disorder, the wires 
in my brain tripped by Dad’s abuse and the resulting post traumatic stress disorder. 
This disorder is characterised by drastic mood swings, from disastrous highs to 
near suicidal lows. In a single cycle, one can rapturously max out all credit cards 
and fly to the moon. Then, in shock and terror, recognise such catastrophic 
stupidity and plummet down to the ground, curling up into a weeping, wretched, 
despairing ball in bed, not to emerge until the creditors’ calls are ringing off the 
hook. It is a hideous state. 
In addition to the battle with my brain, my battle with Dad had not ended. 
Dad’s final physical attack on me occurred a few years later, when I was officially 
out of the house. I had returned from Japan and moved to New York City. I was 
home for what became my last visit. 
Dad’s control over his public behaviour had essentially fled. He became 
enraged with me, ranting loudly, ‘You lost your car keys! How could you lose your 
keys? How stupid can you be? You’re not fit to drive a car!’ He shoved me off the 
curb and into oncoming traffic.  The shove was not successful. Dad did not quite 
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hurl me into an exhaust pipe. After all, someone - a church member whose good 
opinion he valued, for example - might have seen or heard us. 
Finally able to call on a lifetime of buried rage, I shouted ‘DAD! Stop It! You 
could have killed me!’  
Dad shouted ‘SHUT UP!!! Stop shouting! The car didn’t hit you.’ In a much 
lower voice, gazing slyly sideways, as if just trying it on, Dad said, ‘But it would 
have been your own fault if a car had hit you.’ I was alive, but after this broad hint, 
I stopped visiting the family home altogether. 
Several years later, there was a true crisis. It was, for Dad, the beginning of the 
end. 
Schizophrenics are exquisitely sensitive to their own danger. This time it was 
Dad who was in danger, and he knew it. As my brother was moving behind the 
scenes to declare Dad incompetent, Dad sent a letter to us, his children, declaring, 
‘I do know one thing - you are all lying to me!’ For once, Dad’s paranoid fears 
were on the mark. We were all lying to him. Shortly thereafter, my brother 
succeeded in getting Dad involuntarily committed. 
My last encounter with Dad was when he was in lock down. He was strangely, 
mechanically jovial with my brothers. But I was silent, frozen in fear. He stared not 
quite at me, eyes shifting, with a rigid, fixed, flat face, no affect. He said, ‘Who are 
you? Why are you here? I don’t know you. I don’t know you!’ I made an excuse 
and left in tears. It is a bitter thing to remember that he still had the power to affect 
me so strongly. 
Dad finally died in December 2009. Yet, he is lodged in my head and my 
bloodstream for life. I will have to come to terms with the demon in my head. 
 
Conference Discussion 
 
You talk about mental illness/ disorders, especially schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder, as though they can’t be cured. But is this really true? 
 
No. They cannot. According to the American Psychiatric Association, however, 
you can learn to manage the symptoms effectively.9 If the patient is seen early 
enough by a physician, diagnosed, and treated (medications and psychotherapy) 
their symptoms can be managed. My father refused to go to a doctor until 
compelled to do so, in his late fifties.  
When he was hospitalised, yes, he was diagnosed and received treatment, but 
the disease was very severe and very far advanced. Even if he had received 
treatment throughout his life, he would still never have been a normal person, 
although some of his pain and rage might have been alleviated. And he might have 
been less destructive to himself and to others.7 
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It sounds as though you have lived for years with rage at your father. Didn’t you 
have any compassion for him? After all he’s dead, isn’t he? It‘s over.  
 
Yes, rage is corrosive. Letting go of rage is a fine goal, but it is very difficult to 
achieve. Death is not the end of the survivor’s suffering. When Dad was on his 
deathbed, he seemed barely conscious, helpless. I was able to feel compassion 
then. I even held his hand and talked to him, but I no longer recognised him as my 
father. My brief moment of kindness does not constitute forgiveness. 
The received wisdom for survivors of abuse is that they are not required to 
forgive or show compassion towards the abuser. They are enjoined to show much 
needed compassion towards themselves!  
 
Notes   
1 ‘Oni’ - in Japanese folklore, is a demonic creature of fearful appearance. 
Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed January 28, 2013, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/429220/oni 
2 Watanabe Hisao and Jeff Blair, ‘Musume Dojoji’, Kabuki21.com, accessed 28 
January 28, 2013, http://www.kabuki21/musume_dojoji.php. 
3 Tsukioka Kogyo, ‘Musume Dojoji, the Young Maiden at Dojo Temple, as the 
Serpent Woman’. Painting on silk. Creation date is unknown, but is              
believed to be circa 1900-1927, accessed January 28, 2013, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C5%8Dgyo_Tsukioka.  
4 ‘Ninin Dojoji: Version of the Famous Dance Musume Dôjôji’, Kabuki21.com, 
accessed January 28, 2013, http://www.kabuki21.com/ninin_dojoji.php.  
5 Bruce Perry, ‘Sexual Abuse of Infants’, Trauma, Violence, and Abuse: A Review 
Journal 1, No. 3 (2000): 294-296, accessed January 28, 2013, 
http://tva.sagepub.com/content/1/3/294.full.pdf+html.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Tamasaburo Bando, ‘Musume Dôjôji’, accessed January 28, 2013, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zef4KsgqhAE.  
9 There is no cure for schizophrenia, but treatments are available...A variety of 
antipsychotic medications are effective in reducing the psychotic symptoms 
present in the acute phase of the illness. American Psychiatric Association. 
Schizophrenia, http://www.psychiatry.org/schizophrenia. 
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Standing on the Edge of the Abyss: Ethics of Vulnerability, Love 
and Forgiveness 
 
Katrina Jaworski 
 
Abstract 
Judith Butler argues that vulnerability conditions our lives. It composes who and 
what we are, regardless of our own choosing. I do not disagree with Butler’s 
stance. Nonetheless, I wonder how I can live with vulnerability, especially when it 
literally stares me in the face, and how do I live with vulnerability when something 
about it wounds me? Drawing on the abyss as a metaphor for vulnerability, I offer 
a personal account of the relationship I have had with my alcoholic father. Part 
narrative, part analysis, this account canvasses what it feels like to stand on the 
edge of the abyss - a space where I feel my sense of self is about to unravel. 
Analytically deploying the work of Wendy Brown, Emmanuel Levinas, and Judith 
Butler, I consider the degree to which I am wounded, and whether hope can come 
from an interdependence I would rather forget, alongside my desire to love and 
forgive. 
 
Key Words: Abyss, vulnerability, ethics, love, forgiveness. 
 
***** 
 
1.   Introduction: Once upon a Time 
Once upon a time, I knew my father as an alcoholic. When drunk, he would 
turn up at home late at night, or not at all for days. With great ease, he destroyed 
many of the possessions in our apartment. Once upon a time, he even threatened to 
suicide right there and then - a threat that went beyond simply saying so, but which 
thankfully did not end in death. Once upon a time, I understood what it meant to be 
in a space filled with dread and tension that made me feel as if I were standing on 
the edge of the abyss. Once upon a time, I experienced a nameless realisation that I 
was witnessing something beyond my ability to understand, and that maybe 
whatever this was would go away if I breathed very quietly and stayed still. 
     This ‘once upon a time’ came to an end. My mother divorced my father, and we 
left Poland, the country of my birth. With the passing of time, his alcoholism 
became abstract. The lived colour, or rawness of earlier experiences faded. They 
felt safe and contained. This changed with my recent visit to Poland with my 
partner, Graham. As an intellectual, I continue to live with what I am about to tell. 
As a human being, I feel like I am glued to one particular experience. In feeling 
this, I know I am vulnerable. And, I understand that, as Judith Butler argues, 
vulnerability conditions the fabric of my being.1 It composes who and what I am, 
regardless of my choosing. Still I wonder how I can live with this interdependent 
vulnerability, especially when something about it literally stares me in the face. 
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How do I live with vulnerability when something about it wounds me, and how 
this wound constitutes me as an intellectual in ways I am beginning to name? In 
response to these questions, I will offer an account of a relationship I have with my 
alcoholic father. Part narrative, part analysis, this account canvasses what feels like 
standing on the edge of the abyss. Drawing on the work of Wendy Brown, 
Emmanuel Levinas, and Judith Butler, I consider the degree to which I am 
wounded, and whether hope can come from an interdependence I would rather 
disavow and forget. 
 
2.   Returning to the Abyss 
When Graham and I arrived at my home city in Poland, Dad was nowhere in 
sight even though he knew we were coming. Eventually, Dad’s wife and I went to 
get him from his friend’s apartment, which was around the corner from my old 
one. We found out where he was staying by a sheer coincidence. We bumped into 
one of his drinking friends on the street. With reservation, he told us where Dad 
was. We found him in a room, lying on a couch, in someone else’s pyjama 
trousers, half-covered by a blanket. He was lying on his left side, with his head 
turned upwards. Dad’s wife started yelling, cursing, and crying all at once. I stood 
nailed to the floor, watching, stunned by the sight of him. He was unshaven and 
looked grey, old, and abject. Despite the commotion around him, he did not 
respond. He was staring at me, yet through me, as if I were not there. His eyes 
were half open, glassy, and still. Dad’s wife lifted one of his arms twice, 
commanding him to get up. They only flopped back, lifelessly. Shit, I thought to 
myself in English, Is he dead? Suddenly, his eyelids fluttered. He turned his head 
towards me, and in a voice laced thickly with alcoholic stupor, he said, ‘Oh it’s 
you, it’s Kasia. I love you, Kasia.’ You idiot! I thought in English. I started crying. 
I clenched my jaw to keep my face composed as different emotions erupted within 
me. I thought he would vomit all over himself and me. There was no way he could 
come back home in this state. 
It took a few days for him to come home. When he did, it was already dark 
outside. With the support of his friend, he walked, shaking, still grey, in desperate 
need of a bath and a shave. He no longer wore the pyjama trousers he had on 
before. He could not talk. He was very thirsty. He fell asleep quickly, but not 
before his wife exploded with words whose violence shocked me as much as 
seeing Dad the way he was. I have to get out, I thought in Polish. I can’t be here. 
This is madness. This isn’t normal. Graham can’t see him like this. Graham must 
stay in the other room at all costs. What can I tell him? What will I refuse to 
translate? What can and can’t I put into words? What will he perceive anyway? I 
feel so ashamed, so humiliated. 
To my surprise, dad got up during the night and shaved himself. Somehow he 
did this task without cutting his face once. In the morning, he came into the 
bathroom while I was in it, packing my toiletries away. In the background, I could 
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hear his wife crying and yelling, the content of her sentences almost always the 
same. He was wearing his underpants. He needed to vomit. He kneeled at the toilet 
seat, vomited, and wiped the toilet seat with care and attention that I found 
surprising. He looked weak and small, and his shoulders shook. I could see the 
scars on his back, some of which I remembered from my childhood. He was 
sweating and crying at the same time. He got up and started to wipe his hands with 
a hand towel. ‘Dad’, I said, ‘you need to wash your hands properly.’ He started, but 
his hands shook too much to unscrew the tap. ‘Wait,’ I said, ‘let me help you.’ 
I washed his hands and dried them. I dampened a face towel with warm water 
and wiped his face, gently. He looked at me with a searching gaze, as if trying to 
understand why I was doing what I was doing. Or, maybe he was waiting for me to 
tell him off for his choices and actions that did not deserve kindness. ‘Come,’ I 
whispered, ‘you should get ready, get dressed. We will have breakfast. I will get 
you water to drink.’ I kept looking at him. I appeared calm, yet beneath I felt rage 
and love. Why is it that I love him, yet am furious with him? I thought in Polish. I 
hope he doesn’t throw up when Graham meets him for the first time. 
They introduced themselves to each other - Dad in Polish and Graham in 
English. They even hugged. We all sat at the table to eat breakfast with all the food 
laid out nicely - except of course that there was too much food and not enough 
willing eaters. Everything felt as if it was all too much - a distraction to mute the 
situation we were in. I sat between Dad and Graham, preparing myself to translate 
bits of conversation, fearing Dad would vomit at any moment. Dad did not say 
much. He kept drinking lots of mineral water. He did not eat. His wife kept 
oscillating between light talk and hurtling abuse at him. ‘Look at you,’ she kept 
saying. ‘You should be ashamed. You greet your son-in-law in such a state. You’re 
good for nothing. Nobody needs you.’ I sat, trying to swallow my food, pretending 
it was pointless to translate. I wanted her words to disappear, lost in the state of un-
translation. It is not like he did not deserve this. Yet, somehow, his suffering and 
shame were mine. The air kept getting thicker. The suffering and shame felt 
palpable, as if they could be cut with a knife into thick slices. 
Since my return to Australia, I Skype Dad every so often. Sometimes he 
confesses that he has been drinking again. He looks embarrassed but confesses 
anyway. I do not know what to think of this other than I do not want to be his 
priest, therapist or parent. I do not tell him that he will get better. I do not tell him 
to fight it. Instead I ask about his recovery, whether he is okay at work, and then 
we talk about something else. I watch him on the screen and feel as if a 
metaphorical curtain is hanging between us. I like this separation, this containment. 
It feels safe. Still, I long for his company, for scraps of conversation. As I watch 
him through this curtain, I am reminded that we share a deep sense of recognition: 
a wordless familiarity. This affinity feels organic, unforced. Perhaps, this is why 
we are so content in each other’s company when things are okay. I know I love 
him when I think of this. But just as quickly, I am reminded that there is a lacuna 
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between us, filled with my lack of forgiveness. Part of me wants to forgive. 
Another does not. I become conscious of this when he tells me that he loves me as 
we conclude our conversation. He tells me with such intensity. He repeats it 
several times. I repeat it too even though it feels strange, and then suddenly I am 
flooded with anger. The same anger I felt when I thought he was dead. If you loved 
me, I keep thinking in English, you wouldn’t do what you did last year! If you 
loved me, you wouldn’t have given permission for me to migrate on the condition 
that you never had to pay child support. You sold me out, you bastard! And you tell 
me you love me! How dare you! You wouldn’t know how to love me. I press the 
hang up button on the screen, relieved that my English thoughts are my very own, 
and wonder when I will talk to him next. 
 
3.   Responding to the Abyss 
I want to begin by identifying what the abyss means to me at this point in time. 
The abyss signifies fear, dread, shame, and loss - loss of a father I wanted but 
never had, and, paradoxically, the loss of a father I have but do not want. Like 
black holes, the abyss absorbs everything. Nothing can withstand the pull of its 
gravity. My father’s alcoholism feels like this. He is lost in his obliteration, and 
anyone who comes near finds it hard to pull away. Last year, a part of me wanted 
to stay. As a daughter, I felt attached to his obliteration, or what felt like a non-
being at the centre of his being. Another part wanted to leave. I wanted to escape 
what felt like a trap. I wanted to escape my old apartment and the city in which I 
felt like a stranger. I did escape, yet the shadow of the abyss still lurks at the back 
of my mind. And I cannot forget the physical state in which I found him. 
In this way, the abyss is a space of emotional ambivalence. I feel stuck between 
wanting and not wanting to leave, knowing that I will always leave him, afraid next 
time he might not be there. I am haunted by a desire to forgive him and not to 
forgive him. All of this is infused by my ability to understand the world through 
two languages. Polish is the language of my childhood and my emotions. English 
is the language of my adulthood. It is my intellectual language. English is the voice 
of reason, while Polish acts like a colander, filtering everything I articulate in 
English. My thinking and feeling are forever stuck between differences. Divided, 
my identity is situated in a grey zone. Agamben pays attention to this zone by 
saying that it is situated between speaking and not being able to speak - a zone that 
creates a sense of speechlessness because there is no language for it.2 
Speechlessness, however, is not my problem here. Rather, I feel stuck because I 
became aware of one of many interstices that weave our lives, and this one is 
traumatic. This interstice materialised in the room where I found my father and 
thought he was dead. It materialised while he kept looking at me as if I was 
invisible. Our gazes met but this meeting was interrupted. I flinch every time I 
think of his vacant stare. I flinch every time I remember the moment of 
recognition, enveloped by his words of love, and my relief and anger. Our gazes 
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met again, but this time we were in the bathroom. He looked at me, not knowing 
that beneath my calm appearance I felt divided by feelings of love and rage. He 
does not know that I kept thinking of wounded attachments in English, while 
issuing gentle instructions in Polish. 
My father’s face compels me to respond, to give an account of events that 
wounded me. Levinas insists that one cannot ignore the look or the face, because it 
is aimed at a person while someone is looking at him.3 In so doing, it makes an 
ethical demand upon the person to respond even though one might not know what 
the demand is, or refuse to respond. For Levinas, physical features do not 
constitute the face.4 Rather, the face is the sum total of affects and effects that 
force one to consider another way of being. Yet, Levinas argues that the eyes are 
naked and cannot be possessed by another.5 I am exposed to my father’s stare. I 
feel vulnerable and without control, even though I stare back. Through this staring, 
I recognise something of me in him and, in this moment of recognition, I feel love. 
In a way, the bathroom scene demonstrates that. To paraphrase Levinas, my 
capacity to be in this world is constituted by an ethics of love.6 I cannot know who 
and what I am without loving another. My own being cannot have meaning without 
another being, and, here, this includes my father’s masculine, abject, suffering, 
sweating body. What hails love is the scar on his back, which calls upon the child 
in me as the adult watches, thinks, feels and responds. 
 
4.   Love and Forgiveness 
What wounds me are the fear, shame, the abject, masculine, sweating, suffering 
body and the realisation that something about my being is utterly precarious. As an 
educated, white, heterosexual woman, I came undone when I thought my father 
was dead because he failed to recognise me. Against my will, this failure wounds 
me, and in so doing existentially attaches or binds me to him. This is not because 
he is my father. Rather, what attaches me is the manner in which I am hailed, 
which I cannot forget. I cannot forget because of the proximity of bodies and the 
fleshiness of the experience. Through this, I realise that something about my 
autonomy and reflexivity comes from elsewhere, and as such it depends on others. 
I stood on what felt like the doorway to his abyss, and to my surprise I found love. 
Maybe I found love because, as Butler posits, I am ‘awake to what is precarious in 
another life or, rather, the precariousness of life itself.’7 This wakefulness, this 
love, constitutes my reflexivity. I respond not only as a child of an alcoholic father, 
but more importantly as an intellectual who learns the painful lesson of caring for 
what is as it is.8 
Despite the love, I cannot forgive him. If I forgive, it will have to be, in a 
Kierkegaardian sense, a leap of faith against the odds, deprived of reason to 
forgive, empty of intelligibility and meaning I anticipate.9 I cannot forgive him 
because, in a Nietzschean sense, I am full of ressentiment. Wendy Brown interprets 
ressentiment as ‘a righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured 
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[which] delimits a specific site of blame for suffering... responsible for the 
“injury.”’10 In so doing, ressentiment ‘fixes the identities of the injured and the 
injuring as social positions.’11 For Nietzsche, this constitutes the birth of a reactive 
morality, based on its own powerlessness, marked by an overdeveloped sense of 
cleverness, which denies the desire to control others.12 In grasping Nietzsche’s 
point, I realise my identity is attached to wounds that materialised when my Dad 
threatened to suicide, when he tore our apartment to pieces, and when he agreed for 
me to migrate as long as he did not have to pay child support. This worries me, for 
I do not want to be constituted through wounds. So, I wonder, is there any hope for 
me? 
 
5.   Recognition: A Conclusion 
I think there is hope. It resides in recognition. Recognition, as both Butler and 
Lingis argue, is not a matter of two people recognising similarities between each 
other.13 Rather, recognition is the process through which a ‘subject and the Other 
understand themselves to be reflected in one another,’ motivated by a desire to be 
recognised.14 Marked by anger, I became conscious of my desire to be recognised 
when I thought my father was dead. His recognition came through words of love. I 
want to suggest that such intense moments of recognition and non-recognition 
exemplify an encounter with mortality through which I learned the lesson that my 
‘own reason for being ... is not the source of all right and all meaning.’15 While I 
remain horrified by this encounter, it teaches me that love and sociality are not 
constituted through Eros alone, but through the ethical demand to give and to 
remain reflexive in the face of what is difficult to love and forgive. It teaches me 
that, in the course of giving an account of my alcoholic father, I have given an 
account of myself. I have discovered that the existential fabric of my being feels 
raw, messy and contradictory. This is hard to accept, but I will anyway, because it 
turns out that messiness and contradiction form the basis for my reflexivity and 
ability to recognise love in the middle of chaos and disorder. This, I think, is the 
basis for learning to love alterity, and to challenge ressentiment. This is the basis 
through which I might learn to forgive, and to live with my wounds, knowing that 
strength comes from vulnerability rather than mastery. Vulnerability resides at the 
heart of mastery, here made visible by standing on the edge of the abyss. 
 
Notes 
1 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: 
Verso, 2004). 
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